Agricultural policy reforms and trade liberalisation in the Mediterranean Basin : A partial equilibrium analysis of regional effects on the EU-27 and on the Mediterranean Partner Countries by Kavallari, Aikaterini
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agricultural Policy Reforms and Trade 
Liberalisation in the Mediterranean Basin 
A partial equilibrium analysis of regional effects on the EU-27 and 
on the Mediterranean Partner Countries  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades am Fachbereich 
Agrarwissenschaften, Ökotrophologie und Umweltmanagement der 
Justus- 
Liebig-Universität Gießen 
 
 
 
 
 
Eingereicht von 
Dipl.-Ing. agr. Aikaterini KAVALLARI 
geb. in Thessaloniki 
 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 13. Oktober 2008 
 
This thesis is published under the same title by Peter Lang Verlag 
(www.peterlang.com). Page breaks and page numbering are identical. 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
       
 
       Dekan: Prof. Dr. R. HERRMANN 
1. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. P. M. SCHMITZ 
  2. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. R. HERRMANN 
  
 
   V 
Preface 
Trade integration around the Mediterranean is nowadays a particularly updated topic 
as it is directly related to the discussions of creating a Mediterranean Union, an initia-
tive of the French President stemming out the Euro- Mediterranean Association 
Agreements, which aimed to form a Free Trade Area between the European Union 
and the non-EU Mediterranean Countries. The French initiative should be seen from 
the background of recent discussions focusing on the EU east enlargement and the 
relationships of the EU with its new eastern neighbours.  
The southern EU Member States fear that the EU east enlargement and the opening 
of the markets with the new eastern neighbours will be particularly beneficial for the 
northern EU countries, as these Member States due to geographic proximity and 
historical relations will expand their trade towards east. Moreover they worry that re-
sources from the EU budget will be transferred to the new Member States to support 
the agricultural markets and their re-structuring. Besides it has been often criticised 
that the northern agricultural products have received a higher protection compared to 
the Mediterranean ones, implying that the farmers in the northern of the Union have 
received higher income support and are better off than the ones in the southern of 
the EU. The French idea will certainly activate similar positive processes in the 
southern EU Member States. 
The Mediterranean Partner Countries are on the one side interested in expanding 
their preferential access to the EU markets because this is promising for boosting 
their exports to the EU but on the other side fear of having their markets over-
whelmed with imported commodities from the EU, for which still high custom duties 
apply. These contradictory effects create uncertainty regarding the future of the 
Mediterranean agriculture. How trade flows will evolve, who will benefit, who will be 
worse off, what the changes for the taxpayers will be depend from the magnitude of 
the forthcoming or recently agreed reforms and cannot be answered without an em-
pirical analysis.  
Based on an extended overview of the agricultural trade flows around the Mediterra-
nean basin, Aikaterini Kavallari examines the effects of the recent reforms of the EU's 
Common Agricultural Policy, the EU enlargement and the Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreements on the agricultural sector of the Mediterranean countries. The simula-
tions are run with an extended and adjusted version of the partial equilibrium trade 
policy model AGRISIM. Objective is to quantify the allocative and distributional ef-
fects of these reforms on the EU Member States and its Mediterranean Partner 
Countries and to conclude on the competitiveness of the region.  
VI  Preface 
Overall the study can be considered as very successful since it penetrates not only 
theoretically but mainly empirically with the own simulations a highly complex theme, 
this of trade integration in the Mediterranean. It is certainly a contribution that touches 
a politically interesting topic, since the negotiations within the Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements are still running and therefore is particularly relevant and 
telling for the policy makers. 
 
Giessen, January 2009      P. Michael Schmitz 
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   1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Issus and objectives of the study 
Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements have been gaining attention and rele-
vance in recent years. After the Doha negotiations came to a deadlock in the summer 
of 2006 international attention has been increasingly focused on regional trade inte-
gration. The initiatives of the EU to conclude or to deepen existing trade agreements 
with blocks of countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific have been a particular focus of 
attention.  
There are a number of regional trade agreements within the Mediterranean basin that 
are the result of traditional trade relationships and which have led to deeper trade 
integration. Of these, the most significant is the Barcelona Agreement, an initiative of 
the EU which started in 1995 and aims to establish a Free Trade Area (FTA) with ten 
non-EU countries known as the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) by 20101.  
This agreement is of special relevance to EU agriculture, because the MPCs com-
pete directly with the EU’s Mediterranean Member States for market share in north-
ern EU countries (AQUILA and VELAZQUEZ, 2002). This is not the case for the other 
regional trade agreements in which the EU is involved, such as the Economic Part-
nership Agreement (EPAs) between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) group of countries (Cotonou Agreement of 2000), the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) countries, or the negotiations with the Southern Cone Common 
Market (MERCOSUR) countries. This creates a divergence of interests between the 
northern and the Mediterranean EU Member States over further liberalising trade 
between the EU and the MPCs. The northern EU Member States expect to benefit 
from improved market access to North African and Middle East countries for “typical 
northern” commodities, such as cereals, dairy products and meat and thus support 
the Euro-Med Agreements. By contrast the Mediterranean EU Member States fear 
losing their market shares in the fruit and vegetables markets in northern EU coun-
tries and thus oppose the liberalisation of trade in agricultural commodities trade 
around the Mediterranean. The MPCs specialise in producing fruits and vegetables, 
mainly citrus fruits, dates and tomatoes, in which they have comparative advantages 
(GALANOPOULOS et al., 2007), and mainly import cereals and livestock commodities.  
On the other side of the Mediterranean Sea, the MPCs expect to benefit from the 
Euro-Med Agreements through gaining better market access for their export com-
                                            
1 The Barcelona Agreement was signed in 1995 at the EU Summit of Barcelona by the (then) 15 
Member Countries of the EU and 12 Mediterranean Countries Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, 
Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Tunisia and Turkey. These 
countries apart from Cyprus and Malta (which have subsequently joined the EU) are hereafter called 
Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs). 
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modities, but in parallel with this they will have to abolish tariffs on imported com-
modities and thus lose the import rent. Due to low competitiveness with “northern” 
products they also fear that their markets will be overwhelmed with imported com-
modities. These contradictory effects lead the MPCs to see the forthcoming trade 
liberalisation with more scepticism than enthusiasm.  
Parallel to the developments at the bilateral level there are ongoing discussions 
within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on multilateral trade liberalisation. Al-
though opening up markets is seen positively by economists as it enhances welfare, 
when it comes to preferential partners it is not clear who will be the winners and los-
ers. This is because multilateral liberalisation is associated with preference erosion 
effects and it is not clear whether trade creation will be greater than these trade di-
version effects. This question is of relevance for both the EU and the MPCs and em-
pirical evidence is needed to inform the negotiations over future liberalisation of trade 
in agricultural commodities. 
Finally the agricultural sector around the Mediterranean is highly influenced by the 
recent reforms of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. This directly affects those 
countries around the Mediterranean basin that are EU Member States, but also has 
an effect on the MPCs since the EU is their most important trade partner. Changes in 
production patterns within the EU are reflected in trade and will certainly have im-
pacts on welfare and the allocation and distribution of resources in the MPCs as well. 
Forthcoming and recently applied policy reforms are expected to change the level 
and structure of trade flows of agricultural commodities around the Mediterranean, 
affecting the competitiveness of the countries involved. This is expected to increase 
regional disparities not only among countries on the two coastal sides of the Mediter-
ranean basin (the north and the south and east) but also within the EU, due to the 
different agricultural specialisations of northern and southern EU Member States. 
The Barcelona Agreement is expected to benefit the northern EU Member States 
because of low competition with the MPCs. Its effects upon EU and non-EU Mediter-
ranean countries are expected to be more ambiguous, due to the high level of com-
petition among them. Farmers within the EU’s Mediterranean Member States fear a 
reduction of their production levels, of farm gate prices and thus of their income, and 
accuse the EU’s agricultural policy of giving more support to northern EU farmers. 
These fears are in addition to their worries about how they will be able to cope with 
the new balance brought about by the recent reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy. Multilateral liberalisation will certainly benefit third countries but it is not clear 
whether the benefits from the Barcelona Agreement coming into full force will be 
equally shared, or indeed if some countries (both EU and MCP) will be net winners or 
losers. 
Within this framework, the objective of this study is to give an overview of the existing 
status quo of agricultural trade around the Mediterranean and to provide deeper in-
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sights into the likely impacts of agricultural policy reforms in the Mediterranean basin. 
Two further objectives are to evaluate the likely effects of the new policy regimes 
(and suggest further changes) and to provide sound empirical results that can inform 
policy makers involved in discussing the future of Mediterranean agriculture. In par-
ticular the study attempts to address the following questions: 
1. What are the likely overall impacts of trade liberalisation for the agricultural 
sector in the EU and in the MPCs? 
2. What are the likely regional effects within the EU? Will the southern EU Mem-
ber States be discriminated against in comparison with the northern ones by 
the changed agricultural policy? 
3. What are the likely effects on producers and consumers in the two main trad-
ing blocks (i.e. the EU and MPCs)? 
4. What are the likely budgetary effects for the EU as a whole and for particular 
Member States? 
1.2 Structure of the study 
The study can be characterised as an ex-ante analysis that follows the basic struc-
ture of a typical “what if” analysis. After an overview of the existing situation, follows a 
theoretical assessment of the effects of the forthcoming and recently changed agri-
cultural policy reforms. This theory is then tested by applying an empirical model, the 
results of which are intended to be of use to policy makers. 
Hence, the second chapter contains an overview of agricultural trade around the 
Mediterranean. It presents a detailed analysis of the development of trade flows, the 
most significant trade partners and commodities traded. This chapter also gives an 
overview of existing trade agreements among Mediterranean countries, which are a 
key determinate of the development of trade flows and affect the levels of trade pro-
tection applied and countries’ trade preferences. For this purpose the value of prefer-
ence margin and the nominal protection rate are calculated, which are applied for the 
most commonly traded agricultural commodities and indicate the trade preferences 
granted within the Barcelona Agreement and the trade protection respectively. Exist-
ing and proposed reforms of agricultural trade policies are presented in detail as 
these are the other feature influencing how agricultural trade around the Mediterra-
nean is organised, as well as its likely future changes and challenges. 
The effects of these agricultural policy reforms are theoretically assessed in the third 
chapter, using the theory of applied welfare economics. The allocational and distribu-
tional effects of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, the full application of the Bar-
celona Agreement and multilateral trade liberalisation are shown for single markets 
using a static partial framework. Market linkages and their effects are discussed in 
the last section of this chapter.  
4  Introduction 
A literature review of existing empirical assessments of agricultural policy reforms 
with relevance for Mediterranean countries follows in the fourth chapter. This chapter 
focuses on the methodologies applied, the scenarios examined and the results ob-
tained. This review is used to identify gaps in knowledge, future research needs and 
to choose the most appropriate method for addressing the objectives of this study. 
Based on these findings the last section of this chapter discusses the AGRISIM 
model, selected as the most appropriate empirical research tool. This is a partial 
equilibrium model, synthetic and deterministic in nature with iso-elastic demand and 
supply functions. The model can be used to simulate the effects on production, con-
sumption, trade, domestic prices, border prices, state’s budget, consumer surplus, 
producer surplus and overall welfare. The extensions and updates of the model ver-
sion used in this study were undertaken within the EU-project MEDFROL2. 
The simulations and the results from the model AGRISIM are presented in the fifth 
chapter. The simulated scenarios are based upon:  
a) the latest reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy and the enlargement 
of the EU; 
b) trade preferences within the Barcelona Agreement and 
c) multilateral trade liberalisation and preference erosion effects 
The simulation results are divided into three main sections, based on these three 
scenarios. The effects are presented separately for the EU regions and the MPCs. 
The last section of this chapter explores the effects of the changes under these dif-
ferent scenarios on the competitiveness of Mediterranean countries. Especially for 
the EU Member States, the budget effects are captured with a new module that was 
programmed in AGRISIM, which allowed to take into account the intra-community 
financial flows between the budget of the entire EU and of each Member State. 
Concluding remarks are given in the sixth chapter, and a summary of the overall 
study follows in the last chapter. 
                                            
2 Financial support is gratefully acknowledged from the Project MEDFROL “Market and Trade Policies 
for the Mediterranean Agriculture: The case of fruit/vegetables and olive oil”, SSPE-CT-2004-
502459 (STREP), 6th Framework Programme of the EU, for the development of this version of 
AGRISIM. 
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2 Agricultural trade in the Mediterranean basin 
Trade relationships among the countries surrounding the Mediterranean have existed 
since ancient years. This chapter provides an overview of the trade in agricultural 
products and the way it has evolved in recent years. The chapter continues with a 
review of trade agreements among Mediterranean countries, the measures of trade 
protection that have been applied and a detailed description of the reforms of agri-
cultural trade policy, factors that both determine and are determined by existing trade 
flows. 
2.1 The development of agricultural trade in the Mediterranean 
basin 
Around the Mediterranean basin, two groups of countries can be clearly distin-
guished. On the northern side of the Mediterranean Sea there are the Member States 
of the EU, while on the southern and eastern sides are the ten Mediterranean Partner 
Countries that are connected to the EU through Association Agreements.  
The MPCs have much stronger trade flows with the EU than between themselves (as 
shown clearly in Figures 2.1 and 2.2). This is the result of geographic proximity and 
of historical trade relationships between the countries surrounding the Mediterranean 
basin.  
According to EUROSTAT data, the MPCs are important trading partners for the EU, 
with the volume of trade being equivalent to the rapidly developing Asian countries 
although less important than the EU’s trade with the USA and EFTA countries 
(BOUZERGAN, 2007). In 2005 they provided about 8 % of commodities imported by the 
EU, and were the EU’s fifth most important supplier, while taking about 9.5 % of extra 
EU exports, and being the third most important importer after the USA and EFTA, 
which have shares of 23.5 and 11.2 % of extra-EU exports respectively. The same 
report states that MPCs’ share of the EU’s external exports remained quite stable 
over the period 2000-2005, whereas its share of the EU’s external imports increased 
by one percent over the same period.  
The EU has a positive trade balance with the MPCs as a group (approximately 13 
billion Euro in 2005) and with all the individual MPC countries, apart from Algeria and 
Syria. Nevertheless the trade surplus fell by about 5 billion Euro between 2000 and 
2005 because imports to the EU rose quicker than exports from the EU (by +37.4 % 
and +22.9 % respectively), as EUROSTAT data show. This is attributed to the devel-
opment of the Euro-Med Agreements, one of the main aims of which was to promote 
imports into the EU. Indeed, as BOUZERGAN (2007) reported, during 2000-2005 the 
annual growth rate of imports from MPCs into the EU was 6.5 %, while exports to the 
MPCs rose by 4.2 % p.a.. Overall MPCs share of the EU’s external trade rose by one 
percent over the period 2000-2005 (EUROSTAT, 2006).  
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Within the EU the main trading partners of the MPCs are France, Germany and Italy. 
Trade links between the MPCs and the ten new Member States of the (former) EU-
25 are quite limited but the trade volumes with certain countries, such as Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic have shown a promising growth after their entry into 
the EU (BOUZERGAN, 2007). 
Figure 2.1: Main trading partners of the EU-25, as a % of external EU trade in 
2005 
 
Notes: EFTA: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland; Mercosur (South American 
Common Market): Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay; RDAEs (Rapidly 
Developing Asian Economies): Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand and Taiwan. 
Source: Own compilation based on BOUZERGAN, 2007 
Conversely the EU is the most important trade partner for the MPCs, with about half 
of their exports being destined to EU markets and more than half of their imports 
coming from EU countries (BOUZERGAN, 2007; EUROSTAT, 2006). In 2004 products 
from the EU accounted for about 45.1 % of all imports made by the MPCs and about 
48.7 % of the MPCs’ exports were sold in EU markets. Other important trade 
partners for the MPCs are the USA and other Asian countries but these are much 
less important in terms of the MPCs’ imports (approximately 7 % and 15 % 
respectively) and their exports (about 17 % and 11 % respectively), as shown in 
Figure 2.2.  
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Consequently, better market access to EU markets appears very attractive to the 
MPCs since it could give them the chance to expand their trade and to benefit from 
the effects of opening their economies.  
It is worth noting that the volume of trade between the MPCs themselves is relatively 
modest. For example in 2004, intra-MPC trade accounted only for about 4.5 % of to-
tal imports into MPCs and nearly 6.2 % of their total exports. This could hinder further 
south-south integration which is required for the development of the Euro-Mediterra-
nean Free Trade Area.  
Figure 2.2: Main trade partners of MPCs, as % of their total trade in 2004 
 
 
Source: Own compilation based on BOUZERGAN, 2007 
There are notable differences in the MPCs’ trading relationships with the EU (Figure 
2.3). North African countries have a high proportion of their trade with the EU, but this 
share is much lower for Middle Eastern countries. For example, in 2004 Morocco and 
Tunisia sent about 83 % and 74 % of their exports to the EU respectively while just 
3.2 % of Jordan’s exports were destined to the EU. Similar disparities exist in terms 
of imports from the EU, although the differences are lower. This reveals the impor-
tance of the EU as a trade partner for specific countries and also the heterogeneity 
within the MPCs.  
Since 2000 the EU’s share of the MPCs’ trade has reduced slightly, with the excep-
tion of Tunisia which is buying more from the EU markets and this despite the ratifi-
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cation of the Barcelona Agreement by a number of MPCs (discussed in the next 
section). Nevertheless, between 2001 and 2005, the total volume of imports from the 
EU by the MPCs rose from 64.6 to 88.8 billion Euro and the total volume of exports to 
the EU rose by about 20 billion Euro (from exports of 82.8 billion Euro to 101.8 billion 
Euro) (EUROSTAT, 2006). 
Figure 2.3: Share of the EU-25 in the external trade of MPCs in %, 2000 and 
2004 
Source: Own compilation based on EUROSTAT, 2006 
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the EU and the MPCs. In 2005 agricultural products, food and tobacco accounted for 
about 6.7 % of total imports into MPCs from the EU-25 and 4.6 % of the total exports 
from MPCs into the EU-25. This is equivalent to 9.5 % of the total extra-EU imports of 
agricultural commodities and 8.8 % of extra-EU exports. The share of agricultural 
commodities within the overall trade between the EU and the MPCs decreased be-
tween 1995 and 2000 (in 1995 it was round 10 %), but has remained quite stable 
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The EU is the main importer of agricultural commodities from the MPCs 
(GALANOPOULOS et al., 2007). More than half of the agricultural exports from MPCs 
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FELEC, 2004; AQUILA and VELAZQUEZ, 2002). For example in 2004, around 70 % of 
Algeria’s exports of agricultural commodities were into EU markets, while for Jordan 
this figure was just 1.2 %. Between 30 % and 40 % of North African MPCs’ pur-
chases of agricultural commodities are from EU countries, while for Middle Eastern 
MPCs (i.e. Jordan and Israel) the EU’s share is about 15 % (EUROSTAT, 2006).  
The MPCs mostly export fresh and processed fruit and vegetables to the EU and im-
port cereals, dairy products and sugar. In 2004 imports of fresh fruit from the MPCs 
accounted for about 30 % of the total imports of agricultural commodities into the EU-
25, excluding fish and other seafood. Once the imports of fresh vegetables and proc-
essed fruits and vegetables are added to this figure, then more than 60 % of fruits 
and vegetables coming into the EU are from the MPCs (Table 2.1). Most important 
among these commodities are citrus fruits (especially oranges), walnuts (coming ex-
clusively from Turkey) and tomatoes (EUROSTAT, various years; NILSSON et al., 
2007).  
The MPCs are the only countries from which the EU imports olive oil, tomatoes, 
potatoes, figs, dates, walnuts and seeds. Tunisia and Turkey are the sole suppliers of 
olive oil, selling almost exclusively to Italy. The specialisation of the MPCs in 
exporting fruits and vegetables can be explained by the comparative advantages that 
they possess in producing these commodities, particularly tomatoes, oranges and 
olive oil (GALANOPOULOS et al., 2007; NILSSON et al., 2007).  
According to EUROSTAT, the MPCs mostly export their agricultural commodities to 
Germany, France and the Netherlands. The largest suppliers are Turkey, which be-
tween 2000 and 2005 accounted for about half of the MPCs exports of agricultural 
commodities to the EU, followed by Morocco, and Israel, each supplying about 20 %. 
The main EU countries exporting commodities to the MPCs are the central-northern 
EU Member States, with Germany and the Netherlands with the highest proportion of 
traded volumes, mostly destined to Algeria, Morocco, Turkey and Israel.  
Table 2.1 shows the development of the EU’s share of imports and exports of agri-
cultural commodities to and from the Mediterranean Partner Countries. No specific 
trend is observable and the proportions of the trade of agricultural commodities be-
tween the EU and the MPCs between 2000 and 2005 appear to have remained un-
changed. 
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Table 2.1: Share of MPCs in the extra EU-25 trade of agricultural commodi-
ties (HS01-24) excluding fish (HS03) 
Share in EU-25 agricultural 
imports from MPCs, in %  
Share in EU-25 agricultural 
exports to MPCs, in % 
Commodity 2000 2005 2000 2005
Live animals (HS01) 0.2 0.2 4.5 3.0
Meat (HS02) 0.3 0.2 3.8 0.7
Dairy products (HS04) 0.3 0.1 15.8 14.2
Other products of animal origin 
(HS05) 
2.4 1.8 0.4 1.0
Live plants (HS06) 4.9 2.8 0.8 1.2
Fresh vegetables (HS07) 13.9 17.6 2.7 3.0
Fresh fruit (HS08) 35.5 31.7 0.6 1.5
Coffee, tea etc. (HS09) 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.5
Cereals (HS10) 1.0 0.6 20.1 18.3
Milling products (HS11) 0.3 0.3 3.9 2.7
Oilseeds (HS12) 3.6 3.2 2.4 3.2
Lac, gums etc. (HS13) 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.8
Other vegetable products 
(HS14) 
0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0
Other animal and vegetable fat 
(HS15) 
5.1 8.3 8.1 4.1
Processed meat and fish 
(HS16) 
5.4 4.5 0.9 0.9
Sugar (HS17) 1.7 2.0 10.7 10.1
Cocoa (HS18) 0.4 0.6 2.0 2.6
Processed cereals (HS19) 0.7 1.0 3.8 5.9
Processed fruits and vegetables 
(HS20) 
14.1 16.9 1.6 2.1
Miscellaneous food (HS21) 2.3 2.2 5.2 6.5
Beverages (HS22) 1.3 1.7 3.8 5.8
Residues of food industry 
(HS23) 
0.5 0.4 3.5 3.1
Tobacco (HS24) 3.8 2.2 4.4 8.8
All agr. commodities (HS01-24) 100 100 100 100
 2000 2005 
Total value of agricultural imports excluding fish (HS03) €4240 million €6258 million
Total value of agricultural exports excluding fish (HS03) €5577 million €5351 million
Source: EUROSTAT; Own calculations 
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The structure of agricultural exports from the MPCs is very similar to that from the EU 
Mediterranean Member States, such as Spain, Greece and Italy, implying a high 
level competition among these two groups of countries (AQUILA and VELAZQUEZ, 
2002). Based on 1998-99 data the authors have calculated the export similarity index 
(Simip), which is given by the form: Simip = (∑j min (QEUij, QEUpj))*100 with QEUij the j 
product share on i EU country agro-food exports to EU and QEUpj the j product share 
on p MPC’s agro-food exports to EU. They found that Spain and Greece have export 
similarity indexes that mostly closely match those of the MPCs (46.1 and 43.6 re-
spectively), meaning that these two countries compete the most with the MPCs. 
Other countries with high export similarity indexes are the Netherlands (32.6), Italy 
(30.9) and Portugal (27.2), while Ireland and Finland have the lowest export similarity 
indexes (13.9 and 12.1 respectively). Looking at the export similarities between sin-
gle countries, the authors found Spain and Morocco to be the most similar (index 
value of 43.4) followed by Greece and Turkey (41.3), Israel and the Netherlands 
(37.4) and Israel and Spain (36.3). The authors point out that the high export similar-
ity indexes are due to the leading role of fruit and vegetables and olive oil in the ex-
port portfolios of these countries. The similar export performance of the Netherlands 
with the MPCs could be attributed to the export of greenhouse vegetables.  
In the same study AQUILA and VELAZQUEZ (2002) also examined the similarity of ex-
ports from EU countries to non-EU ones with the imports of agricultural commodities 
from the MPCs by calculating the complementarity index. The index helps to com-
pare the EU export structure to non-EU countries and the MPCs import structure 
from EU, both for the two areas as a whole and by country and is calculated using 
the form: Comip = (∑j min (QiEXj, QEUpj))*100, where QiEXj the j product share on i EU 
country agro-food exports to non-EU countries and QEUpj the j product share on p 
MPC’s agro-food imports from the EU. A high index value implies that the import 
structure of an MPC resembles the export structure of an EU Member State. The re-
sults reveal that among the MPCs the imports of Israel and Lebanon most closely 
mirror the exports of EU countries, with index values of 56 and 49 respectively, while 
the exports of Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and France most closely resemble 
the imports of the MPCs (index values of 61, 58, 52 and 51 respectively). As ex-
pected the EU Mediterranean Member States have medium to low complementarity 
rates where Greece ranks the lowest (27). 
 
In summary, analysis of the trade flows around the Mediterranean basin clearly 
shows that the EU is the most significant trade partner of the MPCs and that the 
MPCs are also important trade partners of the EU. Trade flows, particularly of agri-
cultural commodities, have a stronger north-south dimension, a less strong south-
north dimension, while south-south trade between the MPCs is very limited.  
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Clear patterns of trade in agri-food products can be seen. The EU buys fruits and 
vegetables and olive oil from the MPCs and sells cereals, dairy commodities and 
sugar to them. The agro-food export profile of the MPCs resembles that of the EU 
Mediterranean Member States in terms of the exported commodities and the desti-
nation markets, with their imports being complementary to the exports of central-
northern EU Member States. Given this it might be in the interests of northern EU 
countries and the MPCs to seek stronger trade relationships around the Mediterra-
nean basin, as both groups of countries could expand their exports but this would be 
against the interests of the EU Mediterranean Member States because of the high 
competition they face with the MPCs.  
The existing trade patterns and their likely future development are largely attributed 
to the comparative advantage that countries have in producing certain commodities, 
to their geographic proximity and to historical relationships arising from trade agree-
ments and agricultural policy, points which are discussed below. 
Despite the historical relationships between the EU and the MPCs and the launch of 
the Euro-Mediterranean agreements, trade has not expanded over the years be-
tween the two groups of countries. This is particularly evident for fruits and vegeta-
bles, where the MPCs have not improved their market shares to the EU over the pe-
riod 1995-2005, while the trade surplus of the EU felt as well. The findings of NILSSON 
et al. (2007) and MARTÍNEZ-GOMEZ and GARCÍA ÁLVAREZ-COQUE (2005) show that the 
competitiveness of the EU and the MPCs has deteriorated over the years and sug-
gest that the trade performance of the MPCs depends up to a high grade on their 
favourable treatment within the Barcelona Agreement. 
2.2 Trade agreements 
Efforts to promote trade relationships between the EU and the MPCs have intensified 
in recent years and are reflected though the compilation of trade agreements with 
their main trade partners, as identified in the previous section.  
The Euro-Med Association Agreements have been central to the evolution of trade 
between the EU and the MPCs. They were established in 1995, at the Summit of 
Barcelona and were the result of the Mediterranean Policy of the EU, which started in 
1957 with the formation of the European Communities and intensified at the begin-
ning of the ’70’s with the Global Mediterranean Policy (MASALA, 2000). Under this 
Policy the EU aimed to increase its presence in the Mediterranean Region by boost-
ing trade and strengthening the socio-economic structures of the southern and east-
ern Mediterranean countries. The Barcelona Agreement was the result of this Medi-
terranean regional policy and declared its official aim as providing a framework for 
political dialogue and comprehensive cooperation among Partner Countries (EU 
COMMISSION, 2008a). The Barcelona Declaration (EU COMMISSION, 2008b) is not 
solely economic, but has in total four pillars concerning partnership in political and 
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security, economic and financial, in social, cultural and human affairs and finally in 
migration. The governing body of the Euro Mediterranean Partnership is the meeting 
of the Ministers, hosted by the EU Member State with the EU Presidency and chaired 
by this country’s respective Minister. The ministerial meetings are supported by the 
Euro-Med Committee, which consists of senior officials from EU Member States and 
the MPCs and by a number of technical sub-committees. In practice the EU institu-
tions prepare the Euro-Med meetings and have, albeit unofficially, undertaken re-
sponsibility to keep the Barcelona Agreement on track (MASALA, 2000). Today the 
Barcelona Agreement forms a part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
Hence, the political and social dimension of the partnership is supposed to 
strenghen. The ENP is aimed at the EU’s neighbours that have little immediate pros-
pect of membership, but who are willing to undertake economic and particularly po-
litical reforms that extend beyond those within the current association and coopera-
tion agreements (ERDLE, 2007). 
The economic partnership is implemented through Association Agreements3 with 
each of the Partner Countries, which have replaced the Cooperation Agreements of 
the ’70’s. According the EU Commission, Association Agreements have now been 
completed with most of the MPCs. They have been in force between the EU and Tu-
nisia since 1998, with Israel and Morocco since 2000, Jordan and Lebanon since 
2002, Egypt since 2004 and on an interim basis with the Palestinian Authorities (EU 
COMMISSION, 2008a). An agreement was signed with Algeria in 2001 but is still in the 
phase of ratification. Negotiations were initiated with Syria in 2004. Of the original 
Mediterranean Partner Countries, Cyprus and Malta entered the EU in 2004, while 
Turkey is a candidate country and connected to the EU through a customs union 
since December 1995. Libya is not yet a Partner Country, but is an observer. An 
overview of the status of the Euro-Med Agreements follows in Table 2.2. The Euro-
Med Agreements have a reciprocal character and foresee north-south as well as 
south-south integration.  
The aim of the Euro-Med Agreements is the formation of a Free Trade Area between 
the Partner countries after 2010, accompanied by economic and financial coopera-
tion. The Barcelona Agreement sets out a transition period with all MPCs to gradually 
eliminate all tariff and non-tariff trade barriers in manufactured products. A gradual 
liberalisation of agricultural trade is also foreseen but with no specific time framework 
or provisions (PRADA LEAL and DEKA, 2004). So far the Euro-Mediterranean Agree-
ments involve liberalisation of trade in manufactured goods and services and the es-
tablishment of a Pan-Euro-Mediterranean cumulation of origin, which was adopted by 
                                            
3 The Association Agreements are called Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements or simply 
Euro-Med Agreements and, although not identical, this term has been used in the literature as 
synonymous with the Barcelona Agreement. The Barcelona Agreement is a wider term referring to 
all three dimensions as mentioned above, not just to the economic dimension of the Euro-
Mediterranean integration process. 
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the Council of the EU on October 2005 (EU COMMISSION, 2008a). Financial assis-
tance is awarded by the EU in form of grants under the MEDA programmes (Meas-
ures d’accompagnement) (Council Regulation no EC 1488/96 and its amending 
regulations, Official Journal of the European Communities L 189) 
Table 2.2: Status of the Association Agreements between the EU and the 
MPCs as of January 2008 
MPC Status 
Algeria signed on April 2002 / in process of ratification 
Egypt signed on June 2001 / in force since June 2004 
Israel signed on November 1995 / in force since June 2000 
Jordan signed on November 1997 / in force since May 2002 
Lebanon signed on June 2002 /in force since April 2006 
Libya observer 
Morocco signed on February 1996/ in force since March 2000 
Palestinian Authority signed on February 1997 / in force since June 1997 
Syria initiated on October 2004 / to be signed 
Tunisia signed on June 1995 / in force since March 1998 
Turkey Customs union signed on March 1995 /  
in force since December 1995 
Source: Own illustration adapted from EU COMMISSION, 2008a 
Progress in liberalising trade in agricultural commodities has been rather limited. This 
has been acknowledged by the Ministerial meetings of the Barcelona Agreement and 
at the anniversary conference of the Barcelona Agreement in November 2005 a new 
5-year work plan was developed, with a new roadmap for the liberalising agricultural 
trade. According to this a new round of negotiations between the EU and the MPCs 
started in the first quarter of 2006 (EU COMMISSION, 2006). The reason for the slow 
liberalisation of the agricultural sector is the sensitive nature of the sector for both 
sets of participants (the EU and the MPCs), since opening the markets of the MPCs 
to the EU and to other MPCs would result in a loss of import taxes and opening the 
EU markets to commodities from the MPCs would create competition problems for 
the Mediterranean EU Member States. AGHROUT (2007) contends that the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy is an additional obstacle to the negotiations, since it 
shelters the EU’s agricultural sector. He anticipates that some sensitive products 
could be excluded from liberalisation. This argument is further elaborated by the 
Femise Report4 on the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration (RADWAN and 
                                            
4 The Femise Network is a Euro-Mediterranean non-profit association of independent economic 
institutes supported by the EU Commission, aiming at conducting socio-economic analysis of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It currently has 75 members. Further information on the activities 
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REIFFERS, 2005) which shows how the EU has developed a complicated set of norms 
that effectively prohibit access to its agricultural markets. 
The Barcelona Agreement has maintained a bilateral status so far, boosting north-
south relationships. The Euro-Med Agreements seem to have a hub-and-spoke 
character instead of a reciprocal one and lack any institutional framework for south-
south integration. GAVIN (2005) notes that the MPCs are only linked with the EU 
through a network of bilateral trade agreements. The author contends that this is be-
cause the Barcelona Agreement is operated by EU institutions. The economic part-
nership is implemented by negotiations at a bilateral level between the EU Commis-
sion and the individual MPCs. Therefore the decision process is dominated by the 
donor, the EU, than by a mutually agreed decision-making system. One challenge for 
the future of the Euro-Med Agreements and essential for the realisation of the Free 
Trade Area is south-south integration, which needs to be boosted by the MPCs 
themselves.  
The southern and east Mediterranean countries are involved in a number of other 
bilateral and regional agreements. An overview of these and their current status in 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) can be found in Table 2.3.  
To start chronologically with regional agreements, three Mediterranean Partner 
Countries were co-founders of the Arab Maghreb Union. This Union was formed at 
the Summit of Marrakesh in Morocco in 1989 between Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco and Tunisia, with the main objectives of encouraging trade among its mem-
bers, promoting free movement of goods and people among the Maghreb countries 
and incorporating a defence clause that prohibits aggression between the five coun-
tries (UMA, 2008). 
The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) alternatively known as the Pan-Arab 
Free Trade Area was formed on 1st January 1998 among the countries of the Arab 
League. The Agreement contains provisions for the trade of goods and aims to es-
tablish a Free Trade Area that includes Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Leba-
non, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United 
Arab Emirates and Yemen (WTO notifications, 2006). In the Agreement a transition 
period of 10 years was foreseen for the elimination of trade duties, but Saudi Arabia 
communicated to the WTO secretariat that all duties and other restrictive regulations 
had been abolished by 1st January 2005 (WTO Secretariat, 2006). However intra-
Arab integration remains relatively low. RADWAN and REIFERS (2005) identify the lack 
of institutions to support and even more to establish the necessary regulations for 
regional integration as a main reason for this, and that this in turn stems from a lack 
of political leadership and of the will of Arab countries to integrate. 
                                                                                                                                        
of the network can be found on http://www.femise.org/index.html 
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A further regional agreement is the Agadir Agreement, which was signed in 2004 by 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. The Agreement was initiated by Morocco in 
2001 after the fourth meeting of the foreign ministers of the EU and the MPCs. 
RADWAN and REIFFERS (2005) point out that there was no necessity for this Agree-
ment, since the GAFTA was already in existence. However, it was welcomed by the 
EU as a cornerstone for promoting south-south integration. The Agreement aims to 
create a Free Trade Area among the signatory countries by 2006 and to harmonise 
standards and customs procedures. Other MPCs are welcome to enter the Agree-
ment. One key element of the Agreement is the adoption of the Pan-Euro Mediterra-
nean Protocol of Origin as a standard system of rules of origin. This will bring bene-
fits from cumulation as the system is harmonised with the EU one, but this will raise 
cost issues for the signatory countries, which will need to change and adapt their ex-
isting system of certifying origin. This Agreement came into force in 2007 (EU 
COMMISSION, 2008c). RADWAN and REIFFERS (2005) argue that the Agadir Agreement 
can contribute more to integration among the four signatory countries than GAFTA 
because it is supported by the EU and its institutions. Moreover, the Agreement is 
among quite similar Arab Mediterranean countries (in terms of their export range and 
industrial structure) implying that these countries have similar interests, which could 
facilitate agreement. Many GAFTA members are Gulf countries, that are richer, have 
economies  based on oil and thus have differing interests. RADWAN and REIFFERS 
(2005) also point out that the effect of the Agadir Agreement might be diluted by the 
GAFTA, which is already in force, and by the high trade reliance of Morocco and Tu-
nisia on trade with the EU, which leaves little space for developing south-south trade. 
Indeed the European markets appear more interesting than those of neighbour 
countries to most MPCs. Finally the purpose of the agreement is not completely 
clear, since the four signatory countries were already involved in a Free Trade Area 
within the framework of GAFTA and had already concluded bilateral trade agree-
ments with each other. Hence, the Agadir Agreement appears to complicate and 
confuse the trade relationships and make the respective processes  more bureau-
cratic.  
In addition the MPCs are engaged in a number of bilateral trade agreements, also 
shown in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.3: WTO status, bilateral and regional agreements of the MPCs as in 
January 2008 
  
WTO GAFTA AMU 
Agadir 
Agreement USA Other 
Algeria application 
1987 
  1989      
Egypt member 
1995 
1998  2004  EFTA since 2007 
COMESA since 1994 
Israel member 
1995 
   FTA 
1995* 
Mexico since 2000 
Turkey since 1997 
Canada since 1997 
EFTA since 1993 
Jordan member 
2000 
1998  2004 FTA 
2000 
Singapore since 
2005 
EFTA since 2002 
Lebanon application 
1999 
1998    EFTA since 2007 
Libya application 
2004 
1998 1989    
Morocco member 
1995 
1998 1989 2004 FTA 
2004 
Turkey since 2006 
EFTA since 1999 
Palestine – in pro-
gress 
   Turkey since 2005 
EFTA since 1999 
Syria – 1998    Turkey since 2007 
Tunisia member 
1995 
1998 1989 2004  Turkey since 2005 
EFTA since 2005 
Turkey member 
1995 
        Syria since 2007 
Morocco since 2006 
Tunisia since 2005 
Palestine since 2005 
Croatia since 2003 
Bosnia since 2003 
FYROM since 2000 
Israel since 1997 
EFTA since 1992 
ECO since 1992 
Notes: * The Agreement was signed in 1985 but only entered into full force in 1995. In 
2004, with the agreement on agriculture the FTA was expanded to include 
agricultural commodities too. 
 COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and South Africa): Angola, Burundi, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe); ECO (Economic Cooperation Organisation): 
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan); EFTA (European Free Trade Association 
countries): Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland; FTA: Free Trade Area; 
FYROM: Former Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia 
Source: Own compilation based on WTO notifications, 2008 
18                                                             Agricultural trade in the Mediterranean basin 
The USA has signed Free Trade Area Agreements with Israel (in force since 1995), 
Jordan (2000) and Morocco (2004). These agreements are expected to boost US 
exports to the partner countries in absolute terms, but their overall effect on US ex-
ports, production and the economy is considered to be rather negligible due to rela-
tively low values of US exports to Israel, Jordan and Morocco (BUTCHER et al., 2000 
and 2004). Although these FTAs do not have any profound effect for the USA, free 
market access to Mediterranean countries and especially to partner countries of the 
EU increases the competitiveness of the US producers (manufactures and farmers) 
not only against local producers but also in relation to EU ones. 
In addition most of the MPCs have already introduced a Free Trade Agreement with 
the European Free Trade Association countries (EFTA) according to the WTO notifi-
cations (2008), since they are connected to the EU with Association Agreements and 
have already started to form bilateral trade agreements with each other.  
Turkey has been particularly active in concluding FTA agreements with other MPCs. 
This might be partly attributed to Turkey being an EU candidate country and there-
fore needing to conclude and apply bilateral trade agreements with the EU’s trade 
partners. Thus, Turkey has negotiated FTA agreements that are in force with Israel 
since 1997, with Morocco since 2006, with the Palestinian Authorities since 2005, 
with Syria since 2007 and with Tunisia since 2005. Turkey is also member of the 
Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), a Free Trade Area among Afghanistan, 
Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
The only MPCs that have other bilateral FTA agreements than with the USA, the 
EFTA countries and Turkey are Israel, Jordan and Egypt. Israel concluded an FTA 
with Canada in 1997 and with Mexico in 2000, while Jordan has one with Singapore 
since 2005. Egypt is member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), a Free Trade Area among African countries that entered into force in 
1994. 
The MPCs have shown an interest in participating in the current WTO negotiations - 
most of them are members of the WTO or have applied for a membership. Despite 
the fact that the MPCs are involved with a number of regional trade agreements, they 
appear to have different interests and certainly they have not adopted a common 
strategy in the Doha round of negotiations.  
GARCIA ÁLVAREZ-COQUE (2006a) notes that all the MPCs have moved towards im-
plementing the Agreement on Agriculture and have committed themselves to reduc-
ing export subsidies, domestic support and import duties on agricultural products. 
However, they have followed different approaches and have developed different poli-
cies for integrating their agricultural sector into a multilateral trade environment. He 
points out that Israel uses all three of these pillars to support its agriculture, while all 
other countries have opted for a more limited combination of farm support options. 
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Turkey is the only MPC entitled to grant export subsidies to its producers, but this is 
limited by special safeguards and trade-distorting domestic support beyond the de 
minimis level (10 % of the production value for developing countries). Tunisia and 
Morocco have the right to special safeguards for 32 and 374 commodities respec-
tively, but are not allowed to provide export subsidies. Jordan has kept an option on 
trade-distorting domestic support but is not invoking export subsidies or special safe-
guards. Egypt has no rights beyond the de minimis trade-distorting support (GARCIA 
ÁLVAREZ-COQUE, 2006a).  
The different approaches of the MPCs towards multilateralism are visible through the 
various interest groups that they align themselves in the WTO negotiations (GARCIA 
ÁLVAREZ-COQUE, 2006a). Israel is member of the G-10 group (net importers) whose 
main goal is non-trade concerns, Egypt is part of a group seeking a reduction of farm 
subsidies in industrial countries and less focus on market access (the G-20, which 
includes major developing countries as India, Brazil and China). Turkey participates 
in the G-33 (vulnerable developing economies) which requested special treatment for 
particular commodities and support to small farmers. Finally Morocco, Tunisia and 
Egypt are members of the G-90 (consisting of African and least developed countries 
and those of the Asian-Caribbean-Pacific group) that seek to preserve their preferen-
tial treatment, fearing the impacts of preference erosion.  
Finally it is worth noting that some MPCs are members of regional trade agreements 
with a partial scope. Hence, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia are members 
of the General System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP), 
an agreement that entered into force in 1989. Egypt, Israel, Tunisia and Turkey are 
co-signatories of the Protocol relating to Trade Negotiations among Developing 
Countries (PTN), which has been in force since 1973, and five years earlier, in 1968, 
Egypt signed the Tripartite Agreement together with India and the former Yugoslavia. 
2.3 Development of trade protection among the Mediterranean 
countries 
Despite the Euro Med Agreements and the numerous preferential trade agreements 
among the countries surrounding the Mediterranean, there are still restrictions on 
trade in agricultural commodities and obstacles to liberalisation and the creation of a 
Free Trade Area. Trade protection is expressed through both import restrictions and 
export subsidies. Table 2.4 provides an overview of the import restrictions imposed 
by the EU on commodities coming from Mediterranean countries, expressed as ad-
valorem equivalents.  
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Table 2.4: Weighted averages of ad-valorem equivalents of applied tariffs by 
the EU from imports from the MPCs in 2005 
Commodity Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon 
Bovine meat n.a. n.a. n.a. 20 (1996) n.a. 
Pig meat n.a. 0 0 (2003) 0 (1996) 0 (2003) 
Poultry meat n.a. n.a. 3.15 8.8 (1996) 8.8 (1996) 
Milk and cream not 
concentrated n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Milk and cream con-
centrated n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Tomatoes 7.6 2.64 10.9 3.87 4.38 
Oranges 0.63 4.17 5.84 14.86 4.15 
Apples 2.9 2.9 2.83 n.a. 6.1 (2001) 
Wheat and meslin 0 (1996) 
12.8 
(2001) 2.13 n.a. 0 
Barley n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Maize (corn) n.a. 0  0 0 (1994) n.a. 
Rice n.a. 7.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Grain sorghum n.a. 6.4 8.8 (1997) n.a. n.a. 
Other cereals n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Soya beans 0 (1996) 0 (1999) 0 n.a. 0 (2001) 
Linseed n.a. 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Sunflower seeds 0 (1996) 0 0 0 (1997) 0 (1995) 
Other oil seeds n.a. 0 0 0 (2003) 0 
Soya-bean oil n.a. n.a. 7.35 n.a. 
4.05 
(2001) 
Olive oil n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 
Sunflower, safflower, 
cottonseed oil 
n.a. 4.6 n.a. n.a. 5.61 
(1997) 
Unprocessed 
tobacco n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 
Cotton not carded or 
combed 0 (1996) 0 0 0 (1995) 0 (1995) 
Cane sugar n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Beet sugar n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
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Table 2.4 – continued –  
Commodity Libya Morocco Syria Tunisia  Turkey 
Bovine meat n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Pig meat n.a. 0 (2003) n.a. n.a. 0 (1996) 
Poultry meat n.a. 2.9 4.4 (2001) n.a. 0 
Milk and cream not 
concentrated n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Milk and cream con-
centrated n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Tomatoes 10.9 9.81 10.9 0.51 0 
Oranges 14.86 2.55 11.36 1.81 0 
Apples  2.9 2.9 6.3 (1999) 0 
Wheat and meslin n.a. 20 (1994) 0 n.a. 0 
Barley  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Maize (corn) n.a. 0 n.a. 0 (2001) 0 
Rice n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 0 
Grain sorghum n.a. n.a. n.a. 7.6 (1999) n.a. 
Other cereals n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Soya beans n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 0 
Linseed n.a. 0 n.a. n.a. 0 
Sunflower seeds n.a. 0 (1999) 0 n.a. 0 
Other oil seeds 0 (1993) 0 0 0 0 
Soya-bean oil n.a. 3.85 n.a. 
4.05 
(2001) 0 
Olive oil n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Sunflower, safflower, 
cottonseed oil 
n.a. 2.44 4.6 2.54 0 
Unprocessed 
tobacco n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 
Cotton not carded or 
combed n.a. 0 0 0 0 
Cane sugar n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Beet sugar n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Notes: All data for 2005 unless indicated otherwise in parenthesis; n.a.: not available 
Source: Own compilation; TRAINS 
The EU imposes entry prices for specific volumes of imports of fruits and vegetables 
and has an import quota for olive oil. Nevertheless, when the imported quantity is 
within the quota or within the specified quantity for which the entry price applies, then 
no additional tariff (or tariff equivalent) is applied. When for oranges, apples, 
tomatoes and olive oil no duty is reported, it is implied that the imported quantity did 
not exceed the specified quantity.  
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The table shows that the EU applies quite low tariffs on agricultural commodities im-
ported from the MPCs. The highest tariffs are applied to imports of oranges and to-
matoes, and these rates vary between individual countries. The weighted average of 
ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) of all applied tariffs is highest for imported oranges from 
Jordan (14.86 % in 2005), and lowest for oranges from Algeria (0.63 % in 2005). For 
tomatoes the respective AVE is highest for Israel, Libya and Syria (10.9 % for each 
country), and lowest for Tunisia (0.51 %). For the remaining commodities the tariffs 
are all below 10 %, with the exception of beef from Jordan (20 % in 1996) and wheat 
from Morocco (20 %).  
In all cases the tariffs applied by the EU are lower than the Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) tariff, which shows that the EU gives additional preferential treatment to its 
Mediterranean Partner Countries. At first sight this appears to contradict the claim, 
made above, that slow progress has been made in extending the preferences to ag-
ricultural commodities. Hence, before speculating whether the preferences have 
deepened since the Barcelona Agreement and whether this has determined the 
traded volumes between the EU and the MPCs, it is worth having a closer look at the 
trade preferences. 
An indication of the evolution of trade preferences in the Mediterranean basin 
granted by the countries involved in this agreement could be given by the value of 
the preference margin (VPM) as an indicator of the economic value of trade prefer-
ences. GRETHE et al. (2006)5 argue that the VPM of all agricultural commodities for all 
MPCs covered by the agreements of the mid-70s was about 130 million Euro, 
whereas in 1995 the VPM was about 190 million Euro (an increase of 48%). After the 
Barcelona Agreement this reduced to about 165 million Euro. According to the au-
thors this negative change is attributed to a reduction in EU MFN tariffs. They argue 
that once all Euro-Med Agreements have entered into force the VPM will reach 226 
million Euro. 
Tables A.1 and A.2 (see Annex) present details of the VPM from imports into the EU 
of selected agricultural commodities between 1999 and 20036. The calculations were 
done following GRETHE and TANGERMANN (1998a) i.e. it has been assumed that both 
preferential and non-preferential commodities are sold in the destination market (the 
EU) at the same price and thus that the value of the preference margin is the price 
difference between preferential and non-preferential exports multiplied by the quan-
tity of the commodity each partner country exported into the EU. A thorough presen-
                                            
5 This study has been also published as GRETHE et al. 2006 and can be found as GRETHE et al. 2005a 
and b. An earlier version of this study has been published as a discussions paper of the University of 
Göttingen (GRETHE and TANGERMANN, 1998b). 
6 These commodities are the ones included in the database of the model AGRISIM, which is used 
further in this study for the own empirical analysis. The time period was chosen based on data 
availability. 
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tation of the way the VPM has been calculated follows in the Annex. In most cases 
the MFN duties are applied and thus the VPM is zero. MPCs gain due to the prefer-
ential treatment only for their main export products, such as fruits and vegetables. 
The size of the VPM for a given commodity differs significantly from country to coun-
try, mainly because of the high variation in quantities exported and not because of 
any variation in the preferential duty compared to the MFN one. This said the differ-
ence between the MFN and the applied duty varies between 0.2 and 7 %.  
A comparison of the VPM of 2003 with that of 1999 clearly shows that the Barcelona 
Agreement has only slightly intensified the benefits for the MPCs (Figure 2.4). In total 
the VPM increased by about US$ 3 billion throughout the MPCs and for selected ag-
ricultural commodities, but this increase is because of Morocco, where the VPM from 
about US$33.6 million in 1993 expanded to almost US$102.3 million. A potential ex-
pansion of exports into the EU of those commodities where the VPM is already posi-
tive would result in significant gains for the MPCs.  
Figure 2.4: Value of Preference Margin for selected agricultural commodities 
resulting from the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
Source: Own calculations based on reported import duties derived from TRAINS and 
bilateral trade flows derived from COMTRADE 
It seems therefore that the MPCs expect to gain from the Barcelona Agreement more 
from trade diversion effects than from trade creation. Moreover, because they com-
pete with the EU Mediterranean Member States and produce at lower cost, it is ex-
pected that a complete trade liberalisation could divert trade from the Mediterranean 
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EU countries to the MPCs when it comes to trade with the northern EU Member 
States.This is feared by many Mediterranean EU countries (and their producers) and 
is a reason for resisting the full implementation of the Euro-Med Association Agree-
ments (KAVALLARI et al., 2005a).  
Table 2.5 lists the ad-valorem equivalents of import restrictions imposed by the 
MPCs on commodities coming from the EU. Due to the EU’s high share of total im-
ports into the MPCs, the import tariffs upon EU commodities are of particular rele-
vance for the MPCs and are a main source of tariff revenues. It is clear that the 
MPCs apply much higher tariffs to imports from the EU than the EU does on imports 
from the MPCs. The entries refer either to year 2005 or to the latest available year 
after the conclusion of the Euro-Med Agreements.  
The highest tariff rates are applied to livestock commodities. The highest levels of the 
AVE (weighted average) were applied by Morocco to EU beef (272 % in 2003), fol-
lowed by Tunisia on imported non-concentrated milk (180 % in 2004) and by Turkey 
on both concentrated and non-concentrated milk (150 % in 2003). In crop products 
the AVE of import tariffs (as a weighted average) is lower and only exceeds 100 % in 
the case of tomatoes imported into Tunisia (165 % in 2003), sugar (both cane and 
beet) imported into Turkey (136.5 % in 2003) and EU olive oil imported into Israel 
(127.5 % in 2005). 
Morocco, Turkey and Tunisia seem to apply the highest tariffs on agricultural com-
modities from the EU. The southern Mediterranean countries (e.g. Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) appear to levy higher rates than those of eastern Medi-
terranean (e.g. Jordan, Lebanon and Syria), and this may be related to differences in 
the trade volumes and the EU’s share of these countries total imports. As shown ear-
lier in this chapter, EU commodities account for a lower share of the total imports of 
eastern Mediterranean countries, but account for more than half of the total imports 
of southern Mediterranean countries. Hence, for Jordan, Lebanon or Syria it appears 
less attractive to apply high import tariffs to EU commodities, wheras for countries 
such as Morocco, Tunisia or Algeria the high protection both brings in tax revenue 
and can be justified as a means of protecting domestic production.  
The TRAINS database only reports on tarrifs for a limited number of commodities 
imported into the MPCs. These are at about the same level as the duties for EU 
commodities and the applied tariffs are as high as the MFN tariffs (Table A.3 in the 
Annex). 
In general the MPCs have not granted preferences to the EU or to other MPCs for 
agricultural commodities. Despite the reciprocal character of the Euro-Med Agree-
ments and the numerous preferential agreements among the MPCs, the TRAINS 
database reports that up to 2005 the tariffs applied to commodities imported from the 
EU or from other MPCs are the Most Favourite Nation tariffs. 
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Table 2.5: Weighted averages of ad-valorem equivalents of applied tariffs by 
the MPCs to imports from the EU in 2005 
Commodity Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon 
Bovine meat 40 (1993) 5 (2002) n.a. 5 (2001) 5 
Pig meat 30 (2003) 40 (2002) n.a. 30 (2003) 5 
Poultry meat 
30 (2003) 80 (1998) n.a. 17.51 
(2003) 
5.58 
Milk and cream not 
concentrated 
30 (2003) 25 (2002) 0 (1993) 30 (2003) 37.5 
Milk and cream con-
centrated 
5 (2003) 11.88 (2002) 57.26 3.33 (2003) 6.75 
Tomatoes 30 (2002) n.a. 0 (1993) n.a. 70 (2002) 
Oranges 30 (2003) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Apples 30 (2003) 40 (2002) 0 30 (2003) 70 
Wheat and meslin 2.5 (2003) 1 (2002) 25 0 (2003) 0 
Barley 10 (2003) 5 (2002) 0 0 (2001) 0 
Maize (corn) 5 (2003) 1 (2002) 0 n.a. 4.68 
Rice 5 (2003) 20 (2002) 0 5 (2003) 5 
Grain sorghum 10 (2002) 5 (2002) 0 n.a. n.a. 
Other cereals n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Soya beans 5 (2003) 1 (1998) 0 n.a. 0 
Linseed 5 (2003) 1 (2002) 0 n.a. 0 
Sunflower seeds 5 (2003) 1 (2002) 0 15 (2003) 0 
Other oil seeds 5 (2003) 2.43 (2002) 0.06 n.a. 0.02 
Soya-bean oil 10.44 (2003) 10.02 (2002) 4 15 (2003) 8.78 
Olive oil 30 (2003) 12.5 (2002) 127.5 n.a. 70 
Sunflower, safflower, 
cottonseed oil 
11.89 (2003) 8.67 (2002) 4 0.29 (2003) 15 
Unprocessed 
tobacco 
15 (2003) n.a. 0 18.92 
(2003) 
0 (2002) 
Cotton not carded or 
combed 
5 (2003) 5 (2002) 0 n.a. 0 
Cane sugar 5 (2003) 7.5 (2002) 0 n.a. 5 
Beet sugar 5 (2002) 7.5 (2002) 0 n.a. 5 
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Table 2.5 – continued –  
Commodity Libya Morocco Syria Tunisia  Turkey 
Bovine meat 0 (1996) 275 (2003) n.a. 73 (2004) 15 (1995) 
Pig meat n.a. 53.5 (2002) n.a. 125 (2003) 20 (1995) 
Poultry meat 50 (2002) 111.29 (2003) n.a. 73 (2004) 64.42 (1997) 
Milk and cream not 
concentrated 
0 (2002) 109 (2003) n.a. 180 (2004) 150 (2003) 
Milk and cream con-
centrated 
0 (2002) 99.87 (2003) 7 (2002) 58.42 (2004) 150 (2003) 
Tomatoes 50 (2002) n.a. n.a. 165 (2003) 49.1 (2003) 
Oranges 30 (2002) n.a. n.a. n.a. 54.6 (2002) 
Apples 30 (2002) 52 (2003) n.a. 200 60.9 (2003) 
Wheat and meslin 15 (2002) 60 (2003) n.a. 65.79 (2003) 13.35 (2003) 
Barley 0 (2002) 27.12 (2003) n.a. 73 (2004) 42.5 (2003) 
Maize (corn) 0 (2002) 75.10 (2003) n.a. 0 (2004) 12.66 (2003) 
Rice 15 (2002) 62.66 (2003) 7 (2002) 34.79 (2004) 31.33 (2003) 
Grain sorghum 0 (1996) n.a. n.a. 34.33 (2002) 30 (1999) 
Other cereals n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Soya beans 25 (1996) 9.17 (2003) n.a. 15 (2003) 0 (2003) 
Linseed n.a. 21.25 (2003) n.a. 43 (2003) 12 (2003) 
Sunflower seeds n.a. 12.33 (2003) 7 (2002) 43 (1998) 8 (2003) 
Other oil seeds 
10.34 
(2002) 
22.02 (2003) n.a. 25 (1995) 4.7 (2003) 
Soya-bean oil 15 (2002) 2.59 (2003) n.a. 15.01 (2004) 25.01 (2003) 
Olive oil 15 (2002) 52 (2003) n.a. 115 (2004) 32 (2003) 
Sunflower, safflower, 
cottonseed oil 
0 (2002) 2.53 (2003) 7 (2002) 16.58 (2004) 32.23 (2003) 
Unprocessed 
tobacco 
n.a. 17.5 (2003) n.a. 22 (2004) 25 (2003) 
Cotton not carded or 
combed 
0 (1996) 2.5 (2003) n.a. 0 (2004) 0 (2003) 
Cane sugar n.a. 35 (2001) n.a. 15 (1998) 136.5 (2003) 
Beet sugar n.a. 35 (2003) n.a. n.a. 136.5 (2003) 
Notes: Unless 2005 the latest available year is indicated in the parenthesis; n.a.: not 
available 
Source: Own compilation; TRAINS 
At the multilateral level, an indication of overall trade protection can be given by the 
Nominal Protection Rate (NPR). The rate of nominal protection is a coefficient that 
shows the ratio of the domestic price to the border price, where the border price is 
the price of the international market converted into local currency using an exchange 
rate benchmark (TSAKOK, 1990, pp. 55-56). Figure 2.5 illustrates the average NPR for 
the period 2000-2002 and all the countries surrounding the Mediterranean. For the 
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EU the NPR is derived from the database on Producers’ Support Estimate (PSE) 
(OECD, 2006), while for the MPCs it is calculated by extracting the ad-valorem tariffs 
from export subsidies.  
It is clear that Morocco applies higher protection rates for livestock commodities and 
wheat than the EU, with the exception of beef and that Turkey is the most protective 
country. All Mediterranean countries protect their olive oil markets, Morocco applies 
protection to the apple market and the other MPCs (except Morocco and Turkey) 
protect their tomato and orange markets. Nevertheless, because of the low imports of 
olive oil, fruit and vegetables imported into the MPCs, this trade protection has a 
relatively moderate effect on these commodities. The most significant protection is 
levied on livestock commodities and cereals which are the commodities imported 
most by the MPCs. 
Figure 2.5: Nominal protection rate in %, average of 2000-2002 
Source: Own calculations based on TRAINS; OECD, 2006 
Several Mediterranean countries have applied export subsidies to a number of their 
commodities, particularly fruits and vegetables. Between 1997 and 2003, Israel, Mo-
rocco, Tunisia and Turkey all reported export subsidies to the WTO for fruits and 
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vegetables. The value of these subsidies and the quantities subsidised are shown in 
detail in Table A.4 in the Annex.  
Customs duties such as import tariffs and export subsidies are only the one side of 
trade protection. The other side is trade restrictions through so-called non tariff barri-
ers (NTBs), such as technical regulations, monopolistic measures and quantity con-
trol measures. The TRAINS database reports the existence of non tariff barriers on 
agricultural commodities by the EU, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and 
Tunisia in recent years. The reported measures concern livestock commodities, live 
animals and fruit and vegetables and are related to the protection of human and ani-
mal health. Packaging and labelling requirements and pre-shipment inspections have 
also been applied to fruits and vegetables (also to protect human health) and the 
Lebanon has applied seasonal quotas. 
Although it is difficult to quantify the impact of NTBs on import levels, it is obvious 
that as tariffs are reduced, NTBs become the predominant instrument to free trade. 
Moreover they do not have only a prohibitive character, but also a binding one. An 
attempt to estimate the effect of NTBs on imports has been made by KEE et al. 
(2006). The authors considered core NTBs (i.e. price and quantity control measures, 
technical regulations and monopolistic measures as single-channel imports) and ag-
ricultural domestic support to estimate the impact of non-tariff measures on imports 
and further to transform the quantity impacts into price changes by producing AVE of 
NTBs. Their results suggest that the NTBs increase world protection by about 10 %, 
that the most restrictive NTBs are those on agricultural commodities and that the ab-
solute value and the relative importance of the AVE of NTBs increases with GDP per 
capita. Algeria and Morocco are among the five countries with the highest AVEs of 
core NTBs and the EU has the highest AVEs due to domestic support. This shows 
that the issue of NTBs is of particular relevance for Mediterranean countries. Even if 
trade in agricultural commodities becomes free within the Euro-Med Agreements, 
NTBs will certainly constrain free trade within the Mediterranean and should certainly 
be on the agenda of negotiations between the EU and the MPCs and between MPCs 
themselves. 
2.4 Reforms of agricultural policies that affect trade 
One of the main challenges for agriculture around the Mediterranean is hence the 
reforms of agricultural trade, forthcoming or just concluded. These reforms can be 
seen from three perspectives. The first is reforms in domestic policies that could po-
tentially affect trade, such as, the reform of the agricultural policy of major trade play-
ers, like the EU. The second aspect is the anticipated changes in agricultural trade 
policy foreseen by the Euro-Med Agreements and finally the third type is changes in 
the agricultural trade policy at the multilateral level.  
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The existing Euro-Med Agreements were presented in section 2 of this chapter, 
which also elaborated the position of the MPCs in the current WTO round. Extending 
the Euro-Med agreements to agricultural commodities would mean the EU giving free 
market access to the commodities of the MPCs and vice versa. This could be prom-
ising for the MPCs as it could give them more export opportunities for their commodi-
ties and allow them to benefit from trade creation and trade diversion from third 
countries, or even of EU Member States that produce at higher cost. It would also be 
attractive for EU Member States that are net exporters to the MPCs, such as the 
northern EU Member States, who could expand their trading activities. The EU 
Mediterranean Member States are opposed to this, due to their fear of increased 
competition (as explained above).  
Continuing with multilateral opening of markets, both for the EU and for the MPCs it 
is connected to the issue of preference erosion and thus could appear less attractive 
for both country groups. For example a reduction of the import tariffs for highly pro-
tected commodities, such as beef or wheat, would result in lower import rents, and 
the further impacts of these on production, trade flows and overall welfare would 
need to be systematically analysed. 
The following paragraphs elaborate the latest reform of the EU’s Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP) and the features of this that are of most interest for Mediterranean 
agriculture. 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been subject to an immense reform 
process in recent years. The latest reform of the CAP was first discussed in 1999 by 
the Council of the Ministers of Agriculture in Berlin. The proposals of this Council, 
known as “Agenda 2000” were set to run to 2006 and were meant to be revised in 
2003. The Commission published the Mid Term Review of the CAP in July 2002, as a 
joint communication of the Commission and the European Council. This was not just 
a review of the situation in agriculture, but also involved new reform proposals. These 
proposals were revised and adopted in 2003 by the Council of Luxembourg, now 
known as the Luxembourg Agreement, providing the framework for agriculture in the 
European Union for the next 10 years.  
The reform of the Common Market Organizations (CMO) for olive oil and tobacco 
and the support scheme of cotton are considered as follow-ups of the Luxembourg 
Agreement, and came into force in the beginning of 2006. The objective is to provide 
a long-term future for these three sectors by promoting competitiveness, market–ori-
entation and stable income for farmers. The changes are based on the already ex-
isting regimes for these sectors (Council of the European Union, 2004 and Council 
Regulation 864/2004-Official Journal of the EU L161). 
The organization of the raw tobacco market was set out in Council Regulation 
2075/92 and the rules of implementation rules were specified in Commission Regula-
tion 2848/98 (Official Journal of the European Communities L 215 and L 358 respec-
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tively). The producers received a premium subject to their production quotas, which 
are allocated to them according to a guarantee threshold. The premium had three 
parts: A specific aid (25% of the premium), a variable part, adjusted by the varieties 
group and Member State and a fixed part, which was the difference between the 
premium after the deduction of the amount withheld for financing the Tobacco Fund 
and the sum of the specific aid and the variable part. The Community levied zero 
duty on imports from ACP countries and developed countries in the SPG system. 
Council Regulation 1638/98 applied to olive oil (Official Journal of the European 
Communities L 210). It set out a production target price and thus determines the pro-
duction aid received by the olive growers. This was granted on the basis of the quan-
tity of olive oil that they actually produced. To control the budget expenditure of the 
Community, the aid was allocated according to National Guaranteed Quantities 
(NGQ) and in the case of lower or higher production of these NGQs a stabiliser 
mechanism was applied. The aid was distributed to the Producer Organisations and 
only producers registered as olive cultivators were eligible. No aid was provided for 
additional areas planted after 1 May 1998, with the exception of replanting old olive 
plantations or new plantings covered by programmes approved by the Community. 
The areas planted and the olive cultivation register were based on data created by 
the Geographical Information System (GIS) and should correspond to this data. Al-
most all Community imports of olive oil come from Tunisia, which had an import 
quota of 53,000 tonnes (in 2002) rising to 56,000 tonnes (since 2006). This quota is 
expected to be abolished after 2010 with the implementation of the Euro-Mediterra-
nean Free Trade Area. 
Production aid for cotton is governed by Council Regulation 1051/2001 (Official Jour-
nal of the European Communities L 148). The producers receive a subsidy per tonne 
of non-ginned cotton, equal to the difference between the world market price and the 
guide price. The later is set by the Council and the former is determined by the 
Commission based on prices on the international cotton fibre market. The aid is paid 
to the ginners, who are only entitled to receive it so long as they provide a minimum 
of 95 % of the guide price to the producers. This support system is applied for a 
Maximal Guaranteed Quantity in the Community, which is divided to National Guar-
anteed Quantities and is subject to a stabiliser mechanism which can be used to re-
duce the guide price, and thus the minimum price in case of excess production. As 
far as relationships with other countries are concerned, there are no custom duties, 
import quotas or any support measures for exports. 
These support mechanisms to producers are examples of deficiency payments, as 
classified in the Amber Box, in the non-exempted direct payments category (as op-
posed to the price support category) and therefore need to be reconsidered. Given 
that no price cuts were necessary, the Commission’s proposals only concerned the 
decoupling of these direct payments and the introduction of a Single Farm Payment. 
Agricultural trade in the Mediterranean basin 31 
The decoupled payments are linked to environmental and food safety standards 
through cross-compliance and are subject to the modulation and financial discipline 
mechanisms. Different approaches to this have been undertaken for each of these 
sectors, since they face different problems and there are differences in their long-
term priorities (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a and b). 
For olive oil it has been decided that a conversion will imply a minimum of 60 % of 
the coupled payments for the reference period being transferred to the single farm 
payment entitlements. The four marketing years 1999/00-2002/03 serve as the refer-
ence period for the calculation of the initial payments. 40 % of the initial payments 
may be retained by the member states as an additional acreage- based olive pay-
ment, paid through the form of a national envelope. Current private storage meas-
ures will be kept as a safety net mechanism. Refunds for exports and for manufac-
turing certain preserved foods will be abolished (Council of the European Union, 
2004). 
For tobacco the Council has decided on a gradual decoupling of the existing tobacco 
premium, paralleled by the establishment of a financial restructuring envelope, under 
the second pillar of the CAP, to support a more sustainable future for the sector. A 
transitional period towards full decoupling is suggested from 2006 to 2010. During 
this period 40 % of the current payment must be decoupled and up to 60 % can be 
maintained as coupled. The production quotas are being kept so as to define the vol-
umes entitled to receive the coupled payment. At the end of this period support for 
tobacco production will be fully decoupled, with 50 % of it included in the single farm 
payment and 50 % transferred to the restructuring envelope, after which the new 
CMO will apply (Council of the European Union, 2004). 
For cotton two types of payment are being introduced: the single farm payment and a 
payment of eligible acreage of cotton, representing the decoupled and coupled part 
of the payment respectively. Member states must transfer 65% of the support expen-
diture paid to producers to the single farm payment and pay the other 35% as an 
area payment. Greece has 370 000 ha of eligible area and will introduce a two tier 
structure of coupled aid (594 €/ha for the first 300,000 ha and 342.85 €/ha for the 
remaining 70,000 ha). Spain has 85,000 ha of eligible land (where the coupled aid 
will be 898 €/ha) and Portugal has 360 ha with 556 €/ha as the coupled payment. 
This area payment will be reduced proportionately if production exceeds the maxi-
mum within each of these member states (Council of the European Union, 2004).  
Production for these three products is highly concentrated in certain regions, many of 
them lagging behind in economic development and employing a high proportion of 
the rural population. For example cotton is cultivated mainly in Greece in Thessaly, 
Macedonia-Thrace and Sterea Ellada and in Spain it is cultivated in Andalusia, 
Murcia and Valencia (Directorate-General for Agriculture, 2003). The main production 
areas of tobacco are the provinces of Macedonia-Thrace, Thessaly and west Sterea 
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Ellada in Greece, Extremadura in Spain and Umbria, Campania, Aquitane and Ve-
neto in Italy (Commission, 2003c). Because of geographical constraints these areas 
do not offer many alternatives for other economic activities or for cultivating other 
possibly more competitive crops. Therefore, special consideration should be given to 
the impacts of decoupling payments on these sectors (and regions). Abandonment of 
production due to decoupling would generate significant negative impacts for rural 
development in these areas.  
 
From the above it becomes obvious that agricultural trade relationships round the 
Mediterranean are characterised by complexity. Despite the several trade agree-
ments, which are in some cases overlapping, the trade flows are built on the north-
south axis and are dominated by the presence of the EU. Trade relationships seem 
to have so far a hub-and-spoke character, with the EU being in the centre of the cy-
clus and this despite the commitments of all countries to base their relationships on 
reciprocity.  
The analysis of the preference margins and the calculations of the value of the pref-
erence margin showed that only the EU has granted preferences within the frame-
work of the Barcelona Agreement. The size of the VPM differs significantly from 
country to country reflecting the bilateral status of the Barcelona Agreement. The 
Mediterranean Partner Countries are on the one side interested in deepening the 
preferences they currently enjoy, but on the other side they do not seem willing to 
open their borders to the EU commodities and keep high protection rates. The nomi-
nal protection rate is particularly high for those commodities that the MPCs import 
mainly from the EU. 
To this complexity is added uncertainty about the future of the agricultural trade 
round the Mediterranean caused by recently agreed and by the forthcoming reforms 
of agricultural policies. The reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy makes the 
farmers in the EU-Mediterranean Member States to feel more vulnerable. At the 
same time bilateral liberalisation of the agricultural trade within the Euro-Med Agree-
ments although wished by the northern EU Member States and the MPCs, as it is 
promising for better market access, is feared by the farmers in the southern EU 
Member States due to the high similarity in their exports with the MPCs. Multilateral 
liberalisation is connected to the issue of preference erosion and thus seen with 
scepticism from the MPCs.  
Due to this complexity and uncertainty on Mediterranean agricultural trade the need 
for deeper analysis emerges even more demanding. 
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3 Theoretical analysis of agricultural trade policies 
This chapter theoretically analyses the agricultural policy reforms discussed in the 
previous chapter. It examines the effects of the latest CAP reform, the forthcoming 
free trade area around the Mediterranean basin and multilateral liberalisation involv-
ing the EU and the MPCs. Particular attention is paid to allocative and distributional 
effects. To keep the analysis less cumbersome the effects on single markets and 
several regions are addressed first. Effects due to market linkages, both vertical and 
horizontal, are discussed separately in the last section of this chapter. 
To measure these effects the theory of applied welfare economics, and particularly 
the surplus concept, is employed. Social welfare is depicted as the sum of rent for 
producers, the rent for the consumers and the effects on the state’s budget. The ex-
penditure and/or revenue of the state influence the taxpayers’ payments and thus 
overall social welfare. 
The rent of producers is approximated using the notion of profit. In an output market 
the producer surplus is defined as the area above the supply curve and below the 
price line of the corresponding producing entity (JUST et al., 2004, p. 55; KIRSCHKE 
and SCHMITZ, 1990, p. 328). The producer surplus derived from an output can be al-
ternatively measured in the input market in the same way that the rent of the con-
sumers’ is defined, assuming that the producers of any given output are the sole 
consumers of the input.  
The consumer surplus is defined “as the area under the demand curve and above 
the price line” (JUST et al., 2004, p. 100). The notion of consumers’ rent is more diffi-
cult to define since it is approximated by a monetary measurement of their willing-
ness to pay for a certain commodity. Problems associated with simultaneous price 
changes and income changes are known as path-dependence problems and are de-
pendent on which change is considered first (price or income change) – although this 
can be resolved in empirical research by using both paths to measure consumer sur-
plus. A further remaining problem is the non-uniqueness of the money measurement 
of any change in welfare. Developments in the theory of applied welfare economics 
use the measurement of willingness to pay as an estimation of consumers’ welfare 
and are based in the concept of the compensating and equivalent variation which are 
used as an alternative, approximation of willingness to pay.  
It should be noted that in the following analysis considerations of the concept of will-
ingness to pay are not used to measure welfare since they do not allow discussion of 
distributive and allocative effects. According to this concept social welfare consists of 
three components, the utility of consumers, the variable costs for production of the 
commodity that reduce the welfare of producers and the foreign currency refund or 
expenditure, which increases or decreases welfare respectively (HENRICHSMEYER und 
WITZKE, 1994, pp. 147-150). 
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3.1 CAP Reform: Allocative and distributional effects 
The latest CAP Reform, as explained in the second chapter, can be summarised 
through three key words decoupling, modulation and cross compliance. It is difficult 
to quantify modulation and cross-compliance since quantitative modelling tools are 
insufficiently precise to fully measure their effects. Qualitative analysis is better suited 
for providing insights into the effects of cross-compliance. Hence this chapter focuses 
on the theoretical implications of decoupling direct payments and compares the im-
pacts of coupled and decoupled direct payments.  
To begin with, the term decoupling needs to be clarified. In the literature terms that 
have been used to characterise the direct payments are “fully decoupled” and “effec-
tively fully decoupled”. CAHILL (1997) characterises a policy as fully decoupled when 
it “does not influence production decisions of farmers receiving payments and that 
permits free market determination of prices (facing all farmers, whether or not they 
receive income support)”. LOPEZ (2001) argues that the concept of full decoupling is 
very strict and is only fulfilled when there is no change or distortion due to the appli-
cation of the policy in the decision making processes of producers and consumers. A 
less restrictive concept is that of “effectively fully decoupled” which according to 
CAHILL (1997) refers to policies “which result in production levels which are the same 
as those which would occur in the absence of support”. LOPEZ (2001) comments that 
this concept focuses on equilibrium quantities, meaning that this policy would have 
no or almost no effect on trade and production. This implies that the decision making 
process of farmers can be affected by “effectively fully decoupled payments” but in 
such a way that no increase in production will take place.  
As a basis for the discussion the development of the EU’s policy package needs to 
be reviewed. The existing coupled payments were originally granted as compensa-
tion payments for price cuts under the MacSharry reform from 1992 onwards. This 
can be seen as a shift of subsidies from the actually produced quantity of a product 
to the actual product itself: for example, it is not the amount of tobacco produced per 
hectare that determines the level of benefits for the farmer, but the cultivation of to-
bacco. As a next step, the decoupling of direct payments – particularly in association 
with cross-compliance – shifts payments from single products to all agricultural pro-
duction. Now it is not the planting of tobacco that qualifies for a payment, but the cul-
tivation of agricultural land. The market impacts of public payments to farmers are 
determined by the production effects of the payments. This applies to every mode of 
granting payments, i.e. to both coupled and to decoupled payments. Hence, the theo-
retical challenge for analysing decoupling is to define a pragmatic term of “produc-
tion-effectiveness” of direct payments, so as to work with and analyse the production-
effectiveness of coupled and decoupled payments. This option seems more readily 
operationalised within an empirical model and has pragmatic benefits when discuss-
ing the implementation of the Single Farm Payment (SFP) scheme. 
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To elaborate more on the implementation of the SFP the focus is laid upon the deci-
sion processes of farmers over what to produce. A farmer decides for this product (or 
mix of products), which will maximise his profit. Coupled payments for single prod-
ucts per hectare or per animal can affect a farmer’s relative competitiveness and can 
influence production, only if the possible profit of a product (or mix of products) in-
cluding direct payments is the highest. In other words, supposing the cultivation of 
two different commodities (or two different product mixes) gives the same profit to the 
farmer, then he will decide what to produce based on the direct payments he expects 
to receive and he will choose for the product (or mix of products) for which the cou-
pled direct payments are the highest. With some differences in detail, this also ap-
plies to decoupled payments: A farmer will produce (or will continue producing) if his 
agricultural profit exceeds alternative incomes. Acreage will be used for agriculture, if 
there is a possible product mix that gives a profit. 
Therefore production-effectiveness can be defined as the share of direct payments 
which causes changes in the production structure compared to a situation with no 
direct payments. This can vary between 0% and 100%. The direct payments can be 
ceteris paribus converted into an increase in the producer’s price that leads to the 
same changes of the produced quantity. Hence, a producer incentive price results 
from the farm gate price supplemented by the production-effective direct payment. 
Decoupled payments, which are only granted to active farmers, have a production-
effectiveness greater than 0% if they increase farmers’ profits or the profits of the 
acreage in such way that agricultural production is higher compared to a situation 
without coupled payments. 
Building on these theoretical reflections, the next step is to analyse the impacts of 
coupled and decoupled payments on production at a market level. 
Starting from a given farm gate price pFG (Figure 3.1), a quantity q1 is produced. A 
coupled direct payment scheme is implemented and it amounts to price effects equal 
to the distance of (p4–pFG) when converted into payment per unit. Assuming, that 
there is no production-effectiveness of this payment, the producer incentive price 
equals the farm gate price pFG, while the produced quantity will not change. In this 
case, the granted payment tallies with the area (a+b+c+d). In terms of welfare, the 
increase in government expenditure is equal to the increase in producer surplus and 
the social welfare does not change. A decoupled direct payment with no production-
effectiveness amounting to a fixed value equivalent to area (a+b+c+d) yields the 
same results. 
Assuming a low production-effectiveness of these coupled and decoupled payments, 
the producer incentive price rises to p2 and the produced quantity to q2. Assuming a 
high production-effectiveness, the producer incentive price rises to p3 and the pro-
duced quantity to q3. Fixing coupled payments at (p4–pFG) per unit and decoupled 
payments equivalent to area (a+b+c+d), which equals the areas (b+c+d+f+g+h+k) 
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and (c+d+g+h+k+n+r+s), then the following welfare impacts will result, taking the 
case with no production-effectiveness as a reference point (Figure 3.1) 
Figure 3.1: Impacts of different levels of production-effectiveness of direct 
payments on producer’s welfare 
Coupled payments 
 low production-effectiveness high production-effectiveness 
∆ producer surplus = + (e+f+g+h) = + (e+f+g+h+l+m+n) 
∆ budget = – (e+f+g+h+k) = – (e+f+g+h+k+l+m+n+r+s) 
∆ total welfare = – k = – (k+r+s) 
Decoupled payments 
 low production-effectiveness high production-effectiveness 
∆ producer surplus = – a + (f+g+h) = – (a+b) + (g+h+n) 
∆ budget = + a – (f+g+h+k) = + (a+b) – (g+h+k+n+r+s) 
∆ total welfare = – k = – (k+r+s) 
Notes: Reference point for the welfare impacts is the case of no production-effectiveness 
Source: KAVALLARI et al. (2005b) 
Thus, with equal producer incentive prices, the loss of social welfare of coupled and 
decoupled payments is the same. However, with decoupled payments the producer 
surplus and government expenditure are lower. Welfare losses rise with a higher 
production-effectiveness. The maximum producer incentive price is reached at the p3 
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level for decoupled payments, because the sum of direct payments is fixed. For cou-
pled payments, p4 is the maximum producer incentive price. Hence, the maximum 
impact of coupled payments on total agricultural production is higher compared to 
decoupled payments. 
It should be noted that, based on the above, considerations of implementing the SFP 
in the EU and the effects on decision making processes are closer to the definition of 
“effectively fully decoupled” policies. 
3.2 Free Trade Areas: allocative and distributional effects 
The forthcoming Free Trade Area between the EU and the MPCs is a type of eco-
nomic integration among two or more countries and is one form of Preferential Trade 
Agreement (PTA).  
It is useful to more specifically define these terms. A Preferential Trading Agreement 
is a general term used to describe a broader spectrum of economic integration 
among two or more countries. Usually these agreements have a regional scope and 
are thus often called Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). PANAGARIYA (2000) defines 
a PTA as a union where imports from countries that are signatories of an agreement 
are permitted at lower rates than imposed on imports from third countries. BURFISHER 
et al. (2003) and KRUEGER (1997) add that PTAs can have a partial scope and 
therefore focus on selected commodities, or they can have a total scope, meaning 
that the duty reduction covers all commodities produced by the parties to the agree-
ment. An RTA can be agreed on a reciprocal basis, as for example the agreements 
that the EU has up to now with the MPCs, or can have a hub-and-spoke character, 
as for example the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative. 
A Free Trade Area (FTA) is a preferential arrangement in which the member states 
liberalise internal trade by setting all tariff rates between them to zero but maintain 
independence in setting external tariff rates (REED, 2001; PANAGARIYA, 2000). FTAs 
usually include detailed rules-of-origin specification. This prevents goods that enter 
the union from the member country that applies the lower external tariff rate being 
trans-shipped at a zero tariff rate to other members of the FTA. Instead a good is al-
lowed to be traded duty free among members of the FTA as long as there is proof 
that it has been produced within the union. It has been observed that rules of origin 
are often very complex and can act as a trade barrier by specifying domestic thresh-
olds on a commodity basis (BURFISHER et al., 2003). In the case of the Euro-Med 
Agreements the rules of origin are supported by the establishment of the Pan-Euro-
Mediterranean protocol on rules of origin. 
Further forms of economic integration are a Customs Union, a Common Market and 
an Economic Union. A Customs Union is an FTA, where all members impose the 
same external tariff on third countries (REED, 2001; PANAGARIYA, 2000). The next step 
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of economic integration is accomplished through a Common Market, which in addi-
tion to being a customs union, also allows free movement of labour and capital within 
the union, as was the case with the European Economic Community in the early 90’s. 
Harmonisation of the economic and fiscal policies, adoption of compatible monetary 
policies and common currency leads to an Economic Union, such as the EU. 
PTAs have spread widely in recent years, although they violate the GATT/WTO 
most-favoured nation rule. By July 2007, a total of 380 regional PTAs had been noti-
fied to the WTO, with FTAs and partial scope PTAs accounting for 90 % and customs 
unions for nearly 10 % (WTO, 2007). It is worth noting that PTAs are only allowed by 
the WTO if they intend to promote trade between developing countries, as for exam-
ple the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) or if they fulfil the criteria of 
Article 24 of the GATT agreement, i.e. all trade is included and „the general incidence 
of duties and other regulation of commerce“ is not higher or more restrictive against 
third countries than before the formation of the PTA (BURFISHER et al., 2003). From 
the above it becomes obvious that only FTAs or CUs are acceptable and partial 
PTAs are allowed only when they are concluded among developing countries. 
Theoretical assessments of PTAs focus on trade creation, trade diversion and terms-
of-trade effects due to the formation of an FTA or Customs Union. Trade creation 
effects refer to changes in the commodity trade within the PTA and take place when 
the domestic production of a member country falls and is displaced by imports from 
other member countries that produce at lower cost (REED, 2001; KRUEGER, 1997). 
Trade diversion effects are observed when third countries produce at a lower cost 
and when a member country of the PTA replaces imports from higher-cost partner 
countries with imports from third countries with lower costs. Finally terms-of-trade 
effects are due to changes in international prices caused by the formation of the PTA. 
Empirically it is shown that trade creation and terms-of-trade effects are welfare en-
hancing, while trade diversion effects reduce social welfare. Theoretical assessments 
of PTAs such as those by BURFISHER et al. (2003), PANAGARIYA (2000), KRUEGER 
(1997) and BHAGWATI and PANAGARIYA (1996) conclude that it is not clear whether 
PTAs are welfare enhancing or not and the welfare effects depend on the level of 
economic integration (i.e. Free Trade Area versus Customs Union), on the elasticities 
and on the initial reference scenario before the agreement came into force.  
The welfare effects that occur due to a formation of a FTA are illustrated in Figure 3.2 
(in page 41) which is a partial market diagram of three countries and one market 7. In 
order to keep the diagram less cumbersome, it is assumed that the world consists of 
three countries, A, B and C, with A and B being potential FTA partners. It is assumed 
that firms in A, B and C supply at constant prices. Under perfect competition these 
prices represent the marginal and the constant average cost of production. Countries 
                                            
7 Throughout the analysis a price transmission elasticity of 1 has been assumed.  
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B and C are supposed to produce at the same cost, while A is the least efficient 
supplier. Country A is supposed to be a net importer, while countries B and C are net 
exporters, both exporting the same quantity to A. The domestic price in all three 
countries is the free trade price Pf.  
In the reference situation it is assumed that Country A imposes a non-discriminatory 
tariff t per unit rate for all imports of the examined product thus setting the domestic 
price at the level Pi. The world market price Pw1 which applies in both B and C is 
formed according to market equilibrium so that, imports from A (Q2-Q1) = exports of B 
(Q4-Q3) + exports of C (Q6-Q5) and exports of B=exports of C. 
The next step assumes that A and B form a Free Trade Area. As a result country A 
abolishes the import tariff against country B, but maintains it for imports from country 
C. Further it is supposed that the FTA is governed by rules of origin which ensure 
that a lower tariff member cannot re-export duty free produce from third countries to 
the higher tariff member. Going beyond the framework of Viner and Meade, 
PANAGARIYA (2000) distinguishes three cases based on the total supply in A and B in 
relation to the demand in A after the formation of the FTA.  
In the first case he assumes that the combined supply of a certain commodity in A 
and B is less than the demand in A. This implies that after the formation of the FTA, 
country B has an incentive to export more to country A (i.e. to export the maximum it 
can), since because the exports of B are not enough to satisfy the demand of A, the 
remainder of A’s demand is satisfied by imports from C. A new equilibrium arises and 
thus the price in the free trade area is formed at the level Pi1, while in country C a 
new world market price applies, Pw2, which is lower than Pw1 (dashed line in Figure 
3.2). The demand for imports in A rises to Q8-Q7, the exports of B grow to Q10-Q9 
while the exports of C are reduced to Q12-Q11. 
These new prices benefit the consumers of country A since consumer surplus in-
creases by the area a+b+c+d, while the producer surplus decreases by the area a. In 
country B the consumers suffer due to the increase of the domestic price and the 
consumer surplus decreases by the area n+o+q+r, while the producers benefit and 
the producer surplus increases by the area n+o+p+q+r+s. In country C the effects 
benefit the consumers with the consumer surplus increasing by the area u+v while 
the producer surplus decreases by the area u+v+w. 
There are also changes in the tariff revenues. Country A used to enjoy a tariff reve-
nue equal to the area c+f+i before the formation of the FTA. After the creation of the 
FTA, a quantity equal to Q10-Q9 is imported duty free, while for imports equal to Q12-
Q11 country A collects tariff, the revenue from which is given as (Pi1-Pw2)*(Q12-Q11). 
The duty free imports are equal to the grey area illustrated in Figure 3.2, i.e. equal to 
o+p+r+s=e+f+h+i+k+l, while the tariff revenue of country A is equal to the area 
g+j+m. The taxpayers’ effect in country A is thus equal to –c+g+j+m, while in coun-
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tries B and C there are no changes in the effects on taxpayers since it is assumed 
that these countries have no policy for supporting exports (such as export subsidies).  
In total the change of the social welfare is positive for country A, being equal to 
+b+d+g+j+m and attributable to trade creation effects. In county B the total welfare is 
again positive and equal to p+r due to trade creation effects. In country C the effects 
are negative and equal to –w, due to trade diversion effects. Thus it is not clear 
whether the global effects of the creation of the FTA are positive or not. 
The second case that PANAGARIYA (2000) distinguishes is when the demand of A is 
equal to the supply of A and B. After the formation of the FTA country B has an in-
centive to export all of its supply to country A, country A imports only from its FTA 
partner, i.e. country B, while country C is crowded out from A’s market.  
In this case the trade creation and trade diversion effects are more profound for all 
three countries, as shown in Figure 3.3 (in page 42). The new price in the FTA is 
formed at the level Pi2, which is slightly higher than the price Pi1. The imported and 
exported quantities are Q8-Q7 and Q10-Q9 respectively and are equal to each other. 
While there are no changes in the direction of the effects regarding surplus of 
producers and consumers compared to the first case, the areas are now larger for 
country B and C and smaller for country A because of the higher domestic price level 
in the FTA countries, which results in a lower world market price (Pw3) that applies for 
country C. This changes the taxpayers’ effects in country A since all imports are duty 
free, country A no longer collects any tariff revenue, thereby negatively affecting its 
budget to the area c+f+i. Thus country A enjoys gains from trade creation but also 
suffers losses from trade diversion. Again it is not clear whether the entire world is 
better off or not from the FTA. 
Finally the third case that PANAGARIYA (2000) examines is when the total supply of A 
and B exceeds the demand of A for the certain commodity. As in case two, country B 
now has an incentive to export the maximum to country A, crowding out country C. 
The welfare effects and the allocative and distributional effects are the same as in 
case two and are shown in Figure 3.3. Again it is not clear if the world is worse, or 
better, off as a result of the formation of the FTA. 
The foregoing scenarios do not specify whether countries B and C trade with each 
other and whether they apply import tariffs or not. It could be assumed that country B 
for example also applies a non-discriminatory tariff tb, which is lower than the tariff t, 
applied by country A. However as country B is assumed to be a net exporter, the pre-
FTA price in this country is the world market price and thus nothing would change in 
the welfare effects shown above.  
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Figure 3.2: Effects of countries A and B forming an FTA, where countries B and C have the same production costs and the 
post-FTA demand of country A is met by imports from both B and C 
Country A Country B Country C 
∆producer surplus = -a ∆producer surplus = n+o+p+q+r+s ∆producer surplus   = -u-v-w 
∆consumer surplus      = +a+b+c+d ∆consumer surplus      = -n-o-q-r ∆consumer surplus  = +u+v 
∆budget = -c+g+j+m ∆budget                    = 0 ∆budget                    = 0 
∆total welfare = +b+d+g+j+m ∆total welfare          = +p+s ∆total welfare          = -w 
Source: Own illustration 
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Figure 3.3: Effects of countries A and B forming an FTA, where countries B and C have the same production costs and the 
post-FTA demand of country A is met by imports from B alone 
Country A Country B Country C 
∆producer surplus   = -a ∆producer surplus   = n+o+p+q+r+s ∆producer surplus   = -u-v-w 
∆consumer surplus  = +a+b+c+d ∆consumer surplus  = -n-o-q-r ∆consumer surplus  = +u+v 
∆budget                      = -c-f-i ∆budget                    = 0 ∆budget                    = 0 
∆total welfare            = +b+d-f-i ∆total welfare          = +p+s ∆total welfare          = -w 
Source: Own illustration 
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Furthermore, the above analysis assumes that countries B and C have the same effi-
ciency in producing a certain commodity. It could be in reality that one of them is 
more efficient than the other, for example country C could produce at a lower cost 
than country B. If this is the case then, in the pre-FTA situation, country A would im-
port only from C, the most efficient supplier, but after the formation of the FTA with 
country B, country A would import from the higher-cost producers of country B, 
crowding out country C’s producers. The resulting trade creation and, more so, the 
trade diversion effects are more profound for countries B and C than in the diagrams 
above and the entire world would be worse off. But if country A formed an FTA with 
country C instead of B, then both countries would enjoy the effects of trade liberalisa-
tion and the entire world would be better off.  
Certain caveats still remain in this theoretical analysis of FTAs. It has been assumed 
that the level of protection against third countries applied by A (and B) remains un-
changed after the formation of the FTA. Nevertheless this does not have to be the 
case and, combined with the ongoing WTO negotiations or with the common situation 
where one country is involved in more than one PTA, then the external tariffs change 
following the formation of an FTA. This will result in different allocative and distribu-
tional effects for the partner countries and for third countries. In addition, the average 
external tariff may vary due to the application of non-tariff barriers. Under an FTA, 
rules of origin often act as additional trade barriers (KRUEGER, 1997).  
Another aspect that should be taken into account is that the formation of a PTA often 
provides market power to the new block of countries (BURFISHER et al., 2003) since it 
creates trade among its members, giving the partner countries within the block more 
market power than the individual members used to have. This can provide an incen-
tive for small countries to enter FTAs, but also means that the new block can act as a 
price maker, influencing world market prices.  
 
The above analysis shows that the welfare effects are not always profound for coun-
tries that form a PTA. Trade creation and trade diversion effects occur simultaneously 
and from the theoretical analysis it is not clear which of the two prevails. BHAGWATI 
(1999, pp. 14-15) concludes that the magnitude of the effects depends on the relative 
sizes of imports from each source combined with the expenditure on domestic goods 
and on the level of substitution between goods produced domestically and those pro-
duced by non-members. 
Thus other motives must underpin the decision of countries to enter a RTA. 
CRAWFORD and FIORENTINO (2005) identify a variety of political, economic and secu-
rity considerations. They argue that countries often use RTAs as a means of pro-
moting deeper integration in terms of investment, competition, environmental and 
labour standards. The creation of a PTA is usually driven by a search to enter larger 
markets and this can be much easier at a regional or bilateral level than a multilateral 
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one. Preferential access to markets can bring long-term advantages for suppliers, 
giving them an advantage over the competitors, especially with respect to trade in 
services. Discriminatory liberalisation can be particularly attractive for countries that 
fear international competition. It is accepted that developing countries might be willing 
to forego the benefits that GSP (Generalised System of Preferences) programmes 
promise them and instead enter into reciprocal PTAs with developed countries so as 
to access their markets and thus get a comparative advantage over their competitors. 
Moreover, membership of a PTA is thought to indirectly provide a certain security for 
foreign direct investment, which is of particular importance for countries with lower 
labour costs that enter into a PTA with a developed country. For example the EU es-
tablished the MEDA programme under Council Regulation 2698/2000 to support in-
vestments in the MPCs (Official Journal of the European Communities, 2000). In this 
respect it seems that a PTA locks out international competition but locks in foreign 
direct investment. For smaller countries membership in a PTA seems to be a defen-
sive necessity, while for larger ones it is essential so that they are not left behind. 
Finally political reasons (for example common defence programmes) can forge geo-
political alliances and cement PTAs. 
These additional factors are not examined by the traditional theory of PTAs, illus-
trated by the partial market diagrams above. Nevertheless the New Trade Theory 
takes account of aspects connected to the formation of PTAs such as investment 
flows to partner countries, transfer of know-how, labour mobility and the liberalisation 
of production factors. In an empirical review of general equilibrium models applied to 
analyse the impacts of regional trade agreements ROBINSON and THIERFELDER (2002) 
conclude that the welfare effects are of a larger magnitude when models incorporate 
features of new trade theory and with these factors included aggregate trade creation 
is higher than trade diversion. These applied trade models often allow for differentia-
tion of goods based on their origin, examine the issues of economies of scale and 
imperfect competition and take transportation costs into consideration.  
It is clear throughout that a preferential supplier (country B in the above analysis) 
enjoys a preference margin as a result of the formation of the PTA. Yet it is worth 
exploring who in reality manages to capture the preference margin. GRETHE et al. 
(2005c) and FRANCOIS et al. (2006) argue that often in practice it is not the exporting 
partner country but the importing one, that gets the preferential margin, and this is 
dependent on the extent to which importers and their logistics sector exercise market 
power. The reduction of the preferential tariff due to the formation of an FTA can be 
used to sell at a lower price in the partner country in an attempt to expand exports. 
Alternatively, if the domestic price of the importing partner country is fixed, then it can 
be used to increase the received price for a certain quantity. This issue is of special 
interest when tariff rate quotas are applied or when a minimum import price system 
exists, as with the EU’s entry price system for fruits and vegetables. These outcomes 
may well depend upon the way that licences are allocated to importers and exporters. 
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OLARREAGA and ÖZDEN (2005) show that exporters in developing countries received 
on average only one third of the tariff rent, and that this percentage is even lower in 
poorer and smaller countries.  
The issue of the allocation of the preference margin is particularly relevant for the 
trade of fruits and vegetables between the EU and the MPCs, where the EU is the 
net receiver and the MPCs the net suppliers. GRETHE et al. (2005c) and GRETHE and 
TANGERMAN (1998a) argue that all the licences issued by the EU under the preferen-
tial arrangements have gone to European trading companies, suggesting that these 
companies accrue the preference margin. Nevertheless, because of the EU’s entry 
price system for fruits and vegetables, monopolistic export structures often become 
established in the MPCs. This enables the MPCs’ exporters to have a stronger nego-
tiating power with the EU’s trading companies, allowing them to attract at least some 
part of the preference margin. KALAITZIS et al. (2007) verify that most exports from the 
MPCs to the EU are organised through export-related institutions, such as associa-
tions of exporters or trading companies. 
The MPCs are faced with welfare losses due to the formation of the Euro-Med 
Agreements as these will re-distribute the preferential margin to the exporters in 
cases where the EU is the net supplier, as is the case for cereals and livestock com-
modities.  
 
The above analysis demonstrates that a country with a higher initial set of tariffs 
should expect welfare losses when it forms a PTA with a country with lower initial 
tariffs. This point is of particular relevance to the MPCs, which have higher initial tar-
iffs and are joining a PTA with the EU, a low-tariff union that hegemonies trade. The 
MPCs can thus be expected to suffer from welfare losses when the Barcelona 
Agreement enters into full force. According to BHAGWATI and PANAGARIYA (1996), 
these loses will also depend on the volume of trade. They argue that higher volumes 
of trade lead to greater welfare losses for the partner countries. The depth of trade 
creation and trade diversion effects and their relative importance for the involved 
partner countries and the rest of world can only be specified empirically. 
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3.3 Multilateral liberalisation: allocative and distributional ef-
fects in a single market 
The Mediterranean Partner Countries have shown strong interest in participating in 
the multilateral trading system that is currently under discussed. Although, at the time 
of writing, the negotiations of the Doha round have not come to a concrete conclu-
sion, multilateral liberalisation is still on the agenda. Commitments to reduce or elimi-
nate export subsidies and import tariffs and providing improved and non-discrimina-
tory market access are currently being discussed and will eventually take place.  
Free trade is considered to be the most durable and central economic policy and is 
recommended by economists. WONNACOTT and WONNACOTT (2005) suggest that an 
individual country should expect gains by abolishing the tariffs it applies to imports on 
the one hand and by getting better market access to other countries on the other. 
The second effect arises from reductions in tariffs applied by other countries on its 
exports. The following section draws out a theoretical explanation of both of these 
effects. 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the price, quantity and welfare effects of multilateral liber-
alisation on a single market. These effects will depend on the initial trade status of a 
country, i.e. whether it is a net importer or a net exporter. The reference system for 
the analysis is the currently existing agricultural policy. Barriers to free trade are im-
posed by various policy instruments, such as import tariffs, export subsidies, import 
quotas, entry prices or non-tariff barriers. The protection applied by large countries 
(price makers) suppresses current world market prices, keeping them artificially low.  
In a large, net importing, country (Figure 3.4) the application of trade protection to 
domestic prices yields a price Pi, while because of the subsequent effects on the 
world markets, world market prices are lower than they would be under free trade 
conditions, at the level Pw0. Multilateral liberalisation means that free trade conditions 
are applied to the markets, i.e. in the examined market the world price is arrived at 
through global demand and supply (or alternatively on excess demand and supply in 
a particular country or region) and would be higher than Pw0, for example Pw1. This 
price effect would lead this country to expand its imports from Q2-Q1 to Q4-Q3.  
Consumers enjoy positive welfare changes, since they see their surplus being in-
creased by the area a+b+c+d, while producers are worse off and face a decrease of 
their surplus that is equal to area a. The country no longer collects tariff revenue 
(equal to areas c+e), thus facing a reduction of its budget equal to this. Overall the 
deadweight losses of trade protection are recovered (i.e. triangles b and d) while the 
the effects on the terms of trade are negative and equal to area e. Thus, it is not clear 
whether or not the country will enjoy welfare benefits. This depends on the elasticities 
of demand and supply as well as world market prices, and specifically on the devel-
opment of these before and after trade liberalisation.  
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Figure 3.4: Welfare effects of trade liberalisation on a net importing country 
Notes: CS: consumer surplus; PS: producer surplus 
Source: Own illustration 
The results are slightly different for a large net exporting country, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.5. Due to its export subsidy, the country exports the quantity Q2-Q1 thus keep-
ing the world market prices at the level PW0. Once trade restrictions are abolished 
and the export subsidy is eliminated, the markets function according to supply and 
demand, which results in decrease of the exported quantity to Q4-Q3 and an increase 
in the world market price to, for example, the level PW1.  
The social welfare of a large, net exporting, country increases, not only because the 
deadweight losses of trade protection are recovered but also because the effects on 
the terms of trade are positive (shown by the area e+f+g+h+i in the Figure 3.5). The 
allocation of these effects among producers and consumers is similar to the large, 
net importing, country, although the magnitude is different. The consumer surplus 
rises, but not as much as under net importing conditions, while the producer surplus 
drops off more. The effects are shown by the areas a+b and -a-b-c for consumers 
and producers respectively. The state’s budget is favoured by the free trade condi-
tions as the burden of providing export subsidies is removed.  
The increase of world market prices cannot lead to a change of the net trade status 
of a large country, as shown by Figures 3.4 and 3.5.  
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Figure 3.5: Welfare effects of trade liberalisation on a net exporting country 
Notes: CS: consumer surplus; PS: producer surplus 
Source: Own illustration 
The effects are different for small countries, because they are price takers and can-
not influence world market prices by applying a domestic policy. This is illustrated in 
Figure 3.6 where the world market price increases from PW0 to PW1 and these price 
effects lead to an upward and downward adjustment of the imported and exported 
quantities respectively.  
The welfare effects on small countries depend on their net trade status, as shown 
below. For a small net exporting country the consumer surplus decreases by area f, 
while the producer surplus increases by the area f +g, resulting in overall welfare 
gains equal to the area g. In a net importing country the consumers will suffer a de-
crease of their surplus equal to the areas a+d+b, while the producers will gain a sur-
plus equal to area a. As a result the overall welfare will decrease by area b. Finally 
when a change of the net trade status takes place due to an increase of world market 
prices, and the net importing country becomes a net exporting one, then the con-
sumer surplus will decrease by the area c+e, the producer surplus will increase by 
the area c +d and the total overall change in welfare will be +d –e. Thus, it is not clear 
whether the welfare in this country will rise or not. It should be noted that, for the pur-
pose of simplicity, it has been assumed that small countries do not apply trade poli-
cies which would result in different domestic prices but that their internal market price 
is the world market price.  
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It becomes clear that net importers gain from multilateral trade liberalisation while net 
exporters suffer from welfare losses. Within countries the allocation of these welfare 
effects is in favour of the producers. Consumers in countries that are net importers, 
net exporters, or experience a change of trade status suffer from losses, since they 
are faced with higher prices, while the producers enjoy an increase in their surplus 
because of higher prices.  
Figure 3.6: Welfare effects of agricultural trade liberalisation on small coun-
tries 
 net exporter net importer/net exporter net importer 
∆CS = -f -c-e -a-b 
∆PS = +f+g +g+d +a 
∆welfare=  +g -e+d -b 
Notes: CS: consumer surplus; PS: producer surplus 
Source: Own illustration based on PUSTOVIT, 2003 
The assumption that these countries do not apply trade policies and are thus influ-
enced solely by the increase of the world market prices does not always hold. Most 
such countries usually apply a certain degree of protection. Even more because 
many are involved in some form of preferential agreements (as discussed above), 
applying discriminatory protection against imports from certain countries, while pro-
viding preferential market access to some trade partners. In the case of the PTA be-
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tween the EU and the MPCs, the latter already have a certain preferential access to 
EU markets even though the FTA is not yet fully activated.  
In this situation the theoretical assessment of multilateral trade liberalisation becomes 
more problematic, with the effects depending not only on the initial net trade status of 
a country, but also on the type of the initial protection. The effects are connected to 
those of preference erosion and differ between partner and non-partner countries. 
FRANCOIS et al. (2006) explain that preference erosion effects arise from the reduc-
tion or elimination of tariffs on non-preferential suppliers. 
To explore the allocation of the welfare effects that will occur in the event of prefer-
ence erosion due to multilateral trade liberalisation, the same graphic is used as in 
Figure 3.2 (see Figure 3.7). It should be noted that the graphic of Figure 3.3 could be 
used again. The effects would be of the same direction, but of higher magnitude 
since Figure 3.3 illustrates an extreme situation, where the non-preferential partner is 
completely crowded out by the preferential one after the formation of the FTA. 
For the welfare analysis the current status quo between the EU and the MPCs is 
used as the reference point, i.e. the PTA between countries A and B exists, resulting 
in price Pi1 within the union for the partner countries and in a world market price of 
Pw2 for the non-partner countries, because of the application by country A of a non-
discriminatory tariff against all imports. As before, it is assumed that country A is a 
net importer and countries B and C are net exporters. Countries B and C have the 
same efficiency in producing the examined commodity, and country A is the least 
efficient supplier. This assumption (ceteris paribus) implies that under free trade con-
ditions country A would import the same quantity from both countries, implying that 
after full multilateral liberalisation countries B and C will export the same quantity to 
A. The formation of the PTA allows country B to enjoy preferential market access to 
country A. As explained in the previous section, country A imports a total quantity Q8-
Q7 due to the PTA, with a quantity Q10-Q9 being imported duty free from preferential 
partner B and a quantity equal to Q12-Q11 from the third country C, on which a tariff 
revenue equal to the area g+j+m is collected. The price within the union is formed at 
the level Pi1 and the world market price, applied only to country C, is at the level Pw1. 
Multilateral liberalisation means that free trade conditions apply in the market and 
thus the net importing country has no reason to prefer a specific country and import 
more from this one. In this example it imports the same quantity from countries B and 
C. The traded quantities are adjusted according to market equilibrium. Country A will 
need to import the quantity Q14-Q13, while country B sees a drop in its exports and 
will export quantity Q16-Q15 to country A. Country C on the other side sees its exports 
increase to Q18-Q17. The new price that is formed and applies in all three countries is 
Pf.  
The producers in the partner countries are worse off from multilateral liberalisation as 
they are faced with a decrease of the price they used to enjoy. In country A their sur-
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plus is reduced by area α and in country B by the area n+o+p. By contrast the pro-
ducers in third countries, such as country C, benefit from free trade because the new 
world market prices are at a higher level. Their surplus increases by the area 
+δ+ε+ζ+u+η+w.  
The results on consumers are in the opposite direction. Consumers in partner coun-
tries A and B are better off, due to the decrease in price and benefit from an increase 
of their surplus by the area α+β+e+f+g+γ and n+o respectively. In third countries the 
effects on consumers are also negative and they are faced with a decrease of their 
surplus by the area -δ-ε-u-η. 
Effects on taxpayers and the state’s budget are only relevant for country A, since only 
this country that used to collect an import tariff. Liberalisation means that country A 
has to abolish its import tariffs and can no longer collect the tariff rent. The effect on 
its budget is negative and is equal to the decrease of the tariff rent (-g-j-m). To re-
mind the reader, it is not relevant to this analysis whether country B applies an import 
tariff, or not or how high it is, because country B is a net exporter.  
The overall change in social welfare in country A is shown by the area β+γ+e+f-j-m. 
Despite the positive welfare effects of trade liberalisation, country A losses the tariff 
revenue and any conclusion about whether the country will benefit from free trade or 
not depends on whether the loss exceeds the other benefits or not. The preferential 
supplier (country B) is faced with a partial loss of the original benefits under the pref-
erential scheme, although the loss is less than the benefits of the formation of the 
FTA. FRANCOIS et al. (2006) explain that the loss is partial and not complete because 
the preferences granted to country B include benefits that are relative to the original 
tariff-driven equilibrium from a non-discriminatory tariff reduction by the importer. The 
third countries recover from the losses imposed by the preferential scheme and due 
to preference erosion will enjoy welfare gains of the area ζ+w. 
Empirical analysis of the multilateral opening of markets is relevant for MPCs, not 
only because of preference erosion effects, but also as possible future strategy vis a 
vis the Euro-Med Agreements coming into full force. Empirical evidence from 
ROBINSON and THIERFELDER (2002) suggests that global trade liberalisation increases 
welfare more than forming an RTA. If this is also the case for MPCs, then they should 
focus on multilateral trade liberalisation rather than on maintaining and extending 
their preferences within the Euro-Med Agreements. 
The effects would be more profound if countries B and C were not producing at the 
same costs and country C was more efficient than the preferential supplier (country 
B). In this the case, the welfare effects for the net importing and net exporting coun-
tries would be as shown in Figures 3.4 to 3.6, while for the preferential supplier the 
effects would be only partial and not complete. 
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Figure 3.7: Preference erosion effects of multilateral agricultural liberalisation in the two partner countries A and B and in 
the third country C 
Country A Country B Country C 
∆producer surplus   = -α ∆producer surplus   = -n-o-p ∆producer surplus   = +δ+ε+ζ+u+η+w 
∆consumer surplus  = +α+β+e+f+g+γ ∆consumer surplus  = +n+o ∆consumer surplus  = -δ-ε-u-η 
∆budget                    = -g-j-m ∆budget                    = 0 ∆budget                    = 0 
∆total welfare          = +β+γ+e+f-j-m ∆total welfare          = -p ∆total welfare          = +ζ+w 
Source: Own illustration 
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From the above analysis it becomes clear that preference erosion is certainly benefi-
cial for third countries and detrimental for preferential suppliers, especially if they are 
less efficient than third countries. The effects on the preferential importer are not 
clearly positive or negative. One limitation of this static partial analysis is that dy-
namic trade-related effects, such as further trade specialisation are not been consid-
ered. Countries in the G-20 group at the current WTO negotiations argue that prefer-
ences do not always favour small countries, because they encourage them to de-
pend on a reduced number of uncompetitive products, discourage diversification and 
prevent the emergence of other suppliers (GARCIA ÁLVAREZ-COQUE, 2006a). If this is 
the case, then the elimination of preferences could be beneficial for small developing 
countries which supply the major markets in developed countries. This argument 
could be relevant for the MPCs, which at the moment are preferential suppliers to EU 
markets.  
3.4 Market linkages 
So far the theoretical considerations have only referred to single markets in several 
regions. However, agricultural trade policies applied to one particular agricultural 
market influence other agricultural markets. For example it is often observed that 
price changes related to a particular commodity lead to shift in supply or demand in a 
related market, which in turn results in the formation of a new equilibrium in the first 
market. Thus to complete the welfare analysis of agricultural trade policy instruments, 
it is necessary to discuss the effects caused by market interactions.  
There are two types of market linkages that need to be taken into account. Markets 
can be linked vertically with an input – output relationship, or they can be linked hori-
zontally if two products (two inputs or two outputs) are substitutable or complement 
each other in production and/or consumption. An example of vertically linked agri-
cultural markets is that of cereals used as feed in livestock production. An example of 
horizontally linked markets is when two commodities are substitutes, competing, for 
example, for the same land resources because their production takes place under 
similar conditions, such as maize and cotton. Commodity substitution in consumption 
includes various types of meat (beef, pork, poultry meat). Finally, a traditional exam-
ple of complementary products in consumption is that of sugar and coffee. This sec-
tion discusses both effects in theoretical terms. 
Figure 3.8 shows how linkages operate in vertically linked markets. Coarse grain as 
animal feed, is taken as an example for the input and beef as an example for the 
output market. 
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Figure 3.8: Vertical linkages between two agricultural markets 
Notes: S: supply; D: demand 
Source: Own compilation based on RONINGEN (1997), p. 239; JUST et al. (2004),  
pp. 312-322.  
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Initially quantity QA0 of coarse grain is supplied at price PA0 following the SA0 supply 
schedule, while the supply schedule of beef follows the supply curve SB (PB0). The 
demand schedule for beef is shown by the demand curve DB0. The demand and sup-
ply quantity of beef is formed according to the market equilibrium and is at the level 
QB0 at price PB0. The demand schedule of animal feed is formed according to the 
demand for coarse grain from beef producers and is initially shown by the demand 
curve DA (PB0).  
In the beginning an exogenous shock in the input market leads to a shift of the supply 
curve for coarse grain leftwards from SA0 to SA1. This exogenous shock is due to a 
decrease in the supply of animal feed, which could for example be the result of crop 
failure or because coarse grains are used for alternate purposes (for example pro-
ducing bio-ethanol). If there are price incentives then it could appear more attractive 
to coarse grain producers to sell their commodities for bio-ethanol rather than as 
animal feed. The new market equilibrium leads to a increase in the input price to PA1 
and, because input becomes more expensive, the supply of beef meat upwards to SB 
(PA1). A new output equilibrium is formed in which the consumed and supplied quan-
tity of beef are reduced from QB0 to QB1 and the price of beef increases from PB0 to 
PB1.  
The decrease in the quantity produced implies less demand for the input and thus on 
a second round the derived demand for coarse grain shifts leftwards to DA (PB1). This 
sets a new equilibrium in the input market, with the input price decreasing from PA1 to 
PA2. The decrease in the input price makes the input cheaper for the output suppliers 
and leads to a third round where they shift their supply schedule downwards to SB 
(PA2).  
Consequently third, fourth and higher round effects would occur until the establish-
ment of a final equilibrium in the input and output market. 
To find the welfare effects for an entire sector, one needs to add all the rent changes 
throughout the markets (JUST et al., 2004, p. 321). Therefore, welfare calculations 
need to consider the surplus of the coarse grain producers, the surplus of beef con-
sumers and producers (which is equal to the surplus of the consumers of animal 
feed, assuming that the entire production of animal feed goes into beef production). 
The rent of the beef producers can be measured either in the output market or in the 
input market associated with derived demand. Even more the quasi-rent of the pro-
ducers of the final goods can be measured in both input and output markets when 
the price changes are considered sequentially. Alternatively this rent can be meas-
ured in an intermediate market by constructing the equilibrium demand and supply 
curves, as shown by JUST et al. (2004), p. 315-3188.  
                                            
8 The equilibrium supply curve is defined as „a supply curve that allows for equilibrium adjustment of 
input use and input price as the output price changes“ (JUST et al., 2004, p. 315). In a similar way 
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The welfare effects are shown below, for just the first round effects of the above ex-
ample (i.e. comparison of the equilibria QA0 PA0 and QB0 PB0 to QA1 PA1 and QB1 PB1 of 
the input and output markets respectively). 
The surplus of the coarse grain producers decreases by the area h+i+j+k and in-
creases by the area a+b+c. The surplus of beef consumers decreases by the area 
s+t+u+v+w+x+y+z. 
The rent of the input consumers – output producers, measured in the input market by 
simultaneous price changes, decreases by the area a+b+c+d+e+f+g+l. This rent 
measured in the output market by simultaneous price changes decreases by the area 
m+n+o+q+r and increases by s+v. To measure these rent changes sequentially on 
both the input and the output markets, two options need to be considered. The 
changes can either first take place in the input market and then in the output or vice 
versa, as shown below: 
1. a) Increase in the input price by keeping the initial output price constant (PA0 
→ PA1, PB0 fixed): ∆R = -a-b-c-d-e-f-g as measured in the input market;  
b) Increase of the output price by keeping the already increased input price 
constant (PB0 → PB1, PA1 fixed): ∆R = s+v measured in the output market. 
Overall the rent of the output suppliers – input consumers increases by the 
area s+v and decreases by the area a+b+c+d+e+f+g.  
2. a) Increase of the output price by keeping the initial input price constant (PB0 
→ PB1, PA0 fixed): ∆R = s+t+u+v+w+x+p measured in the output market;  
b) Increase of the input price by keeping the already increased output price 
constant (PA0 → PA1, PB1 fixed): ∆R = -a-b-c-d-e. Overall the rent of the output 
suppliers – input consumers increases by the area s+t+u+v+w+x+p and de-
creases by the area a+b+c+d+e.  
The sequential measurement is used as a practical response to data availability, 
since it is easier in practice to observe the welfare changes that occur between 
clearly determined price changes instead of between shifts of the supply and demand 
curves.  
Determining the net social changes derived from the initial external shock in the input 
market involves aggregating the net effects, described above, to the individual actors. 
Thus the effects to the input and output producers, as reflected in the input market, 
result in a decrease of welfare by the area a+b+c+d+e+f+g+h+i+j+k+l. The effects on 
                                                                                                                                        
the equilibrium demand curve can be defined as a demand curve that allows for equilibrium 
adjustments of output use and output price as the input price changes. More details on how the two 
curves are constructed and how welfare can be measured in the intermediate market are given by 
JUST et al. (2004), pp. 315-318. 
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the input and output consumers, as reflected in the output market, yield a decrease 
of the area m+n+o+q+r+t+u+w+x+y+z. 
 
The relationship between two substitute commodities is shown in Figure 3.9. The ex-
ample illustrates shows the inter-relationships between the cotton and maize markets 
in the EU-27.  
Currently the EU-27 is a net importer of maize and cotton (cotton lint) (EUROSTAT, 
various years). The market for cotton in the EU is liberalised, since no import tariffs or 
export subsidies are applied, while direct payments are made to farmers following a 
deficiency payments scheme. The EU applies zero duties for maize too and provides 
subsidies to maize farmers. An indication of the degree of the maize market protec-
tion can be taken from the magnitude of the producer support estimate (PSE), which 
in 2006 was in the order of 162 million Euro (OECD, PSE database, 2006). 
If year 2006 is taken as reference, then in the market for maize, the adjustments due 
to the Luxembourg reform of the CAP had already taken place. The supply scheme 
for maize is depicted by the supply curve S maize and the demand scheme is shown 
by the demand curve D maize. The decoupled producer subsidy lies at the level 
PM,d0, while the world market price is at the level PM,w0.  
The CAP reform of the cotton market first started to be implemented in 2006. Thus, in 
Figure 3.9 the supply curve Scotton depicts the pre-decoupling production scheme 
and the price PC,d0 captures the farm subsidies prior to the introduction of the Single 
Farm Payment. Initially the world cotton market price is assumed to lie at the level 
PC,w0. 
Decoupling of farm subsidies in the cotton market, as explained in chapter 3.1, can 
be translated into a drop of the producer incentive price and, depending on the level 
of its effectiveness, on production. Its effects on the behaviour of producers can be 
depicted in a partial market diagram with lower producer subsidies. This is illustrated 
in Figure 3.9 3.9 which shows a drop of prices paid to cotton producers to PC,d1. The 
price changes on the cotton market result in a shift in the maize supply curve towards 
the right, since it becomes more attractive for farmers to replace cotton with maize. A 
pre-condition for such a shift is that the applicable maize prices (including producer 
subsidies) are higher than the reduced cotton prices.  
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Figure 3.9: Horizontal linkages between two agricultural markets 
Notes: S: supply; D: demand 
Source: Own presentation 
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In a second step, the world market price for maize increases, as we are currently ob-
serving. A possible explanation for this increase could be developments in the bio-
ethanol market, which have increased the demand for maize, driving up world market 
prices. To keep the diagram less complicated, it is assumed that due to an exoge-
nous shock the world market prices increase while the demand schedule remains 
unchanged. The increase in the world market maize price is so high that the new 
world market maize price is higher than the domestic price in the EU, so the producer 
subsidy is no longer relevant for maize producers. The new world market price PM,w1 
is simultaneously the new domestic price PM,d1.  
Due to price effects in the maize market a new round of effects takes place. In a fol-
lowing step EU producers would replace cotton with maize, as shown by the upward 
shift of the cotton supply curve from S cotton to S cotton new.  
Obviously, subsequent changes will continue to take place until the markets are sta-
bilised and until a new market equilibrium in both markets is established. 
The price changes lead to adjustments in the supplied and demanded quantities of 
maize and cotton, giving rise to changes in the quantities traded. In the reference 
situation a quantity of QM2-QM1 of maize was imported, while in the final situation the 
imported quantity is reduced to the level QM4-QM3. In the cotton market the imports 
increase due to the sequential price changes and, after the shifts of the supply curve, 
the EU will import a quantity equal to QC4-QC3 (as opposed to the original imported 
quantity QC2-QC1).  
The allocation of welfare is different in these two markets and can be simultaneously 
measured in each market. The overall social welfare for the sector can be derived 
from the aggregating the effects in each market. 
In the maize market producers enjoy welfare gains equal to a+b+f+g since not only 
the domestic price increases, but the supply curve also shifts to the right. By contrast 
consumers suffer from the higher price and their surplus is reduced by the area 
a+b+c+d+e. Due to the increase in the world market price the effects on the taxpay-
ers are positive. The state no longer needs to finance the producer subsidy and this 
leads to gains of the area g+h+i+j. The overall change of welfare is equal to -c-d-
e+2g+h+i+j. 
In the cotton market the impact of the different price adjustments is only felt by pro-
ducers and taxpayers, since consumers enjoy the world market price, which remains 
stable throughout the sequential adjustments. The producer surplus decreases by 
the area k+l+m+r+s+t. The effects on taxpayers are due to the different expenditure 
on the producers’ subsidy. Initially taxpayers were burdened with expenditure equal 
to m+n+o+t+u+v, while in the final stage their burden equals the area s+t+u+v. 
Therefore the change of the state’s budget is m+n+o-s-v. Overall the welfare change 
is equal to –k-l-r-2s-t-v+n+o. 
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The sequential measurement of the overall welfare on both markets requires talking 
into consideration the welfare effects on producers and consumers of each price 
change that takes place, while the effects on taxpayers are measured individually for 
each market. Again the aggregation of the welfare effects of each step and on tax-
payers gives the overall welfare effects. The price changes take place in two sequen-
tial steps: 
1. Decrease of the domestic price for cotton farmers from PC,d0 to PC,d1, while the 
initial maize price remains unchanged. The effects on the producers are 
measured on the cotton market and are equal to a reduction of their surplus by 
the area k+l+m. There are no effects on consumers. 
2. Increase of the maize price from PM,d0 to PM,d1 = PM,w1, while the, now lower, 
cotton price remains unchanged. The welfare effects are now measured in the 
maize market and for producers the change of surplus is equal to a+b+c, while 
for consumers it is equal to -a-b-c-d-e. 
The effects on the taxpayers are as mentioned above. In the maize market the 
change of the state’s budget is equal to g+h+i+j and in the cotton market equal to 
m+n+o-s-v. 
 
Through the above analysis one can trace third and higher-round effects that can be 
considered as successive approximations of sequential market responses in related 
markets. To capture these effects empirically, TSAKOK (1990) suggests using cross-
price elasticities in quantitative modelling techniques and claims that multi-market 
analysis can provide an appropriate framework for analysing simultaneous changes 
in linked markets. This type of approaches is used to analyse the properties of differ-
ent market equilibria that come about as a result of exogenous changes. This ap-
proach assumes that other factors that can influence the production remain un-
changed, (i.e. ignoring capital changes or technical progress) and in this respect it is 
a comparative static one. 
 
The analysis in this chapter demonstrated that theoretical considerations are alone 
not enough to reveal the precise allocative and distributional effects on the Mediter-
ranean countries (both in EU and non-EU countries) due to the already described 
agricultural policy reforms. How the trade flows are going to be formed, who will 
benefit and who will lose and how much the taxpayers are going to be burdened or 
not by the reform of the CAP, by the Barcelona Agreement and finally by multilateral 
liberalisation is without empirical analysis not easy to answer. 
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4 Empirical studies of agricultural trade policy reforms 
in the Mediterranean basin 
This chapter reviews existing empirical assessments of trade and agricultural policy 
reforms that are relevant for the countries round the Mediterranean basin. After a 
presentation of the main modelling tools and their elements, there follows a literature 
review that focuses mainly on studies that have analysed the impact of changing 
trade policies. These are mostly focused on trade liberalisation, at the bilateral and 
multilateral level between Mediterranean countries, and only a few studies have 
analysed the latest CAP reform and its likely impacts on Mediterranean countries. 
The last section of this chapter presents the trade policy model AGRISIM that will be 
used for the empirical analysis within this study. 
This chapter aims to identify the type of applied modelling tools that have been used 
and to explain how such policy reforms have been formulated within model scenar-
ios. It also attempts to show existing gaps in the literature, and suggests the ele-
ments that a model should entail in order provide a satisfactory analysis of trade pol-
icy reforms as discussed theoretically in the previous chapter. It argues that the 
AGRISIM model incorporates those elements, can fill these gaps and provide a ro-
bust empirical analysis. 
4.1 Basic elements of modelling tools  
The impact of agricultural policies is assessed both ex post and ex ante. The ex-post 
studies describe the status quo and the historical development of trade and attempt 
to identify key factors that influence observed changes in trade flows. By contrast, the 
ex-ante studies try to answer “what if” questions and try to estimate likely changes 
through formulating plausible scenarios and giving insights on the impacts of ex-
pected policy changes. 
The ex post studies are usually accomplished with the help of gravity models or other 
econometric techniques, such as regression analyses or the calculation of indicators, 
such as export similarity and trade concentration indices.  
The gravity equation was first developed by TINBERGEN (1962) and PÖYHÖNEN (1963) 
and ever since has been applied by a number of authors to explain international 
trade flows due to migration, foreign direct investment or the existence of preferential 
trade agreements. It is based on the premise that a flow from an origin to a destina-
tion is explained by economic forces at the flow’s origin and destination and eco-
nomic forces that either aid or resist these flows (BERGSTRAND, 1985). NIELSEN (2003) 
explains that the main advantage of gravity models is that they are simple and intui-
tive but, due to their character the analysis is restricted to one-way trade. ANDERSON 
and WINCOOP (2003) note that due to their lack of theoretical foundation the results of 
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gravity models are biased by omitted variables and that the estimated parameters 
cannot be used in comparative static exercises. 
Ex ante analysis typically uses sector-specific or economy-wide models. While econ-
omy-wide models focus on the entire economy the sector-specific models depict ef-
fects in one particular economic sector. More specifically, the economy-wide models 
can be divided in three main categories: macro-econometric models, input-output 
models and general equilibrium models9 (TONGEREN et al., 2001).  
Macro-econometric models, as the name reveals, examine the macro-economic envi-
ronment, for example, through the development of inflation or of exchange rates and 
do not focus on the agricultural, or any other specific sector.  
Input-output models assess the impact of a change in the final demand of a given 
sector on all sectors of the economy (SADOULET and DE JAVRY, 1995 pp. 285-288). 
They are based on input-output tables, i.e. on a matrix that includes the activity and 
commodity accounts and the interactions between them. The technique of the input-
output modelling was initially developed in the ’30s by Vassily Leontief and is known 
as the Leontief model but since then it has been extended and modified so that the 
derived multipliers more accurately represent the multiplier effect on the economy 
(SADOULET and DE JAVRY, 1995 pp. 285-288). Despite these advances input-output 
models cannot capture welfare effects. 
Equilibrium models, either partial or general, are more widely used in the analysis of 
trade policy reforms. 
CGEs can be defined as models that capture the interactions between economic ac-
tivities within a country, a region or the entire world by focusing on the intra and inter-
regional interdependencies of markets and actors (BROCKMEIER, 1999). This allows 
for the examination of the allocation of resources which could arise, for example, 
from changes in international prices due to a reform of trade policy. They require an 
extended data base since they need to be fed with data for all economic sectors and 
for the transactions between them. Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs) or alterna-
tively input-output tables are used as input data for CGEs. A SAM is a square matrix 
and differs from an input-output table in that the later table is a sub-set of a SAM, 
containing only the activity and commodity accounts (SADOULET and DE JANVRY, 1995 
pp.285). When input-output tables are used as an information source for a CGE, then 
additional data on the behaviour of producers, consumers, importers, exporters and 
possibly other economic agents are required (TONGEREN et al., 2001). Due to the 
large amount of background data that CGEs require, global CGEs cannot be easily 
developed by individuals and in practice they are developed either by international 
                                            
9 Alternative names for the general equilibrium models are computable general equilibrium models 
(CGE) or applied general equilibrium models. Hereafter the term computable general equilibrium 
model will be used. 
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organisations or by consortiums that can afford to construct SAMs for specific re-
gions. Some CGEs have been developed by individuals, but these have usually fo-
cused only on one country and are based on the SAM of this particularly country, 
thus do not provide an adequate regional picture. Equally the commodities within the 
economic sectors are often aggregated at a higher level, either due to data restric-
tions or just in an attempt to keep the models manageable and do not give detailed 
insights on a particular economic activity and economic sector. Therefore when dis-
cussing a particular economic sector, and even more so a limited number of specific 
commodities, it is more common to employ partial equilibrium models.  
Partial equilibrium models (PEs) by definition focus on one part of the economy i.e. 
on one economic sector and do not take into account interrelationships and interde-
pendencies between different economic sectors and the different inputs and outputs 
of the economy. Prices and quantities in the rest of the economic sectors and mar-
kets are not examined, and are assumed to be unaffected by policy change. The 
partial equilibrium models have the advantage of allowing a relatively transparent 
analysis of trade policy issues, since they focus on a very limited set of data on 
prices and policy variables (FRANCOIS and HALL, 1997 p. 122). Moreover they allow a 
higher disaggregated representation of the commodities within the economic sector 
studied than CGEs.  
Equilibrium models (both partial and general) can be characterised as comparatively 
static or dynamic. The comparative-static approach involves comparing different 
equilibria that occur from a simulated policy shock, for example a change in an ex-
ogenous variable (FRANCOIS and REINERT, 1997 p. 6). When changes on investment 
and technology are captured, for example through shifts in the demand and supply 
curves and slope changes, then the approach is a dynamic one (TSAKOK, 1990 pp. 
180-181).  
Equilibrium models can be also characterised as multi-regional based on their re-
gional focus and as multi or single commodity depending on their commodity compo-
sition. 
The structure of the model can allow the assumption that the goods or commodities 
are homogenous, meaning that domestically produced and imported goods are con-
sidered as perfect substitutes in demand, or that they are imperfect substitutes 
(FRANCOIS and REINERT, 1997 p. 5). The latter assumption is known as Armington 
assumption (ARMINGTON, 1969) and is based on the use of constant elasticity of sub-
stitution functional forms to describe the preferences among imports from various 
countries. 
Equilibrium models can also be divided into spatial and non-spatial ones. TONGEREN 
et al. (2001) explain that homogeneity is often connected to a pooled market in non-
spatial models where it is known what each actor brings to, and takes from, the mar-
ket. In the case when the products are differentiated according to their origin, then 
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the price gap between the domestic and the foreign goods reflects the domestic tariff 
and the transport costs from one country to the other (or alternatively from one region 
to another). This modelling approach is known as a spatial one (BOUËT, 2006a). 
Over the years several global multi-commodity equilibrium models have been devel-
oped and have been supported by international organisations. Examples of such 
models are the COSIMO model developed by the Food and Agricultural Organisation 
(FAO) of the United Nations (FAO, 2005), the AGLINK model, by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, various years; CONFORTI and 
LONDERO, 2001; TONGEREN et al., 200110), the ATPSM model (Agricultural Trade Pol-
icy Simulation Model) by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) (UNCTAD, 2004) and the model of the Food and Agricultural Policy Re-
search Institute (FAPRI) (WESTHOFF and YOUNG, 2001). Further models have been 
developed by international networks of university-based scientists, such as the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) (HERTEL, 1998) or within research projects like 
the models WATSIM (KUHN, 2003) and CAPRI (BRITZ, 2005) from the University of 
Bonn, ESIM from the University of Göttingen (BANSE et al., 2004) and CAPsi 
(LEDEBUR et al, 2005) from the Federal Agricultural Research Centre of Germany 
(FAL). Over the same period reviews and evaluations of these global models have 
increased as well, with the study of TONGEREN et al. (2001) being worthy of note. 
Last but not least, ex-ante analyses have also been carried out with non-linear opti-
misation production models. These models belong to the family of mathematical pro-
gramming models. BAUER and KASNAKOGLU (1990) and HECKELEI (2002) explain how 
these types of models determine input allocation to various production activities and 
allow for the modelling of technological and political constrains. They are pro-
grammed using Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) techniques i.e. allowing 
calibration to observed behaviour within a base year. 
All these modelling tools and methodological choices offer advantages and disad-
vantages in their application and should be seen as complementary approaches. In 
practise the choice of a model depends only on the problem that needs to be solved 
and on data availability and the available resources to develop it.  
                                            
10 An extended version of this study has been published as TONGEREN et al. (1999 and 2000). 
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4.2 Literature Review 
The studies reviewed in this section are presented based on their main focus and on 
the methodology they have applied to assess the impact of the reformed agricultural 
trade policies empirically on the Mediterranean countries. 
4.2.1 Empirical assessments of the latest CAP Reform relevant to 
Mediterranean countries 
The latest CAP Reform has been topic of interest in recent years for agricultural 
economists, who have carried out various analyses using partial and general equilib-
rium models. A number of studies have employed static partial equilibrium models to 
assess the impacts of the latest CAP reform and particularly the introduction of Sin-
gle Farm Payments. These include studies by LIPS (2004), KLARE and DOLL (2004), 
the EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2003); BINFIELD et al. (2003) and the FAA (2002). The 
general equilibrium studies mostly involve applications of the GTAP, as for example 
the studies by BROCKMEIER et al. (2003) and MEIJL et al. (2002). Wider views on 
modelling exercises of the Luxembourg Agreement are given by BALKHAUSEN et al. 
(2008)11, while a number of papers review models applied for the analysis of the EU’s 
common agricultural policy. These include a number of working papers from the Ital-
ian Institute of Agricultural Economics. ARFINI (2001) has evaluated positive mathe-
matical programming models, CONFORTI (2001) main partial equilibrium models, DE 
MURO and SALVATICI (2001) multi-sectoral models and SCKOKAI (2001) econometric 
models. 
The studies analyse the first wave of the CAP Reform, from the Luxembourg Agree-
ment and discuss its impacts on typically northern agricultural commodity markets, 
such as cereals, rice and livestock commodities, such as milk, beef, pork and poultry 
meat. They make predictions for either the EU as one region (BROCKMEIER et al. 
2003; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2003; FAA, 2002; LIPS, 2004), or specific countries like 
Ireland (BINFIELD et al., 2003 and BREEN et al. 2005) or the Netherlands (MEIJL et al., 
2003).  
The modelling of the decoupled direct payments that were introduced with the Single 
Farm Payment is a key methodological aspect that requires attention. In partial equi-
librium models such in this of FAPRI, the decoupling is modelled through the applica-
tion of a multiplier that functions in a similar way to the multiplier of production-effec-
tiveness, described in chapter 3. A description of way in which the FAPRI model ap-
proaches modelling decoupling can be found in BINFIELD et al. (2005). 
                                            
11 An older version of this paper has been published as BALKHAUSEN et al. (2005). 
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Due to the regional composition of the models that have been employed to analyse 
the CAP Reform, the regional effects on the Mediterranean EU Member States on 
the one hand and on non-EU Mediterranean countries on the other are not revealed. 
The second wave of the CAP reform (for cotton, olive oil and tobacco) that might af-
fect the agricultural sector of the EU Mediterranean Member States and other Medi-
terranean countries has only attracted limited attention from agricultural economists. 
Three noteworthy studies examine the impacts of the CAP reform on cotton and to-
bacco and are discussed in more detail in the next three paragraphs. 
The modelling exercise of KARAGIANNIS (2004) focuses on the effects on the EU’s 
cotton producers of the CAP reform on cotton. The author developed a single market 
single country synthetic partial equilibrium model, which was applied to both Greece 
and Spain. In the model the policy variables, which are the entitlements per producer 
for the eligible areas are converted from a per-hectare to a per-tonne basis. The new 
area payments are treated as input subsidies that shift the supply curve of land 
downwards and result in a decrease of the rental price of land, which in turn in-
creases the quantity of land used for cotton production. The model treats the new 
area payment as a subsidy targeted at one production factor and the market price 
support as a subsidy spread evenly across all inputs. The model uses the period 
2000-2003 as its reference period and gives results on production and producers’ 
income, which is estimated by the producer surplus. The application of the Single 
Farm Payment in both countries is expected to result in a lower supply, with the ef-
fects on the income of the cotton growers being positive, although to varying de-
grees, depending on the supply elasticity. With a supply elasticity of 0.35, the aver-
age change in the producer surplus is 3.6 % in Greece and 6.1 % in Spain, while with 
a supply elasticity of 0.7 the change is 12.1 % and 16.8 % in the two countries re-
spectively. 
STOFOROS and MERGOS (2004) have used a partial equilibrium model of the EU’s to-
bacco sector to examine the impacts of the EU tobacco policy reform on the EU’s 
producers, consumers and taxpayers. The authors have estimated changes on pro-
duction, consumption and on the EU’s self-sufficiency and net trade based on two 
future scenarios for 2010. The first scenario (baseline scenario) assumes the con-
tinuation of the EU’s tobacco policy, while the second involves the total elimination of 
deficiency payments. The results of the second scenario (expressed as changes 
from the baseline scenario) indicate a 20 % decrease of production and an 8 % de-
crease in consumption. The authors explain that abolition of the tobacco deficiency 
payments will affect the EU’s self-sufficiency, which will result in a rise in prices and 
thus a decline in consumption. Consequently, the imports of tobacco into the EU will 
increase and the EU’s self-sufficiency will decrease from 0.45 in 2003 to 0.39 in 
2010. The effects on producer and on consumer surplus are negative (losses of 226 
and 88 million Euro respectively) but are positive for the entire EU budget (an in-
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crease of 267 million Euro). The demand, supply and price elasticities which underlie 
the modelling exercise were estimated by the authors.  
A further study on the impacts of the CAP Reform on Mediterranean commodities 
has been carried out by ARFINI et al. (2005). Using a farm model based on Positive 
Mathematical Programming the authors examine the Italian tobacco sector and 
elaborate the effects of the reform of the tobacco CMO on harvested surfaces, farm 
incomes and overall employment for a sample of farms derived from the Italian FADN 
(Farm Accounting Data Network). Because the study does not employ a trade model, 
the effects on trade flows and on welfare cannot be derived and the results only fo-
cus on Italian farms that grow tobacco. The results indicate that decoupled aid would 
not justify a continuation of tobacco cultivation and expects a reduction in production 
of up to 95 % in the examined regions. This decline in production is expected to have 
negative results on employment, with non-family workers expected to be the most 
negatively affected group. 
The EU Parliament commissioned GARCIA ÁLVAREZ-COQUE (2006b) to carry out an 
expert estimation of the likely effects of possible reforms to the support regime for 
fruits and their static impacts on the EU’s fruit and vegetable markets. However, 
these reform proposals are only on a preliminary level and did not reflect the sub-
stance of the EU Commission’s proposals for the reform of the fruit and vegetable 
CMO that was later published (Commission of the European Communities, 2007a 
and b). 
 
To date there has been no examination of the effects of the Luxembourg Agreement 
through ex-ante modelling exercises, since the effects of this reform just begin to be-
come evident (in economic year 2006/07) and thus the observations are not sufficient 
for such an analysis. 
4.2.2 Empirical assessments of trade liberalisation that is relevant to 
Mediterranean countries 
Studies on trade liberalisation around the Mediterranean mainly focus on analysing 
the Euro-Med Agreements. The impact of this has been assessed both ex-post and 
ex-ante as association agreements came into force at different times among the 
Mediterranean Partner Countries. Most of the ex-post studies refer to the impacts in 
the entire economy, and not particularly on the agricultural sector, since trade liber-
alisation has already taken place and is mostly related to the secondary and tertiary 
sectors. 
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Ex post studies 
Econometric analyses 
MUAZ et al. (2003) reviewed and evaluated the consequences of the Euro-Med 
Agreements on Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, with particular refer-
ence to the effects on the economic development of the agricultural sector. Through 
a PAM approach the authors sought to quantify the comparative advantage (or dis-
advantage) of eleven horticultural crops12 in these countries and to quantify the main 
economic and social implications of expanding the export volumes of the most com-
petitive crops, in terms of national income, employment, investment and the use of 
resources (especially water). The analysis shows that, due to the Euro-Med Agree-
ments, the EU is the major destination market. The calculation of the Domestic Re-
source Cost (DRC) reveals the MPCs to have comparative advantages in horticul-
tural production, mainly because of favourable climatic conditions, competitive labour 
costs and their proximity to the EU markets. At the same time, market analyses in 
Germany, France, the Netherlands and the UK, based on the concept of profitable 
demand, confirms that there are market windows for the MPCs, mainly during the 
winter months and in the beginning of spring and the end of autumn, i.e. in months 
were there is no production from the EU Mediterranean member states. For example, 
the estimated profitable demand in the Netherlands for green beans was for 24,041 
metric tons between December and April, whereas in the UK, France and Germany 
the demand was for 12,736; 12,782 and 28,586 tons respectively. Meeting profitable 
demand for green beans, strawberries, melons and table grapes in these EU coun-
tries would imply the creation of 119,000 permanent jobs in the MPCs, with total eco-
nomic profits to producers and exporters being in the order of about US$498 million 
and added value to the national economies of the five MPCs equalling US$756 mil-
lion. The social and economic impacts were predicted by translating the unmet de-
mand from metric tons into hectares and then using input-output coefficients to cal-
culate the labour requirement, the permanent jobs, the social added value and the 
water requirement. The authors noted that structural change and adjustments, for-
eign investment and changes in the legal framework need to take place in the MPCs 
to make the conditions favourable for further exploitation of their comparative ad-
vantages. One future constraining factor could be water supply, which is becoming 
the most limited factor in terms of volume and quality. 
A project carried out within the Femise network examined the development of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership focusing on the existing impacts on trade in indus-
                                            
12 The selected crops are green house tomatoes, green house green beans, strawberries (both green 
house and open field), table grapes, sweet melons, green house sweet peppers, apples, dates, 
olives, anises and roses.  
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trial commodities and services and the impacts on the labour market stemming from 
flows of investments aiming at creating structural changes (HABDOUSSA and REIFERS, 
2003). After analysing the current macroeconomic environment of the MPCs the au-
thors identified the areas – axes for development over a fifteen-year horizon. They 
suggest that the focus should lie on creating job through undertaking necessary 
structural adjustments in the labour market and education system and assuring mac-
roeconomic stability. Given the current labour market structure and population growth 
in the coming fifteen years, 34 million new jobs are required to avoid any decline from 
the present situation. The authors suggest that macroeconomic stability requires re-
form of the taxation system, a reduction of public expenditure and controlling infla-
tion. The MPCs should prioritise the objectives of expanding economic growth, mod-
ernising the infrastructure, improving trade competitiveness and addressing the issue 
of poverty. Looking at the poverty level, although only 2 % of the population live on 
less than a dollar per day, about 30 % of the population (72 million people) live on 
less than 2 dollars per day, a rate identical to this of 1987. The key to accomplishing 
these objectives is attracting foreign capital. Despite the Euro-Med Agreements, 
European investors seem to prefer to invest within EU candidate countries or South 
America rather than in the MPCs. American investors appear to be more attracted to 
the region. 
Gravity models 
GARCIA ÁLVAREZ-COQUE and MARTÍ SELVA (2006) have assessed the effects of the 
Euro-Med Agreements on the trade of fresh fruits and vegetables between the EU 
and the MPCs by using a gravity model. The gravity equation shows the extent to 
which bilateral trade flows are determined by variables that indicate the total potential 
demand in the importing country, the total potential supply of the exporting country 
and by binary variables that reflect the effects of the Association Agreements be-
tween the EU with the MPCs in increasing the value of trade between the two. The 
model was applied to the EU-15 and eight south Mediterranean countries, Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Israel, over the period 1995-
2004. The results indicate that the decisive factors for the trade of fresh fruit and 
vegetables between the EU and the MPCs are the distance between the exporting 
countries and the EU, the demand patterns in the EU and the cultural and historical 
links between particular exporting countries and the EU. In spite of logistical and 
technological improvements, the proximity to EU markets has a considerable influ-
ence on trade and provides as a significant premium for retailing companies. Overall 
the Association Agreements have boosted the exports of fruit and vegetables from 
the MPCs to the EU, but when looking at individual countries, the study shows that 
the Agreements have only marginally helped to integrate the Maghreb and Mashrek 
economies and their effect has only really been significantly beneficial for Israel. The 
authors argue that this could be explained by the growing demand for quality prod-
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ucts that is better fulfilled by more developed economies, such as Israel, rather than 
Maghreb and Mashrek countries. 
Ex ante studies  
The existing ex ante empirical studies focus on analysing the impacts of future trade 
liberalisation between the EU and the MPCs. Most of them have been carried out 
using CGE models and only a few with PE models. One study employed an Input-
Output (I-O) model and another study used a non-linear optimisation model. The fol-
lowing section gives more insights on each of these empirical studies. 
Equilibrium Analyses  
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modelling has been widely used to analyse 
the impact of the Euro-Med Agreements, since it offers the advantage of capturing 
economy-wide effects. Nevertheless, because of the extended database required to 
support such a model, most of the studies focus only on one country, usually Turkey, 
Egypt, Tunisia or Morocco, using national CGE models. A number of studies that 
employ multi-regional, multi-commodity models have used the GTAP model without 
modifying its structure or closure, or alternatively use the database from various 
GTAP versions.  
A few studies have been carried out with dynamic CGEs, and fewer still have used 
PE models to analyse the impacts of trade liberalisation on the Mediterranean agri-
cultural sector.  
An overview of the empirical studies and their scope follows in Table 4.1. 
Reviews of the empirical studies which model the Euro-Med Association Agreements 
and regional and preferential agreements (including the Euro-Med) are provided by 
KUIPER (2004), KURZWEIL et al. (2003) and NIELSEN (2003). In addition, an extensive 
literature review on the sustainability of the impacts of the Euro-Med Agreements has 
been prepared by the consortium of the SIA project (Sustainability Impact Assess-
ment) (IARC, 2005 and 2004). 
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Table 4.1: Overview of ex-ante empirical studies on modelling agricultural 
trade policy liberalisation on the Mediterranean Basin with equilib-
rium models 
Type of model Study Scope of the study 
Computable General Equilibrium Models 
   static AUGIER and GASIOREK (2003a) 
BROWN et al. (1997) 
CHATTI (2003) 
HARRISON et al. (1997) 
HOEKMAN et al. (2001) 
KONAN and MASKUS (1997 and 
2000) 
LUCKE (2001) 
 
MINOT et al. (2007) 
 
RAVALLION and LOKSHIN (2004) 
RUTHERFORD et al. (1997) 
Euro-Med Agreements 
EU-Tunisia free trade area 
EU-Tunisia free trade area 
Turkey customs union 
Egypt’s trade liberalisation 
Egypt’s trade liberalisation + fiscal 
policies 
Jordan’s and Syria’s fiscal impact of 
trade liberalisation 
Impacts of trade liberalisation on Tu-
nisia and Syria 
Moroccan trade liberalisation 
 
EU-Morocco free trade area 
      - GTAP ALESSANDRI (2000) 
DENNIS (2006) 
DIAO and YELDAN (2001) 
ELBEHRI and HERTEL (2004) 
HOSOE (2001) 
KUIPER (2006) 
 
MERCENIER et al. (1997) 
SONMEZ et al. (2006) 
Euro-Med Agreements 
Euro-Med Agreements/GAFTA 
Euro-Med Agreements 
EU-Morocco free trade area 
Jordan trade liberalisation  
Euro-Med Agreements on Morocco 
and Tunisia 
EU-Turkey customs union 
Turkey accession to the EU 
   dynamic BOUËT (2006b) 
 
CHEMINGUI and DESSUS (2001) 
FERABOLI et al. (2003) 
LÖFGREN et al. (2001) 
Trade strategies of the MPCs to-
wards the EU 
EU-Tunisia trade liberalisation 
EU-Jordan trade liberalisation 
Moroccan trade liberalisation 
Partial Equilibrium Models 
   static AUGIER and GASIOREK (2003b) 
BRITZ et al. (2006) 
GARCIA ÁLVAREZ-COQUE et al. 
(2007) 
GRETHE (2003) 
Euro-Med Agreements on Morocco 
Euro-Med trade liberalisation 
Euro-Med Agreements on Moroccan 
tomato market 
EU-Turkey customs union 
   spatial M´BAREK (2002) Euro-Med Agreements on Morocco 
and Tunisia 
Source: Own compilation 
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Static CGE models 
HARRISON et al. (1997) developed a CGE model to quantify the impacts of the cus-
toms union between Turkey and the EU. Seven scenarios were developed in total, 
where various policy adjustments that Turkey has to undertake are modelled. These 
include: a tariff reduction on Turkish imports of manufactured products so as to com-
ply with the EU Common External Tariff; the impacts of improved market access only 
to EU markets; improved access because of harmonisation of product quality stan-
dards; improved market access to the markets of EU’s preferential trade partners; a 
reduction of export subsidies; a reduction of trading costs and finally; the overall 
customs union. The gains for Turkey vary between 1 % and 1.5 % of its GDP and 
compensate the losses from tariff revenues. However, the authors do not report more 
on the model or the dataset used for the simulations. They indicate that a broader 
model documentation is included in HARRISON et al. (1996) (a publication that could 
not be accessed).  
MERCENIER and YELDAN (1997) examine the customs union between Turkey and the 
EU and analyse the implications of trade liberalisation on the agricultural sector by 
using an intertemporal CGE model. The model recognises increasing returns to 
scale, the existence of firm level product differentiation and an oligopolistic market 
structure. The demand side is covered through a single representative household. 
The model entails nine sectors, four of which are perfectly competitive (agriculture 
and primary products; food, beverages and tobacco; other manufacturing industries 
and; transport and services) while the other sectors are considered to be non-com-
petitive (pharmaceutical products; other chemistry; motor vehicles; office and other 
machinery and; transport materials). It divides the world into seven regions, i.e. Tur-
key, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, the rest of the EU-12 and the rest of the 
world. These are linked by an Armington system. In two scenarios the authors simu-
late Turkey’s commitment to entering into a customs union with the EU. In the first 
they assume the elimination of tariffs on European imports and harmonising the tariff 
rates with the rest of the world with the existing EU ones. In the second they assume 
the possible accession of Turkey into the EU with a single pricing system. The 
benchmark used for the simulations is a ’92 post-Europe computed equilibrium. The 
authors only find welfare gains, of just below 1 % of GDP for the Turkish economy, in 
the event of the second scenario. They conclude that a simple harmonisation of Tur-
key’s tariff system would result in a loss of real consumption of almost 1 % and would 
only be beneficial if accompanied by full trade integration. 
RUTHERFORD et al. (1997) applied a general equilibrium model to examine the effects 
of trade liberalisation between Morocco and the EU. The model is based on a previ-
ous study of RUTHERFORD et al. (1993) and belongs to a category known as small 
open economy models. It has one representative consumer, assumes no terms-of-
trade effects, no capital accumulation and constant returns to scale with competitive 
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pricing. The authors use a two-tier CET function to firstly determine the split between 
domestic sales and composite export sales and secondly to distinguish between ex-
ports sales to the EU and non-EU countries. The Moroccan economy is organised 
into 19 sectors, seven of which are agricultural (cereals, sugar, citrus fruits, vegeta-
bles, meat and dairy, fishing, forestry and other agriculture). The model utilises pro-
duction and value-added data from a SAM of 1980 and tariff data of 1991. Six sce-
narios are simulated for various trade liberalisation options that range from improved 
market access for Moroccan fruits and vegetables in the EU to a unilateral full trade 
liberalisation of Morocco with the rest of the world. It is shown that the EU-Morocco 
free trade area will increase welfare in Morocco by about 1.5 % of GDP, with the ef-
fects being higher with full unilateral liberalisation (2.6 % of GDP). They find the trade 
creation effects are large than the trade diversion effects. Key parameters used to 
identify whether a regional trade agreement results in net positive results or not, in-
clude: import shares, tariff levels and the substitution elasticities in consumption. The 
results indicate that a higher Armington elasticity leads to higher welfare benefits. 
The study finds a correlation between welfare effects and the required factor adjust-
ments, but shows that broader trade liberalisation creates more welfare gains than a 
free trade area but in this case the adjustment costs slightly higher.  
BROWN et al. (1997) study the impacts of the free trade area between Tunisia and the 
EU, using the “Michigan Brown-Deardorff-Stern CGE trade model”. The model as-
sumes full employment, fixed relative wages and a fixed labour supply. The agricul-
tural sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive, and all other sectors are as-
sumed to be monopolistically competitive. Agricultural commodities are differentiated, 
according to their origin and firm differentiation is applied to all other commodities. Of 
particular interest is the regional aggregation that is followed, with the EU-12 divided 
into three regions, one containing Greece, Portugal and Spain, France and Italy a 
second and the rest of EU-12 a third region. Other regions included in the model are 
Tunisia, the rest of Europe, Asia and the Pacific, the North Atlantic Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) and the rest of world. The simulated scenarios involve the bilateral removal 
of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on goods between Tunisia and the EU-12, combined 
with sectorally mobile capital and a flow of capital from the EU into Tunisia. The re-
sults show that the welfare benefits for Tunisia range from slightly negative (-0.2 % of 
GDP) to somewhat positive (+3.3 %) depending on the sectoral mobility of capital. 
The welfare gains remain almost unaffected by capital flows.  
KONAN and MASKUS (1997) examine the impact of trade liberalisation on the Egyptian 
economy, which is modelled as a small open economy that trades differentiated 
goods and services with multiple regions. The imported and domestic goods are im-
perfect substitutes as are domestic goods and exported ones. The demand side is 
covered by using a single representative household, while changes in aggregate 
consumption are used as direct measure of the equivalent variation of a policy 
change that is also used to measure welfare changes. Benchmark data is taken from 
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a SAM for Egypt from 1990, which the authors updated to 1994. Three of the sectors 
covered in the SAM represent the agricultural sector, namely vegetable food, vege-
table non-food and animal products. The model divides the world into five regions, 
namely Egypt, the EU and Turkey, the USA, the rest of Middle East and North Africa, 
and the rest of the world. The authors use five scenarios to simulate various options 
for liberalising trade, and throughout these they assume that Egypt adjusts its do-
mestic tax system to compensate for a reduction of tariff revenue. The results show 
that Egypt would enjoy significant welfare gains of about 2.0 % of the GDP from re-
ducing red-tape costs on imports and exports, which are taken into account through 
an assumed tariff equivalent. With this reform, the association agreement with the EU 
would slightly reduce welfare. The welfare gains are higher when trade liberalisation 
becomes broader and the highest welfare gains are observed in the scenario where 
full unilateral liberalisation of trade is simulated (about 3.0 % of GDP). In a follow-up 
study the same authors focus on the interactions between trade liberalisation and 
changes in domestic fiscal policies (KONAN and MASKUS, 2000). They conclude that 
Egypt could enjoy welfare gains of to 1 % from reforming its tax system. Trade liber-
alisation also produces welfare gains, but lower due to trade diversion effects and 
lower tariff revenues. A combined effect would result in welfare gains depending on 
the magnitude of each reform. 
ALESSANDRI (2000) uses the GTAP model, version 4, to assess the impacts of the EU 
trade policy under the framework of the Barcelona Agreement. The simulations rest 
on a 10-regions-10 industries aggregation of the GTAP database. The agricultural 
sector is represented through crops and other agricultural products. The study ex-
amines the customs union between the EU and Turkey, the Euro-Med Agreements 
between EU and Morocco and the Euro-Med Agreements between the EU and the 
rest of North Africa which are modelled as reciprocal elimination of trade barriers 
(import tariffs) on manufactured goods. Only two scenarios are relevant for the agri-
cultural sector, in one import tariffs are eliminated and in the other import tariffs are 
eliminated and output and export subsidies are dismantled. The findings suggest an 
increase of the welfare varying from US$3.3 to 2.6 billion for the EU, but an ambigu-
ous impact on the MPCs. For example in Morocco the welfare increase varies be-
tween US$0.38 and 0.47 billion (the higher figure is for the elimination of both import 
tariffs and output-export subsidies) and in Turkey of about US$0.82 billion (for all 
scenarios). For the rest of the North African countries the welfare deteriorates slightly 
(welfare decreases of US$0.23 billion). 
DIAO et. al. (2001)13. extended and adjusted the same model used by MERCENIER 
(1997) to examine the static and inter-temporal effects of bilateral trade liberalisation 
between the EU, Turkey and non-EU Mediterranean countries. The model is based 
                                            
13 The paper has been also published as BAYAR et al. (2001 and 2000). 
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on inter-temporal general equilibrium theory with Ramsey-type dynamics. The world 
is divided into nine regions with EU, Turkey, Morocco, the rest of the Middle East and 
the rest of North Africa as separate regions. It includes nine sectors and the products 
are differentiated according to their geographical origin (Armington assumption). Two 
simulation scenarios are developed, with the customs union between Turkey and the 
EU used as the baseline scenario. The first scenario simulates trade liberalisation of 
the manufactured goods between the MPCs and the EU and in the second this liber-
alisation is extended among the MPCs themselves. The data come from simple ag-
gregation of the GTAP version 3 database. Manufacturing trade liberalisation entails 
static welfare losses for the MPCs and welfare gains for the EU in both scenarios, 
with the losses being smaller in the second scenario. Nevertheless, when dynamic 
aspects such as investment and growth effects are taken into account, then the 
model predicts welfare gains in all regions. The authors conclude that the static ef-
fects are the short term effects, with the welfare loses explained by a deflation of do-
mestic prices in the MPCs and vice versa.  
The impacts of trade liberalisation scenarios between Egypt, the EU and other Arab 
countries are examined by HOEKMAN et al. (2001) using a standard, single country, 
competitive, computable general equilibrium model. The model entails 38 sectors, 
three of which refer to agriculture. Three preferential trade liberalisation scenarios are 
modelled. The first refers to removal of import tariffs on EU goods and improved ac-
cess to the EU market for Egyptian products (through higher export prices of 1 % for 
the Egyptian products), the second looks at the additional removal of tariffs on com-
modities originating from the USA and the third, the additional deeper integration with 
the USA through elimination of all trade barriers. The results indicate welfare gains of 
0.99 %, 1.26 % and 2.31 % of GDP for the three scenarios respectively. The highest 
effects for Egypt are achieved through the formation of a free trade area with the 
USA, but this is to the cost of the rest of the world due to trade diversion effects. 
A comparative static national computable general equilibrium model has been devel-
oped by HOSOE (2001) to analyse the impact of the Uruguay Round and the Euro-
Mediterranean Association Agreements on Jordan. The model is calibrated to the 
GTAP database version 3 and input-output tables of Jordan. The model includes nine 
sectors and three regions (Jordan, EU and the rest of the world). The agricultural 
sector is represented by a single sector. The Uruguay Round scenario consists of 
tariff cuts and a phasing out of the Multi fibre Arrangement, whereas the scenario of a 
free trade area with the EU assumes a reduction of tariff rates between Jordan and 
the EU by 80 %. Social welfare is measured by the Hicksian equivalent variation as 
the relative size of the base run GDP. In both scenarios Jordan’s welfare is improved, 
by 0.28 % and 0.16 % respectively. This change is attributed to trade creation effects 
in exports and imports, changes in sectoral output and favourable trade diversion 
effects favourably on imports from the EU. 
76  Empirical studies 
LUCKE (2001) developed a CGE model to analyse the fiscal impacts of trade liberali-
sation for Jordan. The entire economy of Jordan is decomposed in 13 sectors in-
cluding agriculture (aggregated as one sector). The world is broken down into four 
regions, namely Jordan, the Middle East and North Africa, the EU and the rest of the 
world. The model uses constant elasticity of substitution (CES) and constant elastic-
ity of transformation (CET) functions to determine supply and demand, thus distin-
guishing domestically produced commodities from imported ones. The model is cali-
brated using a 1998 SAM for Jordan, with data from missing elements taken from a 
1987 Input-Output table. The possible effects of the Euro-Med Agreements are 
tested in seven scenarios, which simulate various degrees of trade liberalisation. The 
results indicate that a reduction of import tariffs causes a chain of effects starting 
from reduced domestic prices for imported goods, consumption of domestically pro-
duced commodities being substituted by imported ones, an increase of imports, a 
decline of domestic prices for domestic products and a switch from the domestic 
supply of goods to exports. Real GDP slightly decreases in the full liberalisation sce-
narios. The nominal and real effects of only liberalising trade in agricultural products 
are rather negligible. The losses of government revenue, due to reduced tariff reve-
nue, are about 14 % under full liberalisation. The government deficit though remains 
almost stable because government consumption and investment decline but in the 
same proportion as the fall in government revenue. The rise in the current account 
deficit is much higher (for example 717.9 % under the full liberalisation scenario 
which amounts to 8 % of nominal GDP), reflecting the rise in the trade deficit. The 
losses in tariff revenue could be compensated for by cutting real government con-
sumption by about 5 % and real public investment by about 3 %. It should be noted 
that because all the prices have been normalised in the base run scenario to one 
hundred and also because the consumer index value is used as numéraire with a 
value of one hundred throughout the simulations, the counterfactual values of prices 
can only be seen as index values relative to the consumer price index. 
A CGE for Syria was developed in the same study (LUCKE, 2001). Benchmark data 
for this model used a SAM for Syria from 1999, with the economic activities being 
aggregated into nine categories (one of which covers agriculture). The world was ag-
gregated into nine regions (Syria, Arabic States, EU-15, ex-socialist countries, USA, 
Turkey, Japan, ABC – Argentina, Brazil and Chile - and the rest of the world). A 
composite good was produced for each product category, using the inputs, domestic 
supply and imports in a CES function. Trade creation is described as a function of the 
relative price between domestic and imported commodities. Trade diversion is mod-
elled assuming that, for a given import volume, Syria minimises the costs of imports 
with trading partners under CES technology, and CET transformation functions are 
used to model aggregated export. The picture in Syria is very similar to that of Jor-
dan. The results of seven liberalisation scenarios show a gradual increase in produc-
ers’ prices and an increase in the trade deficit due to an increase in imports. The in-
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crease in the total government deficit is almost equal to the loss of tariff revenue. Due 
to trade diversion effects the EU is the trade partner benefiting the most. The author 
argues that Syria could offset the tariff revenue losses through indirect taxation on 
consumption goods thereby minimising any problems arising from the socially unac-
ceptable distribution of the tax burden. 
AUGIER and GASIOREK (2003a) carried out a non-GTAP study. They built an 11 coun-
try – 10 sector static CGE model, allowing for imperfect competition in product mar-
kets and increasing returns to scale in production, to examine the price and welfare 
implications of liberalisation between the EU and southern Mediterranean countries. 
The scenarios involve full liberalisation (i.e. elimination of all tariffs) as well as im-
proved market access and trade-induced changes in productivity. The welfare effects 
are measured by a compensating variation as a proportion of base GDP. Under the 
full liberalisation scenario all countries gain due to trade creation except for Jordan, 
Syria, and Turkey, whereas the highest welfare gains are for Tunisia (8.9 %), Mo-
rocco (5.36 %) and Egypt (1.39 %). The tariff-reduction and the improved market ac-
cess and productivity scenario results in welfare gains for all the southern Mediterra-
nean countries while the effects are rather minor for the EU. The results are similar 
when reducing the tariffs levied by the southern Mediterranean countries to the EU 
level (i.e. to Most Favoured Nation level). The results do not change when the tariff 
reduction gradually takes place, a scenario closer to the framework of the Euro-Med 
Agreements. 
CHATTI (2003) examined the impacts of the Free Trade Agreement between Tunisia 
and the EU assuming both a competitive market and oligopolistic market structures. 
Three scenarios were simulated with three different versions of a static single country 
CGE model, based on the model provided in RUTHERFORD et al. (1997). The model 
used Tunisian data from 1995 and includes 22 sectors, with agriculture aggregated 
into one sector. The basic version assumed constant returns to scale, perfect com-
petition and exogenous terms of trade, while the commodities are differentiated for 
both imports and exports. The second and third versions of the model introduce in-
creasing returns to scale through positive fixed costs and constant marginal costs, 
respectively. The firms behave oligopolistically, meaning that the unit costs are 
greater than the marginal ones and therefore the marginal cost pricing rule does not 
apply. Nevertheless it is assumed that Tunisian firms only enjoy market power in the 
local market and face an infinitely elastic export demand. These two versions re-
spectively apply either prohibitive or free entry and exit to the oligopolistic industries. 
The welfare effects are measured through the equivalent variation as a percentage of 
GDP in 1995. The results under perfect competition and constant returns to scale 
(first model version) show that Tunisian welfare increases by 6.5 % of GDP, due to 
preferential trade liberalisation of manufactured goods from the EU, with trade crea-
tion being higher than trade diversion. The welfare gains are higher under the second 
and third versions of the model, at about 7.1 % and 7.3 % respectively. The author 
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notes that in all cases the FTA seems to benefit manufacturing sectors which ex-
pand, but at the expense of agriculture and private services. 
ELBEHRI and HERTEL (2004) employed the GTAP model, version 6.1 to examine the 
Morocco-EU Free Trade Area versus multilateral liberalisation. The world is aggre-
gated into three regions, Morocco, the EU and the rest of the world. The Moroccan 
economy is divided into 28 sectors, 15 of which describe manufacturing activities and 
nine agricultural activities. The underlying data are from the GTAP version 5.3 data-
base and incorporate a SAM of Morocco of 1990 into the GTAP database. Unilateral 
liberalisation results in a deterioration of the terms of trade for Morocco and thus in 
welfare losses (a decrease of US$392million, $16million and $1935.9 million respec-
tively when no entry, entry and no entry and unemployment are assumed). The ef-
fects on the output per firm in industries dominated by scale economies and the ef-
fects on the aggregate demand for labour are adverse, with the imports being di-
verted to non-EU suppliers. However, multilateral liberalisation under the WTO Doha 
Round, realised through a 30 % across the board cut in all tariffs, results in welfare 
gains for Morocco (US$414.6 million, $528 million and $666.4 million respectively 
under no entry; entry; and no entry and unemployment), which is attributed to lower 
losses from the terms of trade, positive scale effects, a positive impact on the labour 
demand and non-preferential imports into Morocco. 
The study of RAVALLION and LOKSHIN (2004) deals with the analysis of the impacts of 
trade policy reforms in Morocco. The authors use a static CGE calibrated to 1997 to 
simulate trade liberalisation and to estimate the price changes and welfare effects. 
The model was initially designed by World Bank and the Moroccan Ministry of Agri-
culture to assess the aggregate impacts of removing protection from cereals in Mo-
rocco14. The model entails 16 different crops, three livestock activities, 13 major agro-
industrial activities, six agro-ecological regions and within each region a distinction is 
made between rain-fed and four types of irrigated agriculture. Two types of labour 
have been included with fixed real wage rates. However, the authors do not specify 
the crops, the other activities or these two labour types. In four simulations, tariff cuts 
of 10 %, 30 %, 50 % and 100 % are undertaken, and in all the scenarios Moroccan 
open-market operations are removed (which subsidise sales of cereals so as to keep 
consumer prices at a low level). The results indicate that full trade liberalisation would 
lead a reduction by 24 % of the grain producers’ price and to a reduction by 27 % of 
the price paid by consumers for grain products, while the effects on other crops are 
indirect and are less than +/- 3 %. In a second step the authors combine the price 
changes with household survey data from 1998 covering 5,117 households in 14 of 
                                            
14 Details on this modelling exercise are documented in „DOUKKALI, R. (2003). Etude d’Effets de la 
Libéralisation des Céréales: Resultats des Simulations à L’Aide d’un Modèle Equilibre Général 
Calculable. Joint Report of the Ministry of Agriculture and the World Bank“ This source could not be 
found and information on this modelling exercise is based solely on RAVALLION and LOKSHIN (2004). 
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the 16 regions in Morocco. These data are used for calculations, based on standard 
first-order welfare analysis, to estimate the gains and losses of the induced price 
changes at the household level. By using regression analysis they aggregate the re-
sults and calculate changes in the mean income and the incidence of poverty. They 
estimate partial trade liberalisation reforms to slightly increase the national poverty 
rate, with the effect being larger under full trade liberalisation, where the poverty rate 
rises from 20 % to 22 %. All four reforms decrease urban poverty and increase rural 
poverty. Although the net consumers of cereals benefit from lower prices, the effects 
on rural poverty arise because, among the poor in rural areas, the losses of the net 
producers do not outweigh the gains of the net consumers.  
KUIPER (2006) employed version 6 of the GTAP model to examine the possible out-
come of the implementation of the Euro-Med Agreements on the economies of Mo-
rocco and Tunisia. The regions of the GTAP database are aggregated into nine 
blocs, where Morocco, Tunisia, northern and Mediterranean EU member states being 
modelled separately. The primary agricultural commodities are aggregated into cere-
als, oilseeds and vegetable oils, vegetables-fruits and nuts, spices and other crops, 
plant based fibres, sugar cane, sugar beet, animal and wool products, milk and dairy 
products. The model closes assuming unemployment for unskilled labour instead of 
the standard assumption of perfect labour markets. Four simulation scenarios are 
examined, which include extreme situations providing the upper and lower bounds of 
the implementation of the Euro-Med Agreements. The first two scenarios simulate 
the current implementation of the Agreements through the elimination of the tariffs for 
manufactured commodities, while the next two scenarios simulate full liberalisation, 
i.e. eliminating the tariffs on agricultural commodities as well. In each of these two 
simulations another one is undertaken, where the tariffs are replaced by a consump-
tion tax to make up for the losses to the budget of the states due to reduced tariff 
revenues. The baseline scenario includes the implementation of the remaining Uru-
guay round commitments for developing countries that end in 2005 together along 
with phasing out the restrictions on trade in textiles from 2005 onwards (Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing), China’s WTO accession, the EU enlargement in 2004 and 
the latest CAP reform (Luxembourg Agreement). The results indicate that the north-
ern EU member states would benefit from improved market access to North Africa 
countries for cereals, animal and dairy products, while the Mediterranean EU mem-
ber states would face an increase in imports of vegetable oils. The elimination of tar-
iffs on manufactured commodities reduces distortions in Morocco and Tunisia and 
diverts trade from the rest of the world to the EU. The income gains for Morocco are 
the highest (4.84 % of GDP in the base run) and are relatively insignificant for the 
northern and southern EU regions (0.01 and 0.02 % of GDP in the base run respec-
tively). The replacement of tariffs with a consumption tax leads almost to no further 
changes for the EU but to a decline of welfare in both Morocco (-2.63 % of GDP in 
the base run) and in Tunisia (-1.64 %). Scenario 3, which includes liberalisation of 
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the agricultural sector without tariff replacement, leads to additional gains of 1.2 % of 
the GDP of the base run in Morocco and to 4.8 % of the GDP in Tunisia. Tariff re-
placements lead to minor income losses of 0.2 % of the base run GDP in Morocco 
and to income gains of 1.1 % in Tunisia. One notable effect of the full liberalisation 
scenarios is a spectacular increase of the vegetable oil production in the MPCs. 
Since in the base run most vegetable oil exports (82.1 %) are destined to EU Medi-
terranean countries, this implies that these regions will be the most affected by the 
liberalisation of agricultural trade. Vegetable oil production in Tunisia shows an eight-
fold increase. The production of cereals declines, with and without tariff replacement, 
and EU countries benefit from this. No conclusions for fruits and vegetables can be 
drawn due to the high level of aggregation of these commodities in the model.  
Using the version 6.0 of the GTAP database SONMEZ et al. (2006) employ the general 
equilibrium model Globe to assess the impacts of Turkey’s accession in the EU. They 
use a 15-region, 15-sector and 4-factor world trade CGE, with agriculture aggregated 
into one sector. The regions are the EU-15, broken down to Germany, France, UK, 
Italy and the rest of the EU, Switzerland, the rest of Europe, Russia, the rest of the 
former Soviet Union, Turkey, the rest of the Middle east, Japan, USA and the rest of 
the world. The model is SAM-based, where production follows a two stage nest 
structure, the final demand of the government and of investment is modelled under 
the assumption that the demanded relative quantities of each commodity by these 
institutions are fixed. The utility function of private households is assumed to be of 
the Stone-Geary type and the commodities are distinguished between domestically 
produced and imported ones. The basic model closure is a full employment balanced 
macroeconomic closure with unemployed unskilled labour in some regions, where 
assumptions such as flexible exchange rates, fixed shares of investement expendi-
tures in final demand, fixed tax rate adjusters, mobile and fully employed factors and 
regional specific consumer price indeces to serve as regional numéraires are made. 
In this application two variants on the closure were run with the first assuming only 
full employment so as to assess the effects of assuming unemployed skilled labour in 
Turkey and the second a combination of the first with a balanced macro closure. The 
simulated scenarios involve a 100 % removal of import tariffs and export duties on all 
traded commodities, taking place one at a time and simultaneously and a 100 % lib-
eralisation together with Turkey adopting the EU’s Common External Tariff system. 
The base year for the simulation is 2001, when the trade in industrial and processed 
agricultural commodities was already fully liberalised, due to the customs union be-
tween Turkey and the EU. Therefore, the removal of custom duties involves only 
non-processed agricultural commodities within the developed scenarios. Liberalisa-
tion leads to an increase in GDP from value-added of about 11 % when only import 
duties are removed, by only 2 % when only the export subsidies are eliminated and 
by about 20 % when done together and with full liberalisation (imposing the Common 
External Tariff). The import demand is expected to increase by 32 % with the elimi-
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nation of import duties and by 52 % with the elimination of all custom duties. Figures 
for the export supply under these two assumptions increase by 12 % and 28 % re-
spectively. The tariff revenue decreases by between 8 % and 41 % depending on the 
scenario. There are similar decreases in export tax revenue. The domestic produc-
tion of agricultural commodities increases by about 7% as a result of full liberalisa-
tion. The exports of agricultural products to countries other than the EU decrease 
under the balanced macro closure whereas, with the exception of Russia and the rest 
of the Middle East, they increase under the unemployment labour closure. Overall 
the effects are more profound under the unemployment labour closure.  
DENNIS (2006) examined the impact of regional trade agreements and further trade 
facilitation on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions. The analysis is car-
ried out using the GTAP model, version 6 incorporating trade facilitation by splitting 
trade transaction costs into indirect trade transaction costs (“iceberg” costs) and a tax 
component capturing the direct trade transaction costs. The study uses a 13-region, 
16-commodity aggregation of the GTAP database, with the Mediterranean countries 
aggregated into two groups, the rest of North Africa and the rest of the Middle East, 
apart from Morocco and Tunisia which are modelled separately. The agricultural 
sector is broken down to fruits and vegetables and fish and live animals. Two simula-
tion scenarios are formulated, one where all import tariffs between Middle Eastern 
and North African countries are abolished (a scenario that reflects the GAFTA 
Agreement) and one where, in addition to this the import tariffs for non-agricultural 
commodities between the EU and the MENA countries are reduced by 100 % and 
those for agricultural commodities by 50 % (a scenario reflecting the Euro-Med 
Agreements). For both simulations a counterfactual simulation, with and without trade 
facilitation improvements, was undertaken. The results indicate welfare gains for the 
MENA region amounting to US$913 million under the first scenario and US$1.84 mil-
lion under the second, clearly showing the importance of integration with the EU. 
Nevertheless there are regional differences in the distribution of the welfare gains 
among the MENA countries. For example in the scenario of liberalisation between 
the MENA countries Tunisia gains the most and enjoys welfare increase of +0.53 % 
followed by the rest of Middle East, whereas in the scenario with the EU-MENA liber-
alisation Morocco enjoys the highest welfare gains of about 1.88 % followed by Tuni-
sia (welfare gains of about 1.72 %). The differences in the results between the MENA 
regions are analogous and proportional to their trade expansion. The changes in 
GDP follow the same direction as the welfare changes i.e. the real GDP rises in all 
MENA regions under both simulations, varying from 0.02 % to 0.21 % for the first 
simulation and 0.12 to 2.22 % for the second. Again Tunisia enjoys the highest bene-
fits under the first simulation while Morocco and Tunisia gain the most under the sec-
ond scenario. Because full employment closure of the model is adopted the increase 
of GDP points to an increase in economic activity and positive effects the factor mar-
kets, which in the case of real wages can be translated into increased employment. 
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The results are far more profound when trade facilitation improvements are modelled. 
For example by running the first scenario with the trade facilitation option, the welfare 
gains for the MENA countries are at least three times higher than without trade fa-
cilitation. A decomposition of the welfare gains reveals that they are mainly gains in 
allocative efficiency, while further decomposition reveals that trade facilitation im-
provements from lowering indirect costs contribute more to the welfare gains than 
lowering the direct trade transaction costs. 
MINOT et al. (2007) have done two case studies examining the impact of trade liber-
alisation on agriculture and poverty. The first one, of Tunisia, uses a static CGE 
which is based on a Tunisian SAM from 1996. It incorporates data from a household 
expenditure survey among 400 households in 1995. The authors assume perfect 
mobility of physical capital among different sectors and imperfect substitution among 
domestically and non-domestically produced commodities. Supply is modelled using 
a nested CES function and substitutions among labour categories are implemented 
through nested CES functions for agricultural and non-agricultural activities. The 
commodities are aggregated into 15 categories, including grain crops, leguminous 
crops, fruits, vegetables, meat, fishing products, dairy products, sugar, olive oil and 
tobacco products. The first scenario simulated the elimination of tariffs on imported 
industrial products from the EU. In the second the tariff elimination is extended to ag-
ricultural products and, in the third, the elimination of tariffs on industrial and agricul-
tural products is also extended to the rest of the world. The assumptions of the third 
scenario are carried over into the fourth scenario and combined with an increase in 
world market prices for all agricultural products by 15 %. Openness in trade would 
result an expansion of imports and exports but almost exclusively in non-agricultural 
sectors. There are hardly any effects on the agricultural commodities from the first 
scenario, while under the second scenario imports of meat, fruits and dairy products 
would expand by about 164, 63 and 60 % respectively. The increase of exports of 
grains would be the highest (about 50 %). The effects of the third scenario are similar 
to those of the second scenario, while under the fourth scenario a further increase of 
exports occurs, especially of dairy products and of sugar (about 130 % respectively). 
The changes in poverty are only marginal.  
 
In their second study, MINOT et al. (2007) examine the impact of liberalisation of the 
wheat market on small farmers in Syria. They used a static CGE developed by 
LÖFGREN et al. (2001), which is built using a Syrian SAM from 1999 and includes 10 
representative households for each decile of the Syrian population. The model simu-
lates to a reduction in the domestic subsidies for wheat production and consumption 
of 20 and 50 % and 100% respectively. The macroeconomic effects are rather mod-
erate and government savings increase by up to 3 % throughout the scenarios. 
Complete liberalisation leads to reduction of producers’ prices by about 17 % and 
Empirical studies  83 
about a 2% decrease in production. The effects of subsidy removal on the welfare of 
the Syrian households are regressive, with high-income households gaining and 
lower-income households losing, although they are of a small magnitude (less than 
1 % of the base income for all households).  
Dynamic CGE studies 
CHEMINGUI and DESSUS (2001) created a dynamic CGE to model sequential tariff cuts 
due to liberalisation in trade between Tunisia and the EU. The model takes two rep-
resentative households, one rural and one urban and additionally a tourist household. 
It includes 57 sectors, 26 of which are related to agriculture or food industries, and 
distinguishes two trading partners for Tunisia, i.e. the EU and the rest of the world. It 
is calibrated using a SAM from 1992 for Tunisia. The model assumes imperfect com-
petition among goods coming from different geographic areas and is resolved recur-
sively every three years from 1992 to 2010. The baseline scenario involves growth of 
the Tunisian economy and the implementation of the GATT, involving tariff cuts and 
the abolition of non-tariff barriers as well as a progressive reduction of tariffs on in-
dustrial products, as foreseen by the Euro-Med Agreements. The scenarios refer to 
unilateral liberalisation i.e. tariff reductions or the abolition of non-tariff Tunisian 
measures towards imports from the EU or less governmental support for agricultural 
products. The results indicate a worsening of Tunisia’s agriculture (although the trade 
volume increases) since domestic production has to compete with commodities im-
ported from the EU. The welfare effects are of a low magnitude, they are positive for 
the rural households only in the events of increased access to the EU for Tunisian 
agricultural exports (+2.7 %) and multilateral liberalisation (+0.2 %). The aggregate 
welfare effects throughout the simulations are slightly positive and higher when liber-
alisation is multilateral (+2.5 %). 
LÖFGREN et al. (2001) have developed a dynamic recursive computable general equi-
librium model of Morocco to analyse alternative policy scenarios15. The model uses 
CES production functions, and substitutability is assumed based different geographic 
origin. The model has a savings-driven determination of investment and this is solved 
as a mixed-complementarity problem. It distinguishes between rural and urban activi-
ties and households, uses data from a Moroccan SAM from 1994 and it has a de-
tailed representation of the agricultural sector. Of the 45 activities, 38 are rural and 
most of them relate to agricultural or livestock products. The static model is solved for 
1994 and 1998 and the solution from the 1998 run is used to update the base year 
run. Following this step the model is solved for every two years up to 2012. Between 
the solutions selected parameters are updated in the dynamic module. The baseline 
simulation involves a gradual implementation of the EU partnership. While the first 
                                            
15 A detailed description of the model is given in LÖFGREN et al. (2002). 
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scenario assumes unilateral trade liberalisation, the second combines unilateral lib-
eralisation with changes in domestic policy regarding rural education and the imple-
mentation of a non-distorting programme for cash compensation to owners of re-
sources used in rainfed agriculture. The results indicate that tariff unification has 
rather limited impacts on aggregate factor incomes and household welfare. The later 
is the highest under the second scenario and is not greater than 2.5 % of 1994 GDP. 
The removal of trade barriers and the reduction of tariffs lead to major expansion of 
non-agricultural exports, significant growth of non-agricultural sectors and a slow 
down in the agricultural ones. Trade liberalisation seems to reduce income growth for 
agricultural resources and disfavours poor rural households, but when combined with 
complementary domestic policies it can improve the welfare of all household types. 
A simple dynamic CGE has been developed by FERABOLI et al. (2003)16 to examine 
the impact of a free trade area between Jordan and the EU. The authors developed a 
simple neo-classical open economy model with two production sectors, goods and 
services, assuming perfect competition and full employment in both sectors. The 
model allows for imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign goods. The 
demand side is covered though a single representative household, the model closure 
is based on fixed current-account balance and the saving-investment is solved 
through inter-temporal maximisation. The dataset is based on a SAM of 1998 devel-
oped by LUCKE (2001), but the model is further simplified by aggregating all goods’ 
sectors. The dynamic nature of the model allows liberalisation to be modelled by 
gradually reducing the tariff over a period of 13 years, as foreseen by the Association 
Agreement between Jordan and the EU. Two sets of simulations were carried out, 
involving the implementation of the free trade area between Jordan and the EU and a 
non-discriminatory trade openness by Jordan. The results show that non-discrimina-
tory tariff reduction has more effect in increasing GDP and labour demand in the long 
run than the Association Agreement with the EU. The welfare effects are positive 
throughout the scenarios but the magnitude of them depends on the fiscal measures 
adopted by the government to counteract for losses of the tariff revenue due to the 
progressive reduction of tariffs. When capital tax is endogenous and labour income 
fixed then the free trade area with the EU appears to be more welfare-enhancing 
than under broader liberalisation. In the scenarios where the labour income tax rate 
is endogenous and the capital tax is fixed, trade openness yields larger welfare gains 
than the free trade area. Generally the authors suggest that investment incentives 
are higher under the preferential agreement with the EU.  
The MIRAGE model has been employed by BOUËT (2006b) to quantify the effects of 
different trade strategies of the Mediterranean Partner Countries towards the EU. 
MIRAGE (Modelling International Relationships in Applied General Equilibrium) is a 
                                            
16 This study has been also found as paper presented at the 10th Conference „Theories and Methods 
in Macroeconomics“ Universite des Sciences Sociales, Toulouse, January 19-20 (FERABOLI, 2006). 
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multi-market, multi-region recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium model 
for trade analysis developed by the CEPII (Centre d’ Etudes Prospectives et d’ Infor-
mations Internationales). It is based on the assumption of imperfect competition for 
trade in industry and services and of perfect competition for agriculture. The hori-
zontal product differentiation is linked to varieties and geographic origin and the verti-
cal to one to two quality ranges depending on the country of origin of the product. A 
sequential dynamic set-up from 2006 to 2020 is applied that tracks factor productiv-
ity, including GDP expectations as given by the World Bank’s development index. 
The dynamic nature of the model implies that an investment function is used to mod-
ify the stock of capital at each period. The model closes using unskilled labour im-
perfectly mobile between agricultural and non-agricultural activities. The SAM of 
GTAP version 6, aggregated into 24-regions and 16-commodities is used as data-
base for the modelling exercise. Among the MPCs Morocco, Turkey and Tunisia are 
modelled separately (the other MPCs are included as the rest of North Africa and the 
rest of the Middle East). The studied commodities within the agricultural sector are 
rice, wheat, other cereal grains, fruit and vegetables, other agricultural products, 
sugar, plant-based fibres, meat and meat products and milk. The trade strategies of 
the MPCs are formulated within three simulation scenarios depending on the level of 
trade liberalisation (i.e. tariff dismantling) between the MPCs and the EU or the rest 
of the world. The first scenario simulates a free trade area between the EU and the 
MPCs, the second a south-north agreement where each of the MPCs separately 
forms a free trade area with the EU in industrial and agricultural products and the last 
one multilateral liberalisation. In the first scenario the growth in GDP is highest for 
North Africa (about 2 %) due to reduction in distortions and an increase of economic 
activity caused by higher exports to southern Mediterranean countries. Intersectoral 
reallocations of production are relatively smooth, with the exception of Turkey (with a 
decrease of about 30 % in rice production) and Tunisia (a decrease of about 38 % in 
wheat production). A north-south liberalisation results in a deterioration of the terms 
of trade for all MPCs, as imports are diverted from competitive producers (as Austra-
lia-New Zealand, Latin America) to less competitive ones (the EU). At the same time 
there are evident trade creation effects, especially in Morocco and Tunisia, where 
exports rise by about 42 and 46 % respectively. Social welfare only increases in Tu-
nisia and Turkey (1.3 and 0.5 % respectively) and falls in all the other MPCs, by 0.1 
to 0.9 %. The shifts in production are rather high, with for example a growth in the 
production of rice of about 904.7 % in Tunisia, 102.2 % in Turkey and 220.9 % in the 
rest of North Africa. Milk production falls in all MPCs from -0.3 % in the rest of the 
Middle East to -55.5 % in Morocco. Multilateral liberalisation provides the highest 
welfare gains for all MPCs (varying from 0.4 in the rest of the Middle East to 2.3 % in 
Tunisia). Due to trade creation effects the MPCs’ export volumes expand by 11.4 %, 
compared with 8.8 % under the second scenario, and just 1.9 % under the first sce-
nario. Reallocations of production factors for agricultural commodities are lower than 
in the previous scenario. Among the highest are a decrease of rice production in Mo-
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rocco (-77.8 %) and in Turkey (-30.3 %), a decrease in wheat production in Tunisia, 
by about 65 % and a decrease in milk and meat production in Morocco, by about 
40 % and 23 % respectively. The author concludes that the best trading strategy of 
the MPCs is that of multilateral liberalisation.  
Static Partial equilibrium (PE) models  
GRETHE (2003) developed a comparative-static, partial equilibrium model of the 
Turkish agricultural sector, named TURKSIM, to analyse the impacts of the customs 
union between Turkey and the EU17. The model assumes iso-elastic behavioural 
functions of farm supply on a regional level and demand. It covers 42 primary and 
processed agricultural commodities, which account for more than 86 % of the pro-
duction value of Turkish agriculture. The author developed three scenarios to simu-
late i) the maintenance of the status quo, ii) full unilateral liberalisation and iii) agri-
culture being included in the customs union between Turkey and the EU. The base 
year for the simulation was the average of 1997-8 for the quantities of plant products 
and 1998-1999 for the quantities of animal products and the base year for prices was 
taken as the average over the period 1996-1998. The projections refer to 2006. 
Complete liberalisation of the agricultural sector would lead to significant static wel-
fare gains of € 670 million. Including agricultural products in the customs union with 
the EU had very similar effects but lower terms of trade effects and the author treats 
this as a kind of political liberalisation. The distributional and allocative effects are 
significant. Liberalisation leads to a more equal distribution of real income, reduces 
intra-sectoral inequalities, but also reallocates resources from rural to urban areas. 
AUGIER and GASIOREK (2003b) did a preliminary study, employing a partial equilibrium 
model of imperfect competition to examine the impacts of tariff reduction within the 
Barcelona Agreement on Morocco, focusing on the textile sector. The exogenous 
parameters of the model are based on detailed data at the firm level of the textile 
sector in Morocco. The first scenario involves an asymmetric reduction of import tar-
iffs levied by Morocco of 50 % and results in a decline of the Moroccan textile and 
clothing sector, accompanied by a reduction of the production and exports from EU 
Mediterranean Member States. The results for Morocco are reversed when the costs 
to Moroccan firms in accessing the EU markets are reduced (second scenario). The 
same scenarios are run with lower aggregation of the data set for the Moroccan tex-
tile sector. Here an increase of market access to the EU clearly benefits exporting 
firms (second scenario) whereas in the first scenario exporting firms are completely 
eliminated from the Moroccan market and those that market domestically suffer a 
reduction in output of 63.9 %. 
                                            
17 Parts of this study have been published as GRETHE (2004) and GRETHE (2005). 
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Of particular relevance is a study conducted within the EU-financed project EU-MED 
AgPol (BRITZ et al., 2006), where the partial equilibrium model CAPRI (Common Ag-
ricultural Policy Regionalised Impact) was used to simulate trade liberalisation be-
tween the EU and the MPCs. The CAPRI modelling system was developed by the 
University of Bonn and is based on previous models, RAUMIS, SPEL/EU and WAT-
SIM, developed by the same institution. It covers all the regions of the EU-25 disag-
gregated to sub-national regions at NUTS II level (Nomenclature des Unités Territori-
ales Statistiques) and is designed to simulate the EU’s agricultural sector. The model 
is linked to the WATSIM trade system and thus employs partial equilibrium tech-
niques to enable the modelling of global trade policies. In this application the Mediter-
ranean region is aggregated to Turkey, Morocco and the rest of Mediterranean, while 
the EU-25 is disaggregated to the old EU-15 and the new EU-10. It covers the com-
modities typical to Mediterranean countries, such as fruits, vegetables and olive oil. 
The simulation followed similar lines to those used by KUIPER (2006) (see above), 
which allow the formulation of a partial bilateral liberalisation scenario, where import 
quotas are adjusted i.e. increased (to about twice the level of the base year) and 
Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) are expanded by about 50 %. The authors also ran a sce-
nario in which, in addition to the bilateral liberalisation also simulates the G-20 pro-
posals of the WTO negotiations, although they only provide limited information about 
the tariff cuts on the bound tariffs are integrated in the modelling framework. The re-
sults indicate that bilateral partial liberalisation would have hardly any impact on EU 
producers’ prices and the quantities produced, but that it would have an impact on 
trade flows. For example under the full liberalisation scenario the imports of tomatoes 
from MPCs into the EU almost double, and imports of table olives and citrus fruits 
also increase substantially. Under full liberalisation there is an increase of Turkey’s 
and Morocco’s imports by about 60 % for each country and of about 350% for other 
Mediterranean countries. The EU’s exports of cereals, and especially wheat, in-
crease but there is also a significant growth in its imports of fruits and vegetables. 
The picture changes when the WTO negotiations are taken into account. In this case 
the producers’ price in the EU decreases, particularly for livestock commodities. The 
authors explore the regional effects on farmers’ incomes in the EU, focusing on re-
gions in Spain and Italy. In both countries the income from tomato production in-
creases across all NUTS II regions, but the income from citrus production declines, 
as a result of lower prices due to the substitution of the domestic production from im-
ports. The authors expect welfare gains only to accrue to the largest northern EU 
Member States, while for other EU Member States the changes are not distinguish-
able. 
Another static partial equilibrium model was developed by GARCIA ÁLVAREZ-COQUE et 
al. (2007) within the EU research project “Agricultural Trade Agreements” and was 
applied in the fresh tomato market. The model captures seasonal effects on the to-
mato market and thus enables the modelling of the entry price system for imports in 
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the EU. The preliminary results of liberalisation scenarios on Moroccan exports into 
the EU indicate that the various liberalisation scenarios would affect negatively the 
EU market (reduction of EU sales by about 5 % which, in the event of the removal of 
the entry price system, could be up to 20 % in some months). The results reveal 
positive effects on Morocco especially when the liberalisation is multilateral and the 
tariff reductions apply to MFN suppliers. While being an interesting modelling exer-
cise, the large numbers of parameters required mean that its extension to other mar-
kets would be a very time-consuming task. Market interactions though are not ex-
amined, and the elasticities used, are not calculated on a monthly level but on a 
yearly basis. Moreover the substitution elasticities are relatively high compared to 
those used in other modelling exercises (for example BRITZ et al., 2006; GRETHE, 
2003; M’BAREK, 2002). 
Spatial partial equilibrium model 
M’BAREK (2002) developed a spatial equilibrium model to analyse the Euro-Med 
Agreements and their impact on Morocco and Tunisia. It is an interregional trade 
model with non-linear iso-elastic supply and demand functions, comparative static 
and synthetically calibrated to 1997 as the base year. It covers 19 primary agricul-
tural commodities (soft wheat, hard wheat, barley, maize, soya cake, vegetable oils, 
olives, oranges, dates, tomatoes, early and main crop potatoes, sugar beet, sugar 
cane, beef, sheep meat, poultry meat, eggs and milk), seven supply regions (Tunisia, 
Morocco, EU, CEEC, USA, Argentina and the rest of the world) and six demand re-
gions (Tunisia, Morocco, EU, CEEC, USA and the rest of the world). One interesting 
aspect of the study is that it introduces a land restriction, so that the production of a 
crop cannot exceed the available land for this specific crop. Transportation costs are 
given in the model either as costs per km or as fixed costs for a certain destination 
that were provided through interviews by freight companies. The simulations involve 
formulating a base run scenario and three main scenarios. The base run scenario is 
built for the year 2007 (implying that the projections are also for 2007) and includes 
the modalities for the agricultural sector according to the time schedule of the Doha 
WTO Round in 2003, the EU Eastward enlargement to include five countries (Esto-
nia, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary), free trade for industrial 
products among the EU and the Maghreb countries and the formation of the Greater 
Arab Free Trade Area. The first main scenario simulates a partial and a full unilateral 
trade liberalisation between the EU, Morocco and Tunisia. A similar scheme is re-
peated in the case of bilateral and of multilateral trade liberalisation in the second 
and third main scenarios, respectively. The results indicate positive changes for Tu-
nisia. Consumers enjoy benefits due lower prices, but at the expense of producers, 
particularly producers of cereals and livestock products. The production of cereals 
and animal commodities declines but the production of typical Mediterranean com-
modities increases to varying degrees under the different scenarios (for example to-
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mato production increases by 901.3 % under full bilateral liberalisation and by 15.7 % 
under full unilateral liberalisation). In Morocco the changes in production, prices and 
demand are similar to those in Tunisia, but are more moderate. Producers again face 
lower prices and suffer welfare losses, while consumers benefit. Moving towards 
multilateral liberalisation the changes are more profound. The author also discusses 
the effects on agricultural employment, indicating that a reduction of production leads 
to lower employment in agriculture, which could cause further problems in rural de-
velopment in the two countries. Although the study discusses the welfare gains for 
consumers and producers, the effects on taxpayers from reduced import tariff rents 
are not examined and thus conclusions for the overall social welfare or for the alloca-
tion of resources cannot be drawn.  
Other models 
Input-Output models 
LORCA and VICÉNS (2000) report on the impacts of trade liberalisation within the 
framework of the Barcelona Agreement on economic growth in Egypt, Morocco, Tur-
key and Tunisia. Their model is based on Input-Output tables that utilise the macro-
economic characteristics and the economic development of these countries. By ap-
plying employment coefficients the model captures the effects of creating a free trade 
area among these countries in the period 2000-2004, i.e. after estimating economet-
rically the determinants of trade and the elasticities, it simulates a liberalisation sce-
nario. Three simulation scenarios examine different options for liberalising trade be-
tween the EU and the four MPCs. Unilateral liberalisation from the EU leads to posi-
tive effects for all four countries on production (measured as the share of Added 
Value in GDP), exports and employment. Production will increase by between 0.5 % 
(in Tunisia) to 4.4 % (in Turkey) of GDP and generate more that 222,000 additional 
employment opportunities. The Mediterranean EU Member States will be most af-
fected by the new competition, particular in comestible fruits, where the MPCs’ ex-
ports to the EU will increase annually by 3.42 %. The second scenario simulates bi-
lateral liberalisation leading to a decrease of about 30 to 40 % in prices for certain 
products in the MPCs (for example about -31 % and -40 % change in the prices of 
milk products and processed foods respectively), leaving the producers in these 
countries worse off and the consumers better off. This scenario not only models a 
complete dismantling of tariffs but also a reduction of the European domestic sup-
port, as foreseen by the WTO negotiations (i.e. the reduction of 55 % of internal sub-
sidies affecting trade).The third scenario involves an asymmetrical reciprocal liberali-
sation together with development of a structural tool with MPCs adopting a European 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) orientation. The results reveal gains for 
innovators in agriculture in the MPCs and losses for Mediterranean EU producers 
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due to high competition. Rent-seeking behaviour could also occur in the MPCs de-
pending on how efficiently the EAFFG oriented support for structural changes is dis-
tributed. The results of this modelling exercise are also included in a report under the 
framework of the FEMISE network (RADWAN et al., 2003) on the impacts of agricul-
tural trade liberalisation in the context of the Euro-Med Agreements. 
Mathematical programming models 
A regional agricultural sectoral model called TASM-EU (Turkish Agricultural Simula-
tion Model) was employed by CAKMAK and KASNAKOGLU (2003) to quantify the effects 
of Turkey’s membership in the EU on its agricultural sector. It is a non-linear optimi-
sation model which maximises consumer and producer surplus. It describes total na-
tional supply and use, with production being decomposed into sub-models for Tur-
key’s four main regions. Consumer behaviour is considered as price dependent, 
meaning that market clearing commodity prices are endogenous. It is calibrated us-
ing positive mathematical programming techniques. The model contains more than 
200 activities that describe the production of about 50 commodities. The base period 
for the model is the average of the years 1997-1999 and it is solved for 2005. The 
application runs four simulation scenarios. The first assumes that Turkey will not be-
come a member of the EU and only adjusts population and income growth to 2005, 
using estimates from the Turkish statistical office and price projections from FAPRI. 
The next three scenarios examine various options of Turkey’s membership of the EU. 
Membership of the EU would lead to welfare gains for consumers (increasing con-
sumer surplus by about 12 %) but to welfare losses for producers (decreasing pro-
ducer surplus by about 16 %). The prices (both producers and consumers) in Turkey 
are adjusted to EU ones, resulting in lower prices both for producers and consumers. 
The volume and the value of livestock production decrease by about 22 % and 40 % 
in the EU membership scenarios, reflecting the backward production conditions in 
Turkey. By contrast crop values and volumes increase. For example, the production 
of durum wheat expands by 4 %, that of cotton and of sugar beet by about 5 and 4 % 
respectively, and fruit and vegetable production goes up by about the same level. 
Only the production of soft wheat declines by about 10 %. Exports of crop products 
decline by about 30 % while imports of livestock products increase four fold. There 
are no changes in the trade status of Turkey compared to the base run (and it re-
mains a net exporter of crops and a net importer of livestock products). It should be 
noted that when compensatory payments are introduced in Turkey due to EU mem-
bership, they further compensate to the decline in production, due to set-aside re-
quirements. The level of consumption increases because of a fall in consumer prices, 
by about 40 % which leads to consumer expenditure being about 25 % lower. 
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4.2.3 Outlook on empirical studies and identification of further re-
search needs 
By taking a deeper look at the existing empirical studies it can be concluded that, al-
though agricultural policies affecting the Mediterranean basin have been empirically 
discussed, the majority of studies focus on the impacts of trade liberalisation between 
the EU and single MPCs within the Euro-Med Agreements in terms of the entire 
economy of the MPCs examined. Fewer studies analyse the effects of the reformed 
CAP on EU Member States and MPCs and only the study by BRITZ et al. (2006) re-
veals simultaneous effects brought about by the new agricultural policy scheme in 
the EU and the conclusion of the Euro-Med Agreements. 
In detail, the scenarios analysed in these studies are related to tariff cuts between the 
examined Mediterranean country(ies) and the EU. Because the opening of the EU 
markets to the MPCs under the Euro-Med Agreements is a stepwise procedure, al-
most all the studies simulate scenarios that examine various degrees of tariff reduc-
tion (usually 50 and 100 %). This is true of AUGIER and GASIOREK (2003a and b), 
HARRISON et al. (1997), HOEKMAN et al. (2001), HOSOE (2001), MERCENIER and 
YELDAN (1997), RUTHERFORD et al. (1997) and the studies that use dynamic CGE 
models, whereas liberalisation can be either unilateral (from the side of the MPCs) or 
bilateral. KUIPER (2006) followed a different scheme, formulating a base assumption, 
where the policy variables are adjusted (shocked) and thereby approximate the pol-
icy framework in the year that the results refer to. These are then simulated into a full 
bilateral liberalisation between the examined MPCs and the EU, thus providing the 
lower and upper bounds of the forthcoming liberalisation. A similar scheme is fol-
lowed by BRITZ et al. (2006). Additional policies are simulated in some cases, such as 
adjustments to fiscal policies (for example KONAN and MASKUS, 2000), while in all the 
studies except those of KUIPER (2006) and BRITZ et al. (2006) the EU agricultural 
policy is not simulated. It should be noted that the nature of the Euro-Med Agree-
ments makes it particularly difficult to formulate scenarios. A number of countries are 
negotiating separately with the EU through association agreements, and thus the im-
plementation of the agreements varies and is at different stages. In addition the pref-
erences granted by the EU to one country depend on those granted to other coun-
tries (GARCIA ÁLRVAREZ-COQUE et al., 2007). 
The results of these exercises mainly focus on the whole economy of the non-EU 
countries. The authors generally agree that liberalisation will result in welfare gains 
for the EU, increase of its exports to non-EU Mediterranean countries and higher 
producer prices in the MPCs. The magnitude of the effects varies according to the 
importance of the liberalised sectors for the EU markets (for example liberalisation in 
manufactures or/and services). KUIPER (2006) examines regional effects on the EU 
and finds that the northern EU countries would benefit from improved market access 
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to North African countries for cereals, animal and dairy products, while the Mediter-
ranean EU countries would face increased imports of vegetable oils.  
It is worth noting that the results of the CGE models depend on the assumption of 
capital mobility. Nevertheless, as GARCIA ÁLVAREZ-COQUE et al. (2006) argue, the 
impacts of trade liberalisation are often sectorally and regionally specific. Very often, 
and at least in the short term, it is difficult to find alternative opportunities for labour 
and capital. This is especially relevant in the case of rural areas of MPCs, where ag-
riculture is very often the sole employment source. In such circumstances the as-
sumption of mobile production factors needs to be checked for its plausibility. It 
should also be noted that the use of the equivalent variation in the GTAP model to 
measure changes in income does not provide insights on the distribution of welfare 
changes among different groups (producers, consumers, taxpayers). 
With the exception of the studies of KUIPER (2006) and BRITZ et al. (2006) all the 
other studies give to the agricultural sector a limited role and either represented it in 
an aggregated way or through a limited number of commodities. This high level of 
aggregation does not allow drawing conclusions on the agricultural sector. Changes 
in the main commodities within the region are not captured by the modelling exer-
cises, thus undermining the plausibility of the empirical studies. It should be also 
noted that in most of the CGE models liberalisation is focused on manufacture goods 
and services and not on agricultural commodities.  
There are further agriculturally related issues that should be taken into account. The 
EU enlargement of twelve new Member States has expanded the EU domestic mar-
ket, which could help narrow the existing opposing positions within the EU for liber-
alising agricultural trade between it and MPCs (GARCIA-ALVAREZ-COQUE, 2002). The 
CAP reform creates a new framework for European farmers and, depending on how 
the reform is implemented, this could break the north-south conflict of interests 
among European farmers (GARCIA-ALVAREZ-COQUE, 2002). 
The above studies cannot answer the question of the extent to which Mediterranean 
agriculture will be affected by the forthcoming policy changes or by the recently con-
cluded agricultural policy reforms. Further empirical analysis is required which em-
ploys adjusted modelling tools. The need to base future negotiations on sound em-
pirical findings is evident in the growing interest of the EU and those countries in-
volved in the Agreements to finance research projects and create research networks. 
It should be noted that most research findings to date have been the outcomes of EU 
funded research projects. 
Empirical analysis of Mediterranean agriculture and the impacts of trade policy re-
forms on it would appear to require a multi-commodity and multi-region equilibrium 
model. This should be focused on the agricultural sector and on commodities that are 
typical for the region. It would be preferable to model these commodities separately 
and in a more disaggregated form, i.e. it should focus on specific fruits and vegeta-
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bles rather than viewing these as one aggregated commodity. To capture the inter-
actions between the EU and the MPCs it is necessary to include both blocks of 
countries in the regional aggregation scheme, and it would be interesting to break the 
EU down into southern and northern Member States and the MPCs into single coun-
tries. In this way the different regional effects on the EU and on each MPC could be 
shown better, thus avoiding problems of generalising the effects in the EU and the 
MPCs. Simulation scenarios could interestingly be used to see the extent to which 
changes in European agricultural policy affect MPC countries that are joined with the 
EU through a preferential system and the extent to which any future openness of EU 
markets to the MPCs would affect the EU Mediterranean Member States. 
A partial equilibrium model at this level of regional aggregation, covering the main 
agricultural commodities could provide appropriate insights into the impacts of policy 
changes on Mediterranean agriculture. Due to practical difficulties in finding the ex-
ogenous parameters, a model employing a straightforward equation system might 
prove to be sufficient for such an analysis.  
4.3 Overview of AGRISIM 
AGRISIM (Agricultural Simulations Model) is a partial-equilibrium, multi-commodity, 
multi-region model. It is comparatively static in nature, deterministic and has non lin-
ear isoelastic supply and demand functions (PUSTOVIT, 2003; SCHMITZ, 2002). Trade 
is modelled as net trade. Policy interventions are generally considered as changes in 
nominal protection rates, price transmission elasticities, minimum producer prices, 
production quotas and subsidies. Through shift coefficients in the demand and supply 
functions additional variables can be simulated, such as population and income 
growth. The base version of the model includes nine commodities: wheat, coarse 
grains, rice, oilseeds, sugar, milk, beef, pork and poultry meat. The database was 
recently updated up to the year 2001 and was extended, as will be described later. 
4.3.1 Model description 
The main structure of the model is shown in Figure 4.1, following the suggestions of 
RONINGEN (1997) describing a multi-market multi-region partial equilibrium model and 
the main structure of the model SWOPSIM (Static World Policy Simulation Modelling 
Framework (RONINGEN et al., 1991). The regions are connected with each other 
through a market clearing mechanism, and the world market price that results from 
this mechanism is fed into domestic markets through domestic prices. The net trade 
summed from all regions, arrived at by the difference between supply and demand, is 
fed back into the world market clearing mechanism. 
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Extending the data base of the model and modifying its structure allow further analy-
sis of trade policies by changing the level of applied tariffs and export subsidies on a 
multilateral level for all the countries in the model. 
The results involve changes in prices (domestic and world market prices), produced 
quantities, consumption, net trade and welfare 
Figure 4.1: Simulations-routine in AGRISIM; example of 2 markets – 2 commo-
dities  
Source: Own illustration based on RONINGEN (1997) 
The rest of this section introduces the main equations of the model in detail. The sets 
of the model are defined as: 
r = all regions; 
i,j = all markets 
Volumes 
Supply function 
The quantity supplied is given by an iso-elastic function. Cross price effects between 
the markets are considered through cross price elasticities. The price that influences 
the supply is the producer incentive price. 
( ) Sri
j
P
ririri SHIFTpsS
S
rji
,,,,
,, ⋅⋅= ∏ ε        (1a) 
domestic price 
demand 
net trade 
supply 
domestic price 
demand 
net trade 
supply 
Region 1 
domestic price 
demand 
net trade 
supply 
domestic price 
demand 
net trade 
supply 
Region 2 
world price-market 1 
market clearing  
mechanism (for market 1) 
world price-market 2 
market clearing  
mechanism (for market 2) 
world 
market 1 
world 
market 2 
Empirical studies  95 
with: 
riS ,   = Domestic supply of product i in region r 
ris ,   = Calibration parameter of supply function 
P
rip ,   = Producer incentive price 
S
rji ,,ε   = Own and cross price elasticity of supply 
S
riSHIFT ,  = Supply shifter (yield and other shifts) 
This equation is slightly deferentiated when binding production quotas are applied in 
a commodity market. In this case the price that influences the supply is the quota 
equivalent price, as shown in equation 1b.  
( ) Sri
j
Quo
rj
P
ririri SHIFTppsS
S
rji
,,,,,
,, ⋅−⋅= ∏ ε       (1b) 
with: 
Quo
rjp ,  = Difference between producer incentive price and quota equivalent price  
Yield function 
The yield in the model is given by the following equation. It is calculated according to 
the data parameters of the base year and remains constant unless the shift factors of 
technical progress or annual yield growth are modelled. Using the price elasticity of 
yield allows the possibility of differentiating the effects of price on the yield. Due to 
lack of data this possibility is not used within the current simulations. 
( ) YriPririri SHIFTpyY Y rji ,,,, ,, ⋅⋅= ε        (2) 
with: 
riY ,  = Yield of product i in region r 
riy ,  = Calibration parameter of yield function 
Y
rji ,,ε  = Price elasticity of yield with respect to own price 
Y
ri ,∆  = Yield shifter (e.g. annual yield growth trend, technical progress) 
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Area function 
The acreage (or number of animals for livestock commodities) is calculated by divid-
ing the overall supply of a commodity by the yield: 
ri
ri
ri Y
S
A
,
,
, =            (3) 
where: 
riA ,  = Area (or number of animals) of product i in region r 
Seed demand  
The demand for seeds is determined by multiplying domestic supply with a calibra-
tion parameter of the seed demand function and a shifter, which enables modelling 
factors that could result in a shift of the function such as, for example, technical pro-
gress. 
SD
riri
S
ri
S
ri SHIFTSdD ,,,, ⋅⋅=         (4) 
with: 
S
riD ,   = Seed demand of product i in region r 
S
rid ,   = Calibration parameter of seed demand function 
SD
riSHIFT ,  = Seed demand shifter (e.g. technical progress) 
Feed demand  
The feed demand is given by an iso-elastic function. Due to the lack of data the elas-
ticities are identical to the elasticities used in equation 6. Through the shifter it is pos-
sible to model changes in animal numbers. 
( ) FDri
j
C
rj
F
ri
F
ri SHIFTpdD
DF
rji
,,,,
,, ⋅⋅= ∏ ε        (5) 
with: 
F
riD ,   = Feed demand of product i in region r 
F
rid ,   = Calibration parameter of feed demand function 
C
rjp ,   = Consumption price 
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DF
rji ,,ε   = Own- and cross-price elasticity of feed demand 
FD
riSHIFT ,  = Feed demand shifter (e.g. changes of animal numbers)  
Non-agricultural demand (food demand) 
Non agricultural demand, or food demand, is determined in a similar way to feed de-
mand. Although the model is static in nature, it is possible to use the shifter of this 
function to consider dynamic effects, such as changes in income or population. 
( ) NAri
j
C
rj
NA
ri
NA
ri SHIFTpdD
NA
rji
,,,,
,,∏ ⋅⋅= ε       (6) 
with: 
NA
riD ,   = Domestic non agricultural demand of product i in region r 
NA
rid ,   = Calibration parameter of domestic non agricultural demand function 
NA
rji ,,ε   = Own- and cross-price elasticity of non-agricultural demand 
NA
riSHIFT ,  = Non agricultural demand shifter (e.g. change in income, population) 
Waste 
As with the seed demand, waste is dependent on the quantities supplied, a shifter for 
modelling technical progress and a calibration parameter. 
W
riririri SHIFTSwW ,,,, ⋅⋅=         (7) 
with: 
riW ,   = Waste of product i in region r 
riw ,   = Calibration parameter of waste function 
W
riSHIFT ,  = Waste shifter (e.g. technical progress) 
Net trade 
Net trade is calculated as the difference between the quantities supplied, the stock 
and all the components of demand i.e. seed demand, feed demand, non agricultural 
demand and waste.  
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ririri AdjWDDDSTSNT ,,,,,,,, −−−−−+=    (8) 
with: 
riNT ,  = Net trade of product s in region r 
BY
riST ,  = Change in stocks of product s in region r in base year (constant) 
riAdj ,  = statistical adjustments 
Prices 
There are four price definitions in the basic version model, namely border price, do-
mestic price, producer incentive price and consumer price.  
Border price 
The border price is defined in relation to a reference price. The USA is used as the 
reference country in the model and thus USA border prices are the reference border 
prices. A region’s border price for a certain commodity is therefore determined by the 
USA border price and the difference between the border price of the region and the 
reference border price in the base year.  
( )BYrefiBYriBrefiBri pppp ,,,, −+=         (9) 
with: 
B
rip ,  = Border price of product i in region r 
B
refip ,  = Reference border price of product i (USA border price) 
BY
rip ,  = Border price of product i in region r in base year 
BY
refip ,  = Reference border price of product i in base year 
Domestic price 
The domestic price is determined by the nominal protection coefficient i.e. the rela-
tionship between border and domestic prices and the price reaction to the border 
prices. The price transmission elasticity gives the level of the relationship between 
the border and the domestic price. When pri ,ε = 0, then changes in the world market 
price (and thus of the border price) do not affect domestic prices and when pri ,ε = 1 
then changes in world market prices are transmitted fully to the domestic market. 
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Various trade policies can be simulated, depending on the level of the nominal pro-
tection coefficient and the price transmission elasticity. In this study it is assumed that 
p
ri ,ε = 1. 
( ) priBririDri pNPCp ,,,, ε⋅=          (10) 
with: 
D
rip ,  = Domestic price of product i in region r 
riNPC , = Nominal protection coefficient 
p
ri ,ε  = Price transmission elasticity 
Producer incentive price 
The producer incentive price is calculated endogenously and is equal to the domestic 
price and the element of subsidies that influence production, as given in equation 
(11). The effects of decoupling are modelled through the “production effectiveness” 
coefficient, showing how much the introduction of decoupled payments acts as an 
incentive for production and thus influences the quantity produced and the prices that 
farmers actually receive. 
∑+=
Sub
SubSub
D
ri
P
ri Zpp α,,          (11) 
with: 
Subα  = Production-effectiveness 
SubZ  = Subsidy per ton 
Consumer price 
Due to lack of data the consumer price used in this study is considered to be the 
same as the domestic price. Theoretically, and if the data exist, it is possible to add 
retail margins as a further factor affecting the consumer price. 
ri
D
ri
C
ri RMpp ,,, +=           (12) 
with: 
C
rip ,  = Consumer price 
riRM ,  = Retail margin 
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Market Clearing 
The equilibrium conditions are given in equations 13 and 14. The market is cleared 
when the sum of the net trade for all regions and for all commodities is equal to zero. 
∑ =
r
riNT 0,           (13) 
0, =∑∑
i r
riNT           (14) 
Welfare 
Welfare effects are measured using the surplus concept. Welfare changes consist of 
changes in consumer surplus, in producer surplus, in the quota owner surplus (this is 
relevant only for those markets, where a binding production quota is applied) and the 
effect on taxpayers or the budget. 
Consumer surplus 
The effects on the consumer side follow the Marshallian concept of using willingness 
to pay as measurement for consumer surplus. The consumer surplus is the differ-
ence between what the consumer is ready to pay (willingness to pay) over what he 
actually pays (real expenditure).  
For example the change of the willingness to pay in a single market because of an 
increase of the demand from NAiD 1,  to 
NA
iD 2,  is illustrated as the integral of the respec-
tive interval of the inverse demand curve )( NAii DP : 
∫=∆
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)(          (15) 
with: 
iZ∆  = change of the willingness to pay 
 
Therefore the change of the consumer surplus in a single market is given by the fol-
lowing equation: 
NA
i
C
i
NA
i
C
iii DPDPZCS 12 +−∆=∆        (16) 
with: 
iCS∆  = change of the consumer surplus 
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The consumer surplus can be alternatively given direct from the integral of the de-
mand function. Therefore the change of the consumer rent due to an increase of the 
consumer prices from CiP1  to 
C
iP 2  would be: 
∫−=∆
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C
i
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C
i
NA
ii dPPDCS
2,
1,
)(         (17) 
 
In the model the changes of the consumer surplus of a region r and a market (com-
modity) i in a simulated scenario expressed as deviation from the Base Run As-
sumption (BA) is given by the following equation: 
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where CIrjiP ,,  is the income normalised consumer price. 
 
Due to path-dependency problems in the case of multiple price changes (for more 
see JUST et al., 2004, pp.102-105), both integration paths are calculated in the 
model. The change in consumer surplus is the arithmetic average of the two paths.  
The changes of the consumer surplus in all markets are given by the sum of the 
changes of the consumer surplus in the single markets: 
iscbar
CSCS ∑=,           (19) 
The feed and seed consumer rents are computed in an analogous manner. 
Producer surplus 
The welfare effects for producers are captured following the Marshallian concept of 
quasi-rent, which is equivalent to the producer surplus and is given as the excess of 
gross receipts over total variable costs. In a single market the increase of production 
costs because of an increase of supply from 1,iS  to 2,iS  are given by the integral of 
the respective interval of the marginal cost curve )( i
P
i SP : 
∫=∆ 2,
1,
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i
i
S
S
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P
ii dSSPK          (20) 
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with: 
iK∆  = change of total production costs 
 
The change of the producer surplus in a single market is thus: 
ii
P
ii
P
ii KSPSPPS ∆−−=∆ 1,1,2,2,         (21) 
with: 
iPS∆  = change of the producer surplus 
 
Alternatively the welfare effects on the producer side can be given direct by the inte-
gral of the supply curve. Therefore for an increase of the price from PiP 1,  to 
P
iP 2,  the 
change of the producer surplus is:  
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In the model the resultant producer surplus in a single market for a simulated sce-
nario (scba) caused by a change in producers’ incentive price is expressed as devia-
tion from the base run (BA) is given by the equation: 
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Binding production quotas have a negative impact on producer surplus (the rent of 
the quota owner is calculated separately). Since the model separately includes seed 
and feed demand, the effects of price changes on these markets are explicitly ex-
amined and the resulting welfare effects on the supply side are calculated in an 
analogous fashion to changes in the consumer surplus and added to the producer 
surplus.  
The total changes in the producer surplus are given by the sum of the changes on 
single markets: 
∑= scbaiscbar PSPS ,,          (24) 
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Rent for the quota owners  
In the event of binding production quotas, a rent for the quota owners entails. The 
quota rent is calculated by the price difference between the producer incentive price 
and the quota equivalent price multiplied by the binding production quota. The bind-
ing production quota is given exogenous.  
rj
Quo
rjrj QUOTApQR ,,, ⋅=         (25) 
with: 
rjQR ,   = quota rent 
rjQUOTA ,  = binding production quota 
 
In the model the resultant quota owner surplus in a single market and for a simulated 
scenario (scba) is expressed as deviation from the Base Run (BA) (equation 26). 
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The total changes in the rent for the quota owners are given again by the sum of the 
changes over the single markets: 
∑= scbaiscbar QRQR ,,          (27) 
Taxpayers’ effect 
The budget expenditure or taxpayers’ expenditure or revenue consists of two main 
elements. The first is the change in expenditure on custom duties, such as export 
subsidies, and/or the revenue from custom duties, such as import levies. The second 
is related to the budget expenditure for financing domestic policy measures and 
measures the change in expenditure for direct, input and general subsidies. A cor-
rection is made for EU Member States due to the intra-community financing system 
of the EU. This correction is based on the national contribution that each Member 
State makes to the EU budget, the resources of the EU paid or collected by each 
Member State, (i.e. export subsidies are financed by the EU, whereas the revenue 
from import tariffs is collected by Member States and paid into the EU budget) and on 
the common financing of the agricultural policy measures, which also occur at the 
level of the Member States (i.e. direct, input and general subsidies for agriculture are 
financed by the EU budget and not from resources of individual Member States). 
104  Empirical studies 
4.3.2 Calibration of Elasticities 
The initial price elasticities taken from the literature violate the theoretical conditions 
of microeconomics and thus, must be adjusted before being used in the model.  
On the supply side the conditions of homogeneity and symmetry need to be taken 
into account. 
The homogeneity condition is shown in equation 28. The supply function is homoge-
nous of degree zero when the supplied quantity remains stable after a change (in-
crease) in the commodity prices by the same percent (KIRSCHKE and JECHLITSCHKA, 
2002, pp. 165 – 168).  
Derivation and manipulation of the supply function gives: 
0...... ,,,, 112111 =+++++ ni pSpSpSpS εεεε       (28) 
with: 
11,pS
ε  = price elasticity of supply  
pi = price for product i 
for i = 1 to n 
The symmetry condition of the supply side is expressed in equation 29. According to 
this changes in the quantity of one product caused by changes in the price of another 
product are equal to the changes in the quantity of the second product due to 
changes in the price of the first product (KIRSCHKE and JECHLITSCHKA, 2002, p.167). 
22,11, 1221
SpSp pSpS εε =          (29) 
with: 
S1,2 = Supplied quantities for products 1, 2 
p1,2 = price for products 1,2 
ji pS ,
ε  = cross price elasticity of supply, 
for i, j = 1,2 and i ≠ j 
The same approach is used to express homogeneity and the symmetry condition for 
the demand function and the price elasticities of demand respectively (NICHOLSON, 
1995, p. 209 and KIRSCHKE and JECHLITSCHKA, 2002, pp. 171-174). Since income 
elasticities are not implemented in this version of the model, the adding-up condition 
is not discussed. 
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4.3.3 Database  
The updating and extension of the comprehensive AGRISIM database has been one 
of the key aspects of this project and one of the most time intensive tasks. The data-
base contains raw information about primary and processed commodities and feeds 
the model with all the necessary exogenous parameters. 
The model covers the whole world, aggregated into 17 regions of which, depending 
on the focus of the simulations, 56 can be modelled separately. It also covers 29 
commodities, which are aggregated into commodity markets (for example all oilseeds 
are aggregated together), again depending on the focus of the analysis to be carried 
out. 
An overview of the commodities and countries covered by AGRISIM is given in Table 
4.2. 
Table 4.2: Commodities’ and countries’ list 
Commodities 
Apples* 
Coarse grains  
(barley, maize, millet, 
oats, rye, sorghum, 
triticale, other cereals) 
Beef 
Cotton* 
Milk 
Rice  
Oilseeds  
(rape and mustard 
seed, soya beans, 
sunflower seed)  
Sugar  
Olive oil* 
Oranges* 
Pig meat 
Poultry meat  
(chicken, duck, goose, 
turkey meat, other poul-
try) 
Tobacco* 
Tomatoes* 
Wheat  
Countries 
Australia 
Algeria* 
Brazil 
Belarus 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
China 
Cuba 
Cyprus* 
Czech Republic 
Egypt* 
Estonia  
EU-15 (data for each 
country) 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Israel* 
Japan 
Jordan* 
Korea, Republic of 
Latvia 
Lebanon* 
Libya* 
Lithuania 
Malta* 
Mexico 
Morocco* 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Norway 
Poland 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
Switzerland 
Syria* 
Thailand 
Tunisia* 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
USA 
Rest of World 
Notes: * New commodities and countries added in AGRISIM 
Source: AGRISIM database 
106  Empirical studies 
The database consists of three main parts, data on volumes and prices, data on 
trade policies and the elasticities. 
Time series data from 1975 to 2001 of the volumes of production, commodity bal-
ances and population are derived from FAOSTAT. 
Time series from 1986 to 2001 containing information on trade policies are taken 
from the PSE and CSE database of the OECD (2006). Other supplementary sources 
are used for those counties and/or commodities that are not included in the PSE da-
tabases. Ad-valorem applied tariffs are derived from AMAD, TARIC and the Market 
Access Database of the EU. The same sources are used for any existing tariff rate 
quotas, which are first converted to ad-valorem equivalents and then fed into the 
model. Export subsidies for 1995 to 2004 are taken from the WTO secretariat. More 
specifically, the tariffs applied to the Mediterranean commodities of all countries in 
the model and all commodities from the Mediterranean countries are taken from 
TRAINS. 
The elasticities are derived from three main sources. Initially they were all taken from 
the database of the SWOPSIM model developed on behalf of the United States De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA) (SULLIVAN et al., 1992). Later these were supple-
mented by data for Central and Eastern European Countries taken from the database 
of the CEEC-ASIM model developed on behalf of the IAMO (Leibniz Institute of Agri-
cultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe) (WAHL et al., 2000). The recent 
updates and extensions of the model have drawn on additional sources, including the 
database of FAPRI and the USDA (SEALE et al., 2003). For Turkey and Morocco and 
for Tunisia the elasticities for tomatoes, oranges, apples and olive oil are taken from 
GRETHE (2003) and M´BAREK (2002) respectively. 
The use of various data sources creates the need to check the consistency of data 
before using them in the model, due to the different definitions of commodities that 
are used.  
It is worth noting that a special process is followed for modelling some particular 
commodities, such as sugar, vegetable oil, olive oil and cotton. These are the prod-
ucts derived from the processing of raw commodities, such as sugar beet and cane, 
oilseeds, olives and seed cotton. Here the data on the volumes of trade, the quanti-
ties consumed, the elasticities and policy refer to the processed commodities, 
whereas data on the produced quantities and farm gate prices refer to the raw com-
modities. In these cases the raw products are balanced with the processed ones by 
using empirical conversion factors, with the calculated equivalent quantities and 
prices being used in the model. 
Finally, for milk in the EU regions, the term Quorjp ,  of equaltion 1b has been derived 
from GRAMS (2004, pp. 88-90 and p. 229). 
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4.3.4 Technical Issues 
The model is written in GAMS and uses the solver CONOPT 2. 
Figure 4.2 shows the structure of the model from a technical point of view. The model 
consists of three parts: the preparation of data, the calibration of elasticities and the 
core of the model, where the simulations are run.  
Figure 4.2: The modules of AGRISIM and their inter-connections 
 
Source: Own illustration 
The raw data are stored in a Microsoft Access file named „agridata.mdb“. This can be 
searched for the relevant data for the simulations to be run, which are then exported 
to EXCEL files (named as Q_*.xls). These files are read and, if needed, further proc-
essed by the “agridata.gms” routine. This process ensures that the data are consis-
tent for every single country and market in the database. The processed data, aggre-
gated into “products” and “regions” are re-exported to EXCEL files, (now named 
“data_*.xls”). Before any processing of the raw data takes place, i.e. before the crea-
tion of the Q_*.xls files, the data are checked for their consistency. For example 
checks are made as to whether the export and import quotations of trade flows match 
and if data from the different data sources refer to the same product i.e. that they use 
the same product definitions. 
The second step is calibrating the elasticities. The initial elasticities derived from 
SWOPSIM and other sources are contained in the file “elast0.xls” Through the rou-
1. Data preparation: 
agridata.mdb Q_*.xls agridata.gms data_*.xls 
2. Calibration of elasticities: 
agricals.gms 
agricald.gms elast1.xls 
3. Formulation of scenarios: scen.xls 
4. Running simulations: 
agrisim.gms sout.xls 
elast0.xls 
data_*.xls 
data_*.xls 
elast1.xls 
scen.xls 
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tines “agricals.gms” and “agricald.gms” and by feeding into them the processed data 
containing information for each region (“data_*.xls”) the calibrated elasticities are ex-
ported to the file “elast1.xls”  
After the above steps the model is ready to run. The routine “agrisim.gms” is fed with 
the prepared data, the calibrated elasticities and the formulated scenarios (file 
“scen.xls”) and the results exported to the file “sout.xls”. 
4.3.5 Limitations of the model 
The forthcoming change in the agricultural policy regime of Mediterranean countries, 
particularly the creation of a Free Trade Area between the EU and the MPCs, com-
bined with a lack of empirical studies creates the need to analyse empirically their 
impacts. AGRISIM was extended and adjusted to perform the analysis. 
The extensions include an update of the data base of the model, to cover new com-
modities and build a different regional composition. The commodities selected are 
typical for the Mediterranean region and also important part of the external trade of 
Mediterranean countries, such as olive oil, tomatoes, apples and oranges. To capture 
the precise welfare effects on individual EU Member States, the calculation of the 
budget effects has been corrected in line with the EU intra-community financing sys-
tem. 
Even though great care and attention has been given to transforming the model, 
there are still certain limitations that need to be taken into account when interpreting 
the results. 
The model is comparative-static in nature and, although shift factors and the possibil-
ity of modelling population growth allow some dynamic aspects to be captured, the 
results must be seen as comparative-static. For example non-trend changes in prices 
and quantities or in the behaviour of consumers and producers observed in reality 
can only be produced in the model by assumptions. Thus, the model is not suited for 
forecasts and the results should be interpreted as possible trends rather than as pre-
cise figures. However, the model is suitable for comparing what happens under dif-
ferent policy scenarios, depending on how the simulations are formulated. Addition-
ally, because of its comparative-static nature the model underestimates the true 
gains from trade and from liberalisation, since in reality these gains are commonly 
much higher than the model results. Trade liberalisation is not a static procedure, but 
a dynamic one, which offers opportunities and can act as a catalyst for changes in 
the structure of production, the evolution of employment, and the organisation of 
supply chains. 
The second limitation has to do with the exogenous parameters of the model. Sev-
eral data sources have been used, which are not always consistent with each other. 
Although it is quite easy to obtain time series of quantitative data, it is very difficult to 
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find reliable time series data of domestic or world market prices, thus making it nec-
essary to use different data sources. It is assumed that the domestic prices are de-
termined by a reference world market price, applied tariffs and export subsidies. 
Nevertheless, there can be other barriers to trade, such as non tariff barriers and 
negative protection, which are difficult to quantify and to measure and are not taken 
into consideration.  
A further problem has to do with the elasticities used in the model. Although they are 
calibrated under the assumptions of microeconomic theory, questions can be asked 
about the reliability of the initial elasticities. These are derived from various secon-
dary sources as described above (chapter 4.3.3). Ideally it would be to estimate 
econometrically all the initial elasticities. However, such an estimation would require 
reliable time series of domestic prices for all the countries in the world, which do not 
exist. Constructing such a database would be a very time- and effort-intensive task, 
far beyond the scope of this study. A second best option to overcome this problem is 
to carry out a sensitivity analysis based on the initial elasticities. The simulations can 
be run using different values of the initial elasticities, thus allowing a testing of the 
effects of the elasticities on the results.  
Overall these limitations do not undermine the value of AGRISIM as a tool for empiri-
cally analysing the effects of the altered policy regime for Mediterranean countries. 
Compared to other partial equilibrium multi-commodity and multi-region models, it 
covers typical commodities for the Mediterranean region and countries at a non-ag-
gregated level and through the new regional composition of the model, the regional 
effects on the EU-Member States can be captured. 
What differentiates this study from previous empirical analyses, described earlier in 
this chapter is the commodity and regional composition of the model and its partial 
equilibrium nature, which allows a more detailed analysis of the agricultural sector. 
The model considers the main commodities that are traded around the Mediterra-
nean basin capturing north-south and south-north trade flows. Due to the complexity 
of the market in fruit and vegetables and differences in trade policy that are applied 
not only to specific products but also to according to season, the model focuses on a 
few key products (apples, oranges and tomatoes) which are the most important for 
trade between the EU and the MPCs. Additionally, all Mediterranean Countries, both 
EU Member States and MPCs are modelled. By breaking the EU down into the 
Mediterranean Member States (Greece, Italy and Spain), the rest of the EU-15 and 
new Member States the model is appropriate for revealing regional disparities around 
the Mediterranean and within the EU. 
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5 Simulations with AGRISIM and model results 
For the purposes of this study and in order to keep the model manageable the com-
modities and the countries that AGRISIM includes have been aggregated together. 
Table 5.1 shows the regional aggregation and commodity composition used in the 
simulations. 
Table 5.1: Levels of aggregation used in the AGRISIM Database 
Regions Products 
GRE  Greece  APPL Apples 
ITA  Italy  ORAN Oranges 
ESP  Spain  TOMA Tomatoes 
E12 Rest of EU-15 OLIO Olive Oil 
MOR Morocco COTT Cotton Lint 
TUR Turkey TOBA Tobacco 
MPC Other MPCs (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jor-
dan, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Tunisia)* 
WHEA Wheat 
E10 2004 EU accession countries (Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia) 
COAR Coarse grains (barley, 
maize, triticale, oats, rye, 
sorghum, other cereals) 
BUR Bulgaria and Romania RICE Rice 
RUA Russia and Ukraine SUGA Sugar 
ANZ Australia and New Zealand OILS Oilseeds 
MEX Mexico MILK Milk 
USA United States BEEF Beef and Veal 
BRA Brazil PORK Pig meat 
CHI China POUL Poultry meat 
ROE Canada, Iceland, Japan, Norway, South 
Korea, Switzerland 
  
ROW Rest of World   
Notes: * Although Libya is not yet an official Mediterranean Partner Country of the EU, it 
has been included in this group of countries since it is a potential partner country 
and currently has observer status at the Euro-Med Agreements. Gaza Strip and 
West Bank have been excluded due to lack of data. 
Source: Own compilation 
112                                                          Simulations with AGRISIM and model results 
5.1 Overview of the baseline and simulation scenarios 
The simulations focus on policy shocks that take place in the EU and Mediterranean 
Partner Countries. 
The base year of the model is 2001, when Agenda 2000 was implemented in the EU. 
To have a plausible representation of the existing agricultural policy regime, a Base 
Run scenario (BA) was necessary. To include the reforms made under Agenda 2000 
for 2002 and 2003 the direct payments made for oilseeds were decreased and the 
direct payments made for beef were increased. In addition to the full implementation 
of Agenda 2000 the scenario also simulated the eastern enlargement of the EU and 
the implementation of the Luxembourg Agreement. The eastern enlargement is 
simulated by adjusting the price levels and border policies of the new member states 
to that of the EU-15. For the Luxembourg Agreement the option of full decoupling 
was chosen, since most member states chose not to apply the exemptions for cou-
pled payments that were provided by Council Regulation (EC) 1782/2003 (Official 
Journal of the EU L 270). The subsequent reform of the EU sugar sector, which oc-
curred in 2006, and the reform of the tomato market (2007) are not taken into ac-
count.  
The method for implementing the decoupled direct payment scheme within the Base 
Run is described below. First, the total sum of all decoupled payments was calcu-
lated and this total was divided by the relevant total area, to determine the decoupled 
payment per hectare. The relevant total area consists of the area used for cereals 
(including rice), oilseeds, sugar beet, sugar cane, cotton, olive oil, tobacco and for 
forage. For crops, the result is equivalent to the subsidy per production activity level. 
For milk and beef the results were divided by the stocking density, to determine the 
subsidy per production activity level for the products of ruminants. Pork and poultry 
are assumed to not be directly affected by the decoupling of payments. The subsidy 
per unit of output is derived by dividing the decoupled payment per production activity 
level for each product by its average yield. The impact on the producer incentive 
price for each product is calculated by multiplying this subsidy per ton by a specific 
multiplier for the production-effectiveness of direct payments. It should be noted that 
all the subsidies in the model affect the producer incentive price (KAVALLARI et al. 
2005b and c). Following CAHILL (1997) who showed that the decoupling rates for oil-
seeds and coarse grains without area restrictions are partial, the simulations assume 
a partial production-effectiveness for these products. 
The reform of the CAP for Mediterranean products (cotton, olive oil and tobacco) is 
simulated in SC1 so as to be able to see separately the effects of decoupling the di-
rect payments of those commodities on Mediterranean agriculture. In this scenario 
the direct subsidies for tobacco are fully decoupled and reduced by 50 %, for cotton 
and olive oil they are decoupled by 65 % and 60 % respectively. 
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SC2 simulates the further enlargement of the EU with Bulgaria and Romania. The 
enlargement is simulated by adjusting the price level of these two countries to that of 
the EU. The assumptions of this scenario are taken over into the following scenarios.  
In SC3 the forthcoming Free Trade Area between the EU and the MPCs is simulated. 
The Barcelona Agreement provides for a gradual elimination of trade barriers be-
tween the EU and the MPCs, resulting in a Free Trade Area by 2010. Here the 
simulation goes one step further than the agreed negotiations and assumes a cus-
toms union between the EU and the MPCs. Since the EU is a bigger player in world 
trade than the MPCs, the customs union is simulated by having the MPCs adapt the 
EU’s trade policy with the rest of the world. It assumes that the MPCs apply the same 
trade protection as the EU, measured by the nominal protection rate. The results of 
this scenario can be seen as the upper bounds of the Euro-Med Agreements, while 
the results of SC2 represent the lower bounds18. 
SC4 and SC5 simulate two different options for liberalisation. SC4 simulates a 50 % 
multilateral liberalisation – a possible outcome of the ongoing WTO negotiations19 – 
and SC5 simulates a 100 % multilateral liberalisation. Although the last scenario is an 
unlikely policy outcome, it is useful for checking the plausibility of the model results, 
helping us to understand the magnitude of the results obtained from other scenarios 
and further explain them.  
Table 5.2 gives an overview of the simulated scenarios. 
Table 5.2: Base run and simulated scenarios 
BA Agenda 2000, EU-east enlargement and Luxembourg Agreement 
SC1 Base run + CAP Reform in Mediterranean Products (cotton, olive oil, tobacco) 
SC2 SC1 + EU enlargement with Bulgaria and Romania 
SC3 SC2+ extension of the Euro-Med Agreements into a customs union between 
the EU and the MPCs (i.e. application of the EU’s Nominal Protection Rate by 
MOR, TUR and MPCs) 
SC4 SC2+ 50 % multilateral liberalisation across the entire world 
SC5 SC2 + 100 % multilateral liberalisation across the entire world 
Source: Own compilation 
This chapter only discusses the simulation results for the EU-27 and the MPCs. De-
tailed tables with the baseline projections and results on these countries can be 
found in the Annex (Tables B.1 to B.9). Results for the other regions of the model are 
not presented here but are available from the author. The results presented in sec-
tion 5.1 concern changes from the Base Run Assumption (BA) on supply, demand, 
                                            
18 Hereafter this scenario will be called „Barcelona Agreement“ 
19 Hereafter this scenario will be called „WTO liberalisation“ 
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net trade, prices and social welfare, while in sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 the changes 
are presented in comparison to SC2. As will be explained later, SC2 can be seen as 
a new Base Run scenario, since it is the closest representation of the current policy 
situation. This method of presentation enables direct comparison of the impact of fu-
ture policy scenarios to the current situation. 
5.2 Effects of the CAP Reform for Mediterranean Commodities 
and the Accession of Bulgaria and Romania 
The reform of the CAP for Mediterranean commodities and the enlargement of the 
EU to include Bulgaria and Romania only slightly affect agricultural markets in the EU 
and have almost no impact on the markets of the MPCs. 
5.2.1 Effects on EU Member States 
The effects of the second wave of the CAP Reform and the enlargement with Bul-
garia and Romania affect only marginally supply in the EU-25. The impacts on Bul-
garia and Romania from joining the EU cannot be neglected. 
Commodity balances and net trade effects 
The results mostly indicate changes in the supply and demand for cotton, olive oil 
and tobacco, the only markets for which a policy change is simulated. Most notably 
the supply of cotton falls by 4 % in Spain and Greece, which are the most important 
cotton supplier countries in the EU. For tobacco, the decrease in supply varies be-
tween 1 % in Spain and 7 % in Italy. 
Demand for olive oil decreases by about 1 % due to reform of the olive oil market, 
whereas the demand for cotton and tobacco remains at the same level as the Base 
Run scenario. 
The marginal changes in the supply of cereals and livestock products due to the sec-
ond wave of the CAP reform are mostly due to cross-price effects.  
The CAP reforms on Mediterranean commodities and the enlargement of the EU to 
include Bulgaria and Romania do not change the net trade situation of the EU coun-
tries. The Mediterranean EU Member States are, generally, net exporters of these 
regional commodities. However, there are some exceptions Spain is a net importer of 
tobacco and Italy a net importer of cotton and of olive oil. Italy is by far the most im-
portant net importer of these products among EU countries, with imports coming 
mainly from Tunisia (COMTRADE, various years). Figure 5.1 shows the net trade 
effects of the CAP Reform for Mediterranean commodities on Spain, Greece and It-
aly. It should be noted that model calculates net trade as the difference between 
supply and demand. Therefore, when supply is higher than demand, a country or a 
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region is considered to be a net exporter and when demand is higher than supply, a 
net importer. Table B.4 presents the effects on net trade in detail. 
Figure 5.1: Net trade effects of the CAP Reform for Mediterranean commodi-
ties on Spain, Greece and Italy 
Notes: Positive values in the Y axis show net exports and negative values show net 
imports 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
The effects of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania (SC2) do not affect either sup-
ply or demand in the EU regions, and thus net trade does not change. It does though 
bring about changes in the commodity balances of Bulgaria and Romania. 
The adjustment of price levels in Bulgaria and Romania to those of the EU-25 results 
in an increase in the supply of commodities that are highly protected within the EU, 
such as beef (increase in supply of 25 %) and cotton (an increase in supply of 33 %), 
all brought about by higher EU price levels and to a decrease in the supply of toma-
toes by 32 %.  
Changes in demand also occur in these countries, with demand for livestock com-
modities falling by 24 % for milk, 28 % for pork and 72 % for beef, while only for 
poultry meat it increases by 23 %. The changes in demand for crop products are of a 
lower magnitude. For example the decline in demand for cereals is between circa 
1 % to 5 % and for oranges about 1 %. For olive oil, tomatoes and tobacco demand 
increases by 3 to 10 %. 
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Prices 
The driving force for changes in farm gate prices for the three Mediterranean Com-
modities under the CAP Reform scenario is mainly due to a reduction in direct subsi-
dies for olive oil since no change in the nominal protection rate has been simulated.  
The Net Protection Rate (NPR) for the base year is taken from the PSE database of 
the OECD, while for the commodities and countries not included in this dataset it is 
calculated using the applied tariffs reported in the TRAINS database and the export 
subsidies reported by the WTO secretariat (Table 5.3). It should be noted that the 
levels of border protection are the same throughout the EU regions. 
Table 5.3: Net Protection Rate in the EU-25 markets, in % 
Commodity Base Year BA SC1 SC2
WHEA 2 2 2 2
COAR 8 8 8 8
RICE 40 40 40 40
OILS 0 0 0 0
SUGA 75 75 75 75
MILK 60 60 60 60
BEEF 164 142 142 144
PORK 23 23 23 23
POUL 49 49 49 49
COTT 0 0 0 0
TOBA 0 0 0 0
OLIO 0 0 0 0
APPL 7 7 7 7
ORAN 15 15 15 15
TOMA 0 0 0 0
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
The changes in farm gate prices for tobacco are about +1 % and about +2% for olive 
oil, both due to adjustments in supply.  
A more important influence on supply is the producer incentive price, which is esti-
mated as the farm gate price and the part of the direct subsidies that affects produc-
tion. This is the price that the farmer actually receives and the one that determines 
farmers’ decisions about what and how much to produce. Decoupling the direct sub-
sidies for cotton, tobacco and olive oil leads to a decline in the producer incentive 
prices in Spain, Greece and Italy: of 6 to 14 % for olive oil, 20 to 39 % for cotton and 
19 to 27 % for tobacco. For other commodities the changes in producer incentive 
prices match those of farm gate prices, since the simulated scenarios do not model 
any further CAP reforms. Under SC1 cross-price effects lead to changes in producer 
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incentive prices in the EU Mediterranean countries for other commodities. For exam-
ple in Greece the producer incentive price for milk rises by up to 20 %.  
The same trends are observed in the 2004 accession countries. 
The effects of the EU enlargement to include with Bulgaria and Romania are only felt 
in those two countries. In both of these countries admission to the EU involves ad-
justing farm gate prices to the EU level and this results in a significant increase of the 
farm gate price of, for example, beef (by 164 %) and a decrease of the farm gate 
prices for cereals of 10 to 23 %. 
The revenue of producers changes in response to the new price and supply levels. 
These changes are minor and of a small magnitude, as shown in Table B.6. Spanish 
and Greek cotton farmers face a revenue reduction by 4 and 3.5 % respectively. 
Greek tobacco producers face a loss of their revenue of 3.5%, those in Italy of 6 % 
and Spanish tobacco farmers one of just 0.5 %. Olive oil producers in the three dif-
ferent countries enjoy an increase of their revenue of between 0.1 and 0.7 %. Farm-
ers in the rest of the EU-15 growing these crops face changes in their revenue of a 
similar magnitude. Farmers growing typically „northern“ commodities such as cereals 
experience increases in their revenue of not more than 2 % (increasing in Spain and 
Italy, decreasing in Greece and remaining unchanged in the other EU regions). It 
should be noted that the magnitude of the effects would be higher for the three 
Mediterranean commodities if producer’s incentive prices were used instead of farm 
gate prices to calculate farmers’ revenues. 
In Bulgaria and Romania farmers’ revenue is adjusted as a result of their countries 
entrance to the EU, again depending on the changes in prices and supply. The larg-
est change by far is an increase in beef producers’ revenue, by 230 %.  
The changes in border prices in the two simulations are equivalent to changes in 
farm gate prices as a price transmission elasticity of 1 has been assumed. 
Budgetary, allocative and welfare effects 
This part of the discussion focuses on the distributional and allocative effects, con-
sidering producers, quota owners, consumers, taxpayers and society at large. The 
effects on the taxpayers are reflected in the effects on state budgets, and the effects 
on other groups are shown using the surplus concept. The changes in state budgets 
are attributed to changes in agricultural subsidies (direct, input, general and decoup-
led direct subsidies) and to changes in customs duties. 
The driving force for budgetary changes in the scenario reforming the CAP regime for 
cotton, tobacco and olive oil (SC1) are the changes in the direct subsidies made for 
those three commodities (Table 5.4) and particularly the decoupled direct subsidies 
within the EU-25 regions (Table 5.5). It should be noted that changes in the decoup-
led direct subsidies within the 2004 accession countries are close to zero as the 
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Base Run of the model assumes direct payments in these countries to have already 
been decoupled. Changes in the customs duties in this scenario are minimal and are 
only reflected in changes of the quantities traded since, as discussed above, no 
change in EU border protection was simulated (Table 5.6). Moreover the changes in 
the input and in the general subsidies are close to zero. 
Table 5.4: Budgetary effects from changes in direct subsidies within the EU-
25 (deviations from Base Run in US$ million) 
Cotton Tobacco Olive oil 
 BA SC1 SC2 BA SC1 SC2 BA SC1 SC2 
Greece 0 323 323 0 337 337 0 321 321
Italy 0 0 0 0 303 303 0 461 461
Spain 0 127 127 0 103 103 0 559 559
Rest of EU-15 0 0 0 0 105 105 0 21 21
2004 Accession 
States (EU-10) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM  
Table 5.5: Budgetary effects of changes in the decoupling of direct subsidies 
in the EU-27 (all agricultural markets, deviations from Base Run in 
US$ million) 
 BA SC1 SC2
Greece 0 -799 -800
Italy 0 -608 -608
Spain 0 -730 -729
Rest of EU-15 0 -73 -73
2004 Accession States (EU-10) 0 0 0
Bulgaria & Romania 0 0 -2541
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
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Table 5.6: Budgetary effects of changes in customs duties in the EU-25 (deviations from Base Run in US$ million) 
Greece Italy Spain Rest of EU-15 EU-10 Commodity 
BA SC1 SC2 BA SC1 SC2 BA SC1 SC2 BA SC1 SC2 BA SC1 SC2 
WHEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
COAR 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 1 0 0 0
RICE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OILS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUGA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0
MILK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 10
BEEF 0 -1 0 0 -5 -4 0 -9 -9 0 -1 -5 0 1 10
PORK 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 5 0 0 14 0 0 3
POUL 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 1 0 0 0 -7 0 0 -2
COTT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOBA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OLIO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
APPL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ORAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOMA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
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The scenario regarding Bulgaria’s and Romania’s entry to the EU shows changes in 
the budgets of the two countries, which are due to the required changes to their agri-
cultural subsidies and their customs duties, as shown in Table 5.7. The changes 
caused by decoupled direct subsidies in these countries are included in Table 5.5. 
In total the budgetary effects on the EU-27 are positive. They are mostly due to lower 
levels of expenditure on decoupled direct subsidies, which are reduced for tobacco. 
These benefits are partly offset by small changes in trade levies brought about by 
changes in the net quantity traded commodities.  
Table 5.7: Budgetary effects of changes in direct subsidies and customs du-
ties in Bulgaria and Romania (deviations from Base Run in US$ 
million) 
Change of direct subsidies Change of customs duties 
Commodity BA SC1 SC2 BA SC1 SC2 
WHEA 0 0 0 0 0 14
COAR 0 0 0 0 0 -7
RICE 0 0 0 0 0 -52
OILS 0 0 0 0 0 -1
SUGA 0 0 0 0 0 -4
MILK 0 0 -25 0 0 -143
BEEF 0 0 0 0 0 -344
PORK 0 0 -6 0 0 -40
POUL 0 0 -2 0 0 39
COTT 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOBA 0 0 0 0 0 -7
OLIO 0 0 0 0 0 -1
APPL 0 0 0 0 0 2
ORAN 0 0 0 0 0 1
TOMA 0 0 0 0 0 -32
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
To capture the budgetary effects on the different EU regions a new module was pro-
grammed for the model. Initially the taxpayers’ or budgetary effects were calculated 
by adding the changes in trade levies and agricultural subsidies (differentiated into 
input, direct, general and decoupled subsidies) and assuming these attributes as ad-
ditional expenditure or revenue (depending on the deviation from the Base Run) for 
the national budget. However, following PUSTOVIT (2003, p. 159), the intra-community 
financial flows between the Member States’ and Brussels also need to be taken into 
account. Thus, the agricultural subsidies included in the model are financed by the 
EU, and the customs duties are collected by each member state on behalf of the EU 
and flow to the EU budget. Additionally, each member state makes a contribution to 
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the EU budget which is based on its national contribution i.e. the GNI-based (Gross 
National Input) its own resources payments, the VAT-based (Value Added Tax) own 
resources payments and the UK rebate. Table 5.8 shows the changes to the budget 
of the EU-25 regions resulting from the CAP Reform for Mediterranean commodities 
and the EU’s enlargement with Bulgaria and Romania. The intra-community financial 
flows benefit southern EU Member States which make a smaller contribution to the 
EU budget. For these countries the budgetary effects are brought about by changes 
in revenues, while for the rest of EU-15 the effects are due to expenditure changes, 
since they contribute more to the EU’s budget. For the ten new Member States the 
changes are also related to expenditure since they collect now customs duties that 
go to the EU budget. 
Table 5.8: Budgetary changes in the EU-25 due to the CAP Reform for 
Mediterranean commodities (SC1) and the accession of Bulgaria 
and Romania (SC2) (in US$ million) 
Deviations from BA 
Region Financing System BA SC1 SC2 
SC1 SC2 
National -6669 -6618 -6615 51 54
Spain 
Intra-community 5059 5047 5047 -12 -12
National -5848 -5666 -5665 182 183
Greece 
Intra-community 5513 5340 5340 -174 -174
National -5952 -5801 -5799 151 153
Italy 
Intra-community 3304 3217 3220 -87 -84
National -6972 -6920 -6907 52 65
Rest of EU-15 
Intra-community -6080 -5821 -5805 259 275
National 7188 7188 7209 0 21
EU-10 
Intra-community -7797 -7783 -7802 14 -5
Source: Own calculations based on AGRISIM simulations and on EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
2005 
The two simulated scenarios result in a reduction of the budget revenue of the EU’s 
Mediterranean member states when intra-community financial flows are taken into 
account because of the custom duties effects. Thus the deviations of SC1 and SC2 
from the Base Run are negative, with a reduction of US$12 million in Spain, US$174 
million in Greece and US$84 and 87 million in the two scenarios in Italy. However, if 
these changes in financial flows would place a burden on these countries’ national 
budgets, then their budgetary expenditure would be reduced, as shown in the col-
umns with the deviations from BA and the effect on taxpayers, expressed as devia-
tions to the Base Run, would be positive. For the rest of the EU-15 the deviations 
from the Base Run due to the CAP Reform of Mediterranean commodities and the 
EU enlargement with Bulgaria and Romania are positive and are of higher magnitude 
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when intra-community financial flows are taken into consideration. In the ten new 
Member States the financial flows within the EU imply an increase in budgetary ex-
penditure. This is despite their low contribution to the Brussels budget and is due to 
the customs duties that they collect on behalf of the EU being higher than the agri-
cultural subsidies paid for out of Brussels’ budget. SC1 results in lower expenditure 
for these countries, when adjusted for intra-community financial flows (lower expen-
diture) but slightly higher expenditure under SC2, which takes into account the EU’s 
enlargement with Bulgaria and Romania. 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate the welfare effects on producers, quota owners and 
consumers among the EU-25 regions.  
Figure 5.2: Allocation of welfare effects among the EU Mediterranean Member 
States due to the CAP Reform for Mediterranean commodities 
(SC1) and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania (SC2) 
(deviations from BA) 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
producer
surplus
quota
owner
surplus
consumer
surplus
producer
surplus
quota
owner
surplus
consumer
surplus
producer
surplus
quota
owner
surplus
consumer
surplus
Spain Greece Italy
US
$ 
m
ill
io
n
SC1 SC2
Simulations with AGRISIM and model results 123 
Figure 5.3: Allocation of welfare effects on the rest of the EU-15 and 2004 
accession states as a result of the CAP Reform of Mediterranean 
commodities (SC1) and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania 
(SC2) (deviations from BA) 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
Producer surplus is reduced in all EU-25 regions, with the largest reductions being in 
Greece and Italy (US$175 and US$145 million respectively under both SC1 and 
SC2). This is partly because the reductions in the farm gate prices for cotton, tobacco 
and olive oil in these countries are greater than those in the other EU regions and 
partly because these commodities have a larger share in the commodity composition 
of these two countries than in the other EU regions.  
The effects on quota owners and on consumers are minor. For quota owners the ef-
fects are attributed to cross price effects for commodities to which production quotas 
are applied, such as sugar and milk. For consumers they are due to the small effects 
that these changes have on demand. 
The overall welfare effects on the EU regions depend upon the budgetary effects. 
Due to intra-community financial flows, the changes in welfare are negative for 
Greece, Italy and Spain, where the revenue decreases, but are positive for the rest of 
the EU-15 and the ten new Member States. In the EU-25 as a whole the CAP reform 
of Mediterranean commodities and the enlargement with Bulgaria and Romania re-
sult in increases in welfare of US$ 10 and 22 million respectively. Table B.9 in the 
Annex presents the results in detail. 
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These results show that the effects of the EU enlargement with Bulgaria and Roma-
nia on the EU-25 are only marginal. However, the welfare effects of acceding to the 
EU are of a considerable magnitude for Bulgaria and Romania, although those of 
SC1 are negligible (Figure 5.4). Producers in these two countries will enjoy welfare 
gains of about US$2,527 million as a result of the adjustment of price levels to those 
of the EU, while there is a slight decrease in consumer welfare as a result of an ad-
justment of demand. For Bulgaria and Romania the intra-community financial flows 
system of the EU was modelled, since their exact contribution to the EU budget was 
not known at the time that the module was programmed. Instead budgetary effects 
are illustrated under the assumption that these countries would have to finance the 
application of EU agricultural policy from their own resources. The overall negative 
welfare effects are a result of this assumption. 
Figure 5.4: Welfare effects on Bulgaria and Romania due to the CAP Reform 
for the Mediterranean commodities (SC1) and their accession to 
the EU (SC2) (deviations from BA) 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
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5.2.2 Effects on the MPCs 
The effects on the Mediterranean Partner Countries of the CAP reforms for cotton, 
olive oil and tobacco and the EU enlargement by Bulgaria and Romania are minimal, 
with the changes in the commodity balances, prices and social welfare being almost 
close to zero. However, the simulations for those two scenarios referred to shocks 
only on the EU’s markets and any effects on the MPCs would result from the market 
clearing mechanism of the model and would be due to chain effects on the rest of the 
world, stemming from changes in the EU’s markets. Despite the EU’s dominant posi-
tion as global player and as the most important player in the Mediterranean region, 
the results indicate that the MPCs were not affected by the change in market support 
for cotton, olive oil and tobacco or by the enlargement of the EU to include Bulgaria 
and Romania. This could be also explained by the small effects that SC1 and SC2 
have on the EU’s markets, as discussed above. 
Commodity balances and net trade effects 
The only distinguishable effect of the reform of the CAP regime for cotton, olive oil 
and tobacco and the enlargement of the EU with Bulgaria and Romania is an in-
crease in the supply of olive oil by 1 % in Turkey and in the rest of the MPCs.  
Demand remains at the same levels as in the Base Run. 
As a result there is almost no change in the net trade and the trade status of the 
MPCs. They remain net importers of typically “northern” commodities, such as cere-
als, sugar, oilseeds and livestock products (meat and dairy products) and net export-
ers of olive oil, tomatoes and oranges. In detail, Morocco is a net exporter of about 
260,000 t of oranges in both SC1 and SC2 and of about 207,000 t and 210,000 t of 
tomatoes in SC1 and SC2 respectively, while its net exports of olive oil are only 
about 2,000 t. Turkey is a net exporter of about 108,000 t of olive oil and 143,000 t of 
oranges in both SC1 and SC2. In SC2, Turkey’s net exports of tomatoes increase by 
45,000 t (from 642,000 t to 687,000 t). Turkey is also a net exporter of sugar, with net 
exports of about 900,000 t. The rest of the MPCs are net exporters of olive oil (about 
107,000 t) and oranges (about 430,000 t) in both scenarios. Net exports of tomatoes 
from these countries also increase under SC2, by 38,000 t (from about 99,000 to al-
most 137,000 t). The rest of MPCs are also net exporters of cotton (about 183,000 t), 
largely from Egypt.  
Prices 
The price effects are minimal and are due to the changes in supply, since no 
changes in the price level or border protection of the MPCs was simulated. Table 5.9 
presents the applicable net protection rates for the two first scenarios. 
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In detail, the CAP Reform for Mediterranean commodities results in a marginal rise in 
farm gate prices which is highest for olive oil (about 2 %) and tobacco (about 1 %) in 
all three MPC regions in the model, i.e. in Morocco, Turkey and the rest of the MPCs.  
The changes in farm gate prices are transmitted to the border prices with a price 
transmission elasticity of 1. Since domestic policy within the three MPCs is not mod-
elled the producer incentive price is the same as the farm gate price. 
Table 5.9: Net protection rates in the MPCs, in % 
Morocco Turkey Rest of MPCs 
Com-
modity 
Base 
Year BA SC1 SC2
Base 
Year BA SC1 SC2
Base 
Year BA SC1 SC2
WHEA 29 29 29 29 -7 -7 -7 -7 7 7 7 7
COAR 0 0 0 0 19 19 19 19 0 0 0 0
RICE 111 111 111 111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OILS 0 0 0 0 25 25 25 25 0 0 0 0
SUGA 0 0 0 0 27 27 27 27 2 2 2 2
MILK 115 115 115 115 16 16 16 16 26 26 26 26
BEEF 0 0 0 0 207 207 207 207 8 8 8 8
PORK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
POUL 109 109 109 109 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20
COTT 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOBA 18 17 18 18 25 25 25 25 4 4 4 4
OLIO 55 54 55 55 31 31 31 31 43 43 43 43
APPL 55 54 55 55 0 0 0 0 7 7 7 7
ORAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 7 7
TOMA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 37 37 37
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
Budgetary, allocative and welfare effects 
The budgetary effects are also very small, coming about solely as a result of changes 
in customs duties, as shown in detail in Table 5.10. These changes, as explained 
above, are due to small changes in the supply, which in turn are a chain effect of the 
changes in the EU’s markets. 
The effects show that the resources are equally allocated between producers and 
consumers throughout the MPCs (Table B.9 in the Annex). The slight increase in 
farm gate prices results in an increase in the producer surplus, which is in Morocco of 
about US$3 and US$2 million in both SC1 and SC2. Turkey experiences an increase 
in producer surplus of about US$8 under SC1, but no observable change under SC2. 
The rest of the MPCs see an increase of about US$20 and US$17 million under SC1 
and SC2 respectively. This change in price levels leads to a decrease of the con-
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sumer surplus, which is almost of the same magnitude as the increase in the pro-
ducer surplus. 
Overall welfare is only slightly affected. In Turkey, there are welfare gains of about 
US$2 million from the EU enlargement to include Bulgaria and Romania and a similar 
level of welfare losses under the CAP reform for Mediterranean commodities, both 
attributed to the changes of the customs duties. In the rest of the MPCs the welfare 
losses due to SC1 and SC2 are about US$6 and US$4 million respectively, while in 
Morocco the overall welfare effects are close to zero. 
Table 5.10: Changes in the customs duties of the MPCs due to the CAP reform 
of Mediterranean commodities (SC1) and the accession of Bulgaria 
and Romania to the EU (SC2) (deviations from Base Run in US$ 
million) 
Morocco Turkey Rest of MPCs Commodity 
BA SC1 SC2 BA SC1 SC2 BA SC1 SC2
WHEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
COAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RICE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OILS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUGA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MILK 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
BEEF 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
PORK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
POUL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1
COTT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOBA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OLIO 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 -4 -4
APPL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ORAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOMA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -5
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
 
Thus the effects of SC1 and SC2 on the MPCs are only marginal. Since SC2 refers 
to the current policy regime, it can be taken as the new Base Run scenario. In the 
following sections the effects will expressed as deviations from SC2 and are thus ex-
pressed in percentage points. References to the scenarios are kept as in Table 5.2, 
so as to avoid confusion.  
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5.3 The effects of the „Barcelona Agreement“ 
This section focuses on the effects of SC3 and the deviations are given in compari-
son to the existing policy regime (SC2) for the reasons given above.  
This scenario aims to model the effects of the Euro Med Agreements. Because the 
model treats the commodities as homogenous and does differentiate them on the 
basis of their origin, the simulation models a customs union between the EU and the 
MPCs rather than a Free Trade Area between the two groups of countries. Moreover, 
because the EU is the dominant player in agricultural trade, it is assumed that the 
MPCs will apply the same border protection as the EU. Thus the simulation is ac-
complished by applying the EU’s NPR to the MPCs. 
5.3.1 Effects on the EU Member States 
Commodity balances and net trade effects 
The results indicate that the „Barcelona Agreement“ does not result in any distin-
guishable changes in the commodity balances in the EU regions. Olive oil production 
in Spain and Greece increases by one percentage point (deviation of SC3 from SC2), 
the supply of tomatoes increases by three percentage points in each of Spain, 
Greece and the 2004 accession states, by one percentage point in the rest of the 
EU-15 and by two percentage points in Italy. The supply of oranges from Italy, the 
2004 accession states and Greece declines, by almost one percentage point. For all 
other commodities, the changes bought about by the „Barcelona Agreement“ deviate 
by less than one percentage point from the new Base Run (SC2). 
Demand remains at the same levels as under SC2, with no observable changes from 
to the application of the EU’s NPR by the MPCs. 
These changes in demand and supply are reflected in the changes in net trade. Fig-
ure 5.5 shows the changes in net trade in detail. Due to the almost marginal changes 
in supply, the changes in the quantities traded are very small and there is no change 
in net trade status. The sole exception to this is the net trade in poultry meat in Spain, 
where the simulation of the „Barcelona Agreement“ changes Spain’s trade status 
from being a net exporter of 1,000 t of poultry meat to a net importer, of 5,000 t. 
The net trade in specific commodities, such as tomatoes and olive oil develops in 
favour of the Mediterranean EU Member States, which export a little more and to im-
port a little less than under the current agricultural policy regime (new Base Run or 
SC2). For example the „Barcelona Agreement“ leads to an increase in net exports of 
tomatoes from Spain and Italy by 100,000 t each and an increase of 50,000 t of net 
exports of tomatoes from Greece. Net exports of olive oil from Spain and Greece in-
crease by 20,000 t, and Italy’s net imports of olive oil decrease by approximately the 
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same magnitude. The „Barcelona Agreement“ has negative effects on exports of or-
anges from these three countries, with net exports decreasing by 10,000 t in each 
country. The other commodity market where distinguishable changes occur is wheat, 
with Spain and Italy decreasing their net imports by 20,000 t each, and Greece re-
maining a net exporter of 95,000 t. Finally the Agreement does not affect the net 
trade of cotton, commodity important only for Greece and Spain. 
Figure 5.5: Net trade effects of the „Barcelona Agreement“ on Spain, Greece 
and Italy (SC3) 
Notes: Positive values in the Y axis show net exports, negative values show net imports 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
For the rest of EU-15, the „Barcelona Agreement“ leads to an increase in net exports 
of wheat that are in the order of 180,000 t, a decrease of exports of coarse grains by 
120,000 t and a decrease of tomato imports, by 40,000 t. This decline in the net im-
ports of tomatoes suggests that the additional tomato exports from Greece, Italy and 
Spain (discussed above) would not be distributed to EU markets but would be ex-
ported to the rest of the world (Figure 5.6).  
For the ten 2004 accession countries, and Bulgaria and Romania the changes 
brought about by the „Barcelona Agreement“ are very minor. The most distinguish-
able changes are a decline of 40,000 t in the net exports of coarse grains from the 
ten 2004 accession countries, and a decline in the net exports of milk of Bulgaria and 
Romania, which drop by 70,000 t (Figure 5.6). 
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Figure 5.6: Net trade effects of the „Barcelona Agreement“ on non-
Mediterranean EU regions (SC3) 
Notes: Positive values in the Y axis show net exports, negative values show net imports 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
Prices 
The price effects brought about by the „Barcelona Agreement“ occur solely as a re-
sult of changes in the commodity balances within EU markets. To remind the reader, 
in this scenario the only adjustment made has been to change the NPR of the MPCs 
to the EU level. No further shocks or changes to the EU’s markets were modelled. 
Border protection, expressed as the difference between border prices and domestic 
prices has been kept at the level of SC2, which is modelled through the NPR, and 
there are no additional changes in the implementation of the CAP. An overview of the 
applied NPR in the EU’s markets up to SC3 is presented in Table 5.11. 
This is why the deviations in farm gate prices between SC3 and the new Base Run 
(SC2) are within +/-1% for all commodity markets in the model, with the exception of 
olive oil, where the effects are slighty higher. Here SC3 leads to an increase of 4, 6, 5 
percentage points in farm gate prices in Spain, Italy and Greece respectively and 3 
percentage points in each of the rest of the EU regions (EU-15, 2004 accession 
countries and Bulgaria and Romania), reflecting the inelastic supply of olive oil (the 
own-supply elasticity of olive oil in Spain, Greece and Italy is of 0.15, 0.17 and 0.08 
respectively, while in the rest of EU-15 and in EU-10 of 0.16 and 0.15 respectively). 
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The changes in border prices are of the same magnitude as the changes in farm gate 
prices throughout the markets and the EU regions due to the assumed price trans-
mission elasticity, as explained above. 
Table 5.11: Net protection rates in the EU-25 markets, in % 
Commodity Base Year BA SC1 SC2 SC3
WHEA 2 2 2 2 2
COAR 8 8 8 8 8
RICE 40 40 40 40 40
OILS 0 0 0 0 0
SUGA 75 75 75 75 75
MILK 60 60 60 60 60
BEEF 164 142 142 144 150
PORK 23 23 23 23 23
POUL 49 49 49 49 49
COTT 0 0 0 0 0
TOBA 0 0 0 0 0
OLIO 0 0 0 0 0
APPL 7 7 7 7 7
ORAN 15 15 15 15 15
TOMA 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
The „Barcelona Agreement“ only has minor effects on farmers’ revenue, and these 
are only distinguishable within the olive oil and tomato markets. Olive oil producers 
enjoy an increase in their revenue of five percentage points, with Greek olive oil pro-
ducers being best of all with an increase in their incomes of seven percentage points. 
In the new Member States (EU-10 and Bulgaria & Romania) the increase in revenue 
is three percentage points. Tomato farmers also benefit from an increase in their 
revenue, varying between four percentage points in Spain, Greece, the rest of EU-15 
and the ten new Member States to 2.5 percentage points in Italy and 1.5 percentage 
points in Bulgaria and Romania. In Bulgaria and Romania there are some disparities, 
with the revenue of sugar and beef producers, decreasing by 3.5 and 5.0 percentage 
points respectively. 
Budgetary, allocative and welfare effects 
In the simulation of the „Barcelona Agreement“ the driving force for the budgetary 
effects are the changes in customs duties which are a direct result of changes in the 
quantities traded. The border protection and expenditure on agricultural subsidies in 
the EU are kept at the same level as in SC2. The effects are of a small magnitude, 
which is to be expected because of the marginal changes in net trade. The revenue 
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changes in the rest of the EU-15 stem from changes in the milk and poultry markets 
and in the ten new Member States they are due to changes in the milk and beef mar-
kets (Table 5.12). 
Table 5.12: Change in customs revenues in the EU-27 due to the „Barcelona 
Agreement“ (SC3) (deviations from new Base Run (SC2) in US$ 
million) 
Commodities Greece Italy Spain rest of EU-15
new Member 
States (EU-10) 
Bulgaria & 
Romania
WHEA 0 0 0 -1 0 0
COAR 0 0 0 -1 0 0
RICE 0 0 0 0 0 0
OILS 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUGA 0 0 0 5 1 0
MILK 0 0 1 24 28 8
BEEF 2 5 0 1 22 7
PORK 0 0 1 4 0 0
POUL 0 2 2 11 1 0
COTT 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOBA 0 0 0 0 0 0
OLIO 0 0 0 0 0 0
APPL 0 0 0 0 0 0
ORAN 1 1 1 0 0 0
TOMA 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
Table 5.13 shows the welfare effects and the allocation of resources between pro-
ducers, consumers and taxpayers, all expressed as deviations from SC2. Producers 
in the EU-15 region enjoy welfare gains from the implementation of the „Barcelona 
Agreement“ because of a slight increase in farm gate prices, while in the ten new 
Member States the producer surplus decreases, due to a slight reduction of the farm 
gate prices for livestock.  
The slight changes in farm gate prices are the driving force for changes in consumer 
surplus. Overall there is a decrease in consumer surplus in the three EU Mediterra-
nean member states and an increase in the other EU regions. 
The quota owner surplus effects are attributed to the changes in the milk, sugar and 
tobacco markets and are more evident in the rest of the EU-15 and in the twelve EU 
Member States (EU-10, Bulgaria and Romania) because these countries have the 
highest share of milk and sugar quotas.  
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Table 5.13: Welfare effects in the EU-27 due to the „Barcelona Agreement“ 
(SC3) (deviations from new Base Run (SC2) in US$ million) 
 Spain Greece Italy rest of EU-15 
new Member 
States (EU-10) 
Bulgaria & 
Romania 
Producer 
surplus 135 55 99 39 -24 0
Quota owner 
surplus -24 -7 -42 -355 -70 -20
Consumer 
surplus -32 -27 -44 249 45 6
Budget1 3 2 8 43 53 15
Total1 81 23 21 -25 4 1
Budget2 6 0 8 35 -49  – 
Total2 85 21 22 -33 -98  – 
Notes: 1 Without considering intra-community financial flows; 2 Considering intra-
community financial flows 
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
The regional budgetary effects are small and positive for the EU-15 region, whether 
or not intra-community financial flows are taken into account. For the ten 2004 ac-
cession states the intra-community financial flows have negative budgetary effects 
(as was the case for SC1 and SC2) since import tariffs are collected on behalf of the 
EU and do not flow into the national budget. The intra-community financial flows be-
tween the EU and Bulgaria and Romania were not modelled as they were not known 
at the time. 
Overall the scenario of the „Barcelona Agreement“  results in welfare gains in the 
southern EU member states and welfare losses in the northern ones (the rest of the 
EU-15 and the EU-10). The overall welfare gains for the EU-25 are US$105 million. 
5.3.2 Effects on the MPCs 
The effects of the „Barcelona Agreement“ on the MPCs are more pronounced, al-
though in general they are also of small magnitude. This is to be expected because 
the simulations only involve shocks on the border protection of the markets of these 
countries. The following section contains detailed results of the effects on commodity 
balances, prices, state budgets, allocation and welfare. 
Commodity balances and net trade 
The effects on commodity balances are in line with the changes in the NPR levied by 
the MPCs and depend on the initial net trade status of each country. Due to the dif-
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ferent initial protection rates in the MPC regions the effects will differ from country to 
country. 
In Morocco the wheat supply decreases by 6 percentage points, the supply of other 
cereals such as coarse grains and of rice decreases by eleven and six percentage 
points respectively. This is because the EU border protection level is lower than that 
currently applied by Morocco. For the same reason oilseeds production decreases by 
one percentage point, the milk supply by six percentage points, the poultry supply by 
23 percentage points and the supply of apples by 26 percentage points. The beef 
supply increases by 23 percentage points and the supply of sugar increases by 6 
percentage points, both due to the application of a higher NPR. More significantly 
there are changes in the supply of typical Mediterranean commodities, with an in-
crease in the supply of tomatoes, oranges and cotton, by 4, 11 and 7 percentage 
points respectively, and a decrease of the supply of tobacco and olive oil by 2 and 11 
percentage points respectively. 
In Turkey the largest changes are observed in the markets for coarse grains, where 
the supply drops by 12 percentage points, and in the markets for milk, poultry meat 
and oranges, where production increases by 25, 12 and 11 percentage points, re-
spectively. There is also a notable change in the tomato supply, which increases by 6 
percentage points. In the other commodity markets the deviations are within + /– 5 
percentage points. 
In the rest of the MPCs the highest deviations occur in the tomato market, where the 
supply decreases by 40 percentage points, in the milk and beef market, where pro-
duction increases by 12 and 20 percentage points respectively and in the olive oil 
markets, where there is a decrease in production by 11 percentage points. 
The changes in total demand are smaller than those for the supply and are only ob-
servable in some particular markets. In Morocco and in the rest of the MPCs the de-
mand for beef declines by 24 and 22 percentage points respectively. By contrast the 
demand for apples in Morocco increases by 18 percentage points and the demand 
for tomatoes in the rest of the MPCs increases by 13 percentage points. 
Changes in net trade result from the changes in supply and demand. Figure 5.7 illus-
trates the net trade effects on particular commodities in the MPCs as a result of the 
application of the „Barcelona Agreement“. The net trade status of MPCs in tomatoes 
changes, with these countries moving from being net exporters of 137,000 t in SC2 to 
net importers of 4.5 million t. Turkey and the MPCs both shift from being net import-
ers of milk to net exporters. Turkey was previously a net importer of 181,000 t but 
becomes a net exporter of 2.5 million t and the rest of the MPCs change from being a 
net importer of 1.4 million t to a net exporter of 475,000 t. Morocco experiences 
changes in its net trade status for olive oil and apples, but these changes are of a 
smaller magnitude. The „Barcelona Agreement“ leads Morocco to become a net im-
porter of 8,000 t of olive oil (from a net exporter of 2,000 t in SC2) and a net importer 
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of 86,000 t of apples (from a net exporter of 8,000 t in SC2). A further shift in Mo-
rocco is in the market for beef, where it shifts from a net importer to a net exporter of 
70,000 t. 
The effects on the rest of the markets are only marginal and the MPCs maintain their 
initial net trade status. 
Figure 5.7: Net trade effects of the „Barcelona Agreement“ on MPCs (SC3) 
Notes: Positive values in the Y axis refer to net exports, negative values to net imports 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
Prices 
The driving force for the price effects under SC3 is the adjustment of the protection 
levied by the MPCs’ to the EU level. As Table 5.14 shows, there are significant dis-
parities both among the MPCs and among the various agricultural markets in the ini-
tial level of the NPR and therefore in the effects that this change has. For example in 
Morocco the NPR for milk is rather high, 115 %, while in Turkey and in the rest of 
MPCs it is much lower, at about 20 %. This explains why the application of the EU’s 
protection rate leads to different result for the same markets among the MPCs and 
why it is difficult to draw out general trends for the MPCs as a whole. 
To remind the reader, the NPRs for the Base Year are derived from the PSE data-
base of the OECD. For commodities and countries not included in this dataset the 
NPR is calculated by comparing the applied import tariff with the export subsidies. 
The applied import tariffs are expressed as ad-valorem equivalents and the export 
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subsidies are derived from the TRAINS database and the WTO country notifications 
respectively. Thus, the entry price system of the EU for specific commodities, such 
as tomatoes, has not been explicitly modelled but has been indirectly taken into ac-
count through the applied AVE of import tariffs reported in the TRAINS database. 
Table 5.14: Net protection rates in MPCs, in % 
Morocco Turkey Rest of MPCs Commodity 
Base Year SC3 Base Year SC3 Base Year SC3
WHEA 29 2 -7 2 7 2
COAR 0 8 19 8 0 8
RICE 111 40 0 40 0 40
OILS 0 0 25 0 0 0
SUGA 0 75 27 75 2 75
MILK 115 60 16 60 26 60
BEEF 0 164 207 164 8 164
PORK 0 23 0 23 2 23
POUL 109 49 19 49 20 49
COTT 3 0 0 0 0 0
TOBA 18 0 25 0 4 0
OLIO 55 0 31 0 43 0
APPL 55 7 0 7 7 7
ORAN 0 15 0 15 7 15
TOMA 0 0 0 0 37 0
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
The application of the EU’s protection level mainly influences farm gate prices, which 
adjust to the EU level increasing or decreasing according to the difference between 
national levies and the newly imposed NPR. The border prices remain almost unaf-
fected since no significant change in the world market prices occurs due to the 
simulations. 
The highest disparities in farm gate prices are observed in Morocco since its border 
protection show the highest deviations from the EU one. Compared to SC2 (new 
Base Run), the farm gate prices for beef increase by 160 percentage points and 
those of sugar by 75 percentage points The farm gate prices for oranges and toma-
toes rise by 14 and 2 percentage points respectively. By contrast, the farm gate 
prices for olive oil and apples decrease by 30 percentage points each. Those for rice 
and wheat decrease by 20 and 35 percentage points respectively. 
In Turkey the deviations in farm gate prices are generally within 40 percentage 
points. The beef farm gate prices decrease by about 16 percentage points since Tur-
key applies a higher protection for beef than the EU. A decrease of 20 percentage 
points is observed in the tobacco, olive oil and oilseeds markets, while there is an 
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increase of 40 percentage points in the farm gate prices for sugar and milk and one 
of 25 percentage points for each of pork and poultry. The farm gate prices of oranges 
and tomatoes increase by 14 and 4 percentage points respectively. 
In the rest of the MPCs the highest increases are observed in the farm gate prices of 
beef sugar, rice, milk, poultry and pork of 142, 70, 40, 26, 24 and 20 percentage 
points respectively. For typical Mediterranean commodities, the „Barcelona Agree-
ment“ scenario results in a decrease in the farm gate prices of olive oil and tomatoes 
by 28 and 27 percentage points, respectively, while farm gate price of oranges is in-
creased by 7 percentage points. 
The changes in producer incentive prices are the same as for farm gate prices, since 
no direct subsidies are modelled for these countries. Farmers’ revenue therefore ad-
just in response to the new farm gate prices and supply level. The decline in farm 
gate prices leads to a decrease in farmer’s revenue for most commodities in the 
model (which are approximated by the changes in farmers’ revenue), as illustrated in 
detail in Table B.6. 
Moroccan farmers are particularly affected by the „Barcelona Agreement“ with ob-
servable reductions in the revenue of wheat, rice, milk and poultry producers by 25, 
38, 30 and 45 percentage points respectively. Reductions in farmers’ revenue of 40 
and 55 percentage points are observed for olive oil and apple producers. Beef pro-
ducers benefit the most, with their revenue rising by about 220 percentage points. 
Sugar and orange producers enjoy revenue increases of 85 and 26 percentage 
points. The effects on tomato producers are of a lower magnitude, with their revenue 
growth not exceeding 7 percentage points. 
In Turkey the revenue of wheat, rice, sugar, milk, pork and poultry farmers is ex-
pected to rise by 12, 47, 41, 70, 23 and 39 percentage points respectively while pro-
ducers of apples, tomatoes and oranges will enjoy an increase in their revenue of 10 
and 25 percentage points respectively. Farmers producing coarse grains, oilseeds, 
beef, tobacco and olive oil all suffer from revenue decreases of 20 percentage points. 
In the other MPCs producers of wheat, tobacco, olive oil, apples, oranges and toma-
toes will suffer revenue losses of 6, 3, 33, 10.5 (for both apples and orange produc-
ers) and 55 percentage points respectively. Other farmers will gain significantly more, 
with the revenue of rice, sugar, milk, beef, pork and poultry producers increasing by 
50, 80, 40, 190, 25 and 35 percentage points respectively. 
Budgetary, allocative and welfare effects 
The changes in the levels of border protection and subsequent changes in net trade 
and domestic price levels in the MPCs will have knock-on effects on the customs du-
ties collected. These changes will impact on the states’ budgets, as shown in detail in 
Table 5.15. The largest changes occur in the markets where the net trade effects are 
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the highest or where the net trade status quo changes, as for example in the beef 
market in the other MPCs and in Morocco and the milk market in Turkey and the 
other MPCs. 
Table 5.15: Changes of customs duties in MPCs due to the „Barcelona Agree-
ment“ (SC3) (deviations from new Base Run (SC2) in US$ million) 
Commodity Morocco Turkey Rest of MPCs
WHEA -137 -17 -93
COAR 17 18 86
RICE 0 12 -33
OILS 0 -72 0
SUGA 102 -119 324
MILK 16 -271 -358
BEEF -224 34 -241
PORK 0 0 1
POUL 17 -19 -87
COTT -1 0 0
TOBA -4 19 -15
OLIO 2 48 85
APPL 4 -9 0
ORAN -17 -15 -20
TOMA 0 0 18
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
Overall the adjustments to the protection levied by the MPCs to bring it in line with 
that of the EU leads to a reduction in trade levies and, therefore to negative budget 
changes. In Morocco, the burden for the taxpayers is in the order of US$225 million, 
in Turkey US$392 million and in the rest of the MPCs US$333 million (Table 5.16). 
In all the MPCs the allocation of resources is in favour of producers, who will benefit 
from the implementation of the Barcelona Agreement. This is due to an overall rise in 
farm gate prices. This goes along with a negative effect on the demand and leads to 
a loss of consumer surplus. In Turkey and in the rest of the MPCs consumer surplus 
is reduced by roughly US$1.0 billion and US$5.5 billion respectively (Table 5.16). In 
Morocco the effect on consumer surplus will be marginally positive. 
In total the welfare will decrease by US$75 million in Morocco, US$62 million in Tur-
key and by about US$0.8 billion in the rest of the MPCs. 
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Table 5.16: Welfare effects in MPCs due to the „Barcelona Agreement“ (SC3) 
(deviations from new Base Run (SC2) in US$ million) 
 Morocco Turkey Rest of MPCs
Producer surplus 122 1332 4995
Quota owner surplus 0 0 0
Consumer surplus 28 -1002 -5477
Budget -225 -392 -333
total -75 -62 -814
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
5.4 The effects of multilateral liberalisation 
This section discusses the effects of a possible WTO liberalisation (SC4) and the ef-
fects of a full multilateral trade liberalisation (SC5) comparing them to the new Base 
Run. The effects of SC5 are in most cases linear i.e. of twice the magnitude of SC4, 
with the exception of markets which had almost no initial protection. Although this 
scenario is a hypothetical one, the simulations and its results are included in the re-
port to facilitate checking the plausibility of the model and to exhibit the relative mag-
nitude of the model’s results. It can also serve as a basis for comparing this model-
ling exercise with others that have preceded or will follow it.  
5.4.1 Effects on the EU Member States 
The changes bought about by the „WTO liberalisation“ scenario or even full trade 
liberalisation are not of a high magnitude but are still higher than those resulting from 
the „Barcelona Agreement“ scenario.  
Commodity balances and net trade effects 
The scenario of „WTO liberalisation“ leads to changes in the product balances, espe-
cially for those commodities that are highly protected. For commodities that are less 
significant within the EU the effects are minor. The highest effects are in the livestock 
markets and particularly for beef, pork and poultry, where the supply in each of the 
EU-15 regions (i.e. Greece, Italy, Spain and rest of EU-15) decreases by 7, 4 and 11 
percentage points, respectively. In the 2004 accession states the effects are milder, 
with decreases of 4, 1 and 4 percentage points in these three respective markets re-
spectively.  
Changes in the production of Mediterranean commodities are smaller. The supply of 
tomatoes rises by 1 to 2 percentage points due to „WTO liberalisation“, while the 
production of oranges decreases by 2 to 5 percentage points. The effects on the ap-
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ple market are positive for Greece and the ten 2004 accession countries (increase in 
the supply by 4 and 3 percentage points respectively) but negative for other EU 
regions, although the decrease is within a one percentage point margin. The supply 
changes in the cotton, tobacco and olive oil markets are minor and are close to zero 
in the EU-25 region. Supply falls by less than 5 percentage points in Bulgaria and 
Romania. This is to be expected since the EU has already opened these markets 
and the only distortion to free trade are domestic direct subsidies within the EU. The 
decrease in cotton production in Bulgaria and Romania is due to price adjustments 
and cross-price effects.  
For other commodities there is an increase in the supply of rice by 6 percentage 
points and an increase of wheat production in Greece, by 3 percentage points. In 
both scenarios the milk and sugar markets the production quotas are not abolished 
but continue to be maintained. This means that there are no changes in the supply of 
milk and sugar throughout the EU markets. 
Consumption by contrast seems to increase due to „WTO liberalisation“, with the 
highest increases in the EU-15 region being in poultry (14 percentage points), beef 
(11 percentage points) and sugar (8 percentage points). The increase in the demand 
for poultry, beef meat and sugar is higher still in the ten new Member States (20, 34 
and 18 percentage points respectively) and in Bulgaria and Romania (25, 10 and 13 
percentage points respectively). In the EU-15 region the demand for rice declines by 
10 percentage points, that for olive oil by 1 percentage point and for tobacco by 2 
percentage points.  
The changes brought about by SC5 only exist in the markets where deviations in the 
NPR have been modelled, i.e. in those markets where EU border measures were 
applied in the new Base Run scenario (SC2) or where the initial NPR of the EU was 
greater than zero and are twice as high as for SC4.  
The adjustments on the net trade of certain agricultural markets are illustrated in Fig-
ures 5.8 and 5.9. Under the „WTO liberalisation“ scenario a net trade Spain’s poultry 
meat market, moves from being where a net exporter of almost 1,000 t p.a. to a net 
importer of about 266,000 t p.a., Greece moves from being a net exporter of sugar 
(of 16,000 t in the new Base Run Greece) to a net importer (of 11,000 t sugar) and 
Bulgaria and Romania change from being net exporters of wheat (21,000 t under 
SC2) to net importers (of 145,000 t) under SC4.  
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Figure 5.8: Net trade effects of „WTO liberalisation“ on Mediterranean EU 
Member States (SC4) 
Notes: Positive values in the Y axis refer to net exports and negative values to net imports 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
Full liberalisation (SC5) would additionally result in a change of the net trade status of 
Spanish pork (from net exports of almost 0.4 million t under SC2 to net imports of 
56,000 t), of the net trade status of Italian oranges, with Italy moving from being a net 
exporter of 70,000 t of oranges to becoming a net importer of 61,000 t, of the net 
trade status for sugar among the ten 2004 accession States (from net exports of 0.2 
million t to net imports of 0.25 million t) and of the net trade in milk of Bulgaria and 
Romania, formerly net exporters of about 1.4 million t milk they become net importers 
of 0.6 million t. 
Finally it is worth noting that the net traded quantity of olive oil in the full liberalisation 
scenario (SC5) is much closer to the traded quantity under the Barcelona Agreement 
scenario (SC3) than under WTO liberalisation scenario (SC4).  
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Figure 5.9: Net trade effects of „WTO liberalisation“ on non-Mediterranean EU 
regions (SC4) 
Notes: Positive values in the Y axis refer to net exports, negative values to net imports 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
Prices 
The price effects are attributed to the simulated changes in the NPR, as shown in 
Table 5.17. To remind the reader, the „WTO liberalisation“ scenario involved a reduc-
tion in the NPR of the EU of 50 %, while full liberalisation was simulated by eliminat-
ing the difference between domestic and world market prices, i.e. by applying a NPR 
of zero. Other protection measures such as production quotas or minimum farm gate 
prices were not altered and have remained at the same level as in the new Base Run 
scenario. These changes create observable deviations in both in farm gate and EU 
border prices, the later of which are adjusted to the level of the world market prices. 
The deviations are higher in markets where the changes of the NPR are the highest. 
„WTO liberalisation“ results in a decrease in the farm gate prices for sugar, milk, beef 
and poultry meat by 15 percentage points in each of Greece, Italy, Spain and rest of 
EU-15. In the ten new Member States the decrease in the farm gate price of beef is 
21 percentage points and in Bulgaria and Romania this declines by 59 percentage 
points. Further declines are observed in the farm gate prices of pork and cereals, 
with the exception of rice. The decline is of 6 and 4 percentage points in the EU-25 
countries and of 4 and 9 percentage points in Bulgaria and Romania. Although the 
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NPR for rice is reduced, farm gate prices for this commodity rise by 22 percentage 
points, mainly due to cross-price effects. The farm gate prices for oranges decline by 
between 4 and 6 percentage points and the prices for apples by nearly 1 percentage 
point in all EU regions, with the only observable increase being in Greece, where 
there is an increase of 4 percentage points. In the rest of the markets, where no 
change of the NPR takes place, farm gate prices increase but only minimally.  
Table 5.17: Net protection rates in the EU-25 markets, in % 
Commodity Base Year BA SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 
WHEA 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 
COAR 8 8 8 8 8 4 0 
RICE 40 40 40 40 40 20 0 
OILS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SUGA 75 75 75 75 75 38 0 
MILK 60 60 60 60 60 30 0 
BEEF 164 142 142 144 150 82 0 
PORK 23 23 23 23 23 11 0 
POUL 49 49 49 49 49 24 0 
COTT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOBA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OLIO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
APPL 7 7 7 7 7 3 0 
ORAN 15 15 15 15 15 7 0 
TOMA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
The „WTO liberalisation“ scenario leads to an increase in border prices throughout 
the EU-27 for nearly all markets with the exception of cereals where the border prices 
decrease slightly, by 3 percentage points for wheat and 1 for coarse grains. The 
highest increases in border prices are for beef, by 15 percentage points in the EU-25 
and 8 percentage points in Bulgaria and Romania, for sugar by 8 percentage points 
in all EU-15 and 14 percentage points in the 2004 accession countries. In Bulgaria 
and Romania, the increase in border price of sugar is 85 percentage points. A further 
notable increase in border prices is that for milk by 6 percentage points in all the EU-
27. 
Farmers’ revenue adjusts to these new levels of supply and farm gate prices. Thus, 
under SC4 cereal farmers in the EU are faced with a decline in revenue, of 5 per-
centage points or less. Producers of sugar, milk, beef and poultry are faced with re-
ductions in their revenue of 15, 14, 20 and 25 percentage points respectively. Orange 
producers will also suffer from a revenue decrease of 6 percentage points (9 per-
centage points in Bulgaria and Romania), while apple producers face a decrease of 
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nearly 2 percentage points (although in Greece they will enjoy a revenue increase of 
9 percentage points). For Mediterranean commodities, such as tomatoes, olive oil, 
cotton and tobacco, farmers in Spain and the rest of the EU-15, are expected to en-
joy a revenue increase of 2 percentage points, those in Greece an increase of 3 per-
centage points, those in Italy a change of between 1 to 5 percentage points, those in 
the ten 2004 accession states an increase of nearly 1 percentage point and those in 
Bulgaria and Romania an increase of 1 percentage point (apart from cotton where 
farmers’ revenue decreases by 4 percentage points). 
The price and revenue effects resulting from the full liberalisation scenario (SC5) are 
almost twice the magnitude of the results of SC4. 
Budgetary, allocative and welfare Effects 
The budgetary effects are mainly due to changes in customs duties. The changes in 
agricultural subsidies are due to changes in direct and input subsidies and are of a 
rather small magnitude, as shown in Tables 5.18 to 5.21. The changes of the subsi-
dies are endogenous adjustments due to changes in the commoditiy balances. 
Table 5.18: Changes in direct subsidies in the EU-27 due to „WTO liberalisa-
tion“ (SC4) (deviations from new Base Run (SC2) in US$ million) 
Commodities Greece Italy Spain rest of EU-15 
new Member 
States (EU-10) 
Bulgaria & 
Romania
WHEA 0 0 0 0 0 0
COAR 0 0 0 0 0 0
RICE 0 -4 -3 -1 0 0
OILS 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUGA 0 0 0 0 0 0
MILK 0 0 0 0 0 0
BEEF 0 0 0 0 0 0
PORK 0 0 1 4 0 0
POUL 0 1 1 4 0 0
COTT 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOBA 0 0 0 0 0 0
OLIO -1 0 -1 0 0 0
APPL 0 0 0 0 0 0
ORAN 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOMA 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
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Table 5.19: Changes in direct subsidies in the EU-27 due to full liberalisation 
(SC5) (deviations from new Base Run (SC2) in US$ million) 
Commodities Greece Italy Spain rest of EU-15
new Member 
States (EU-10) 
Bulgaria & 
Romania
WHEA 0 0 0 0 0 0
COAR 0 0 0 0 0 0
RICE 0 -1 -1 0 0 0
OILS 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUGA 0 0 0 0 0 0
MILK 0 0 0 0 0 0
BEEF 0 0 0 0 0 0
PORK 0 1 2 7 1 0
POUL 0 1 1 8 1 0
COTT -1 0 0 0 0 0
TOBA 0 0 0 0 0 0
OLIO -2 -1 -2 0 0 0
APPL 0 0 0 0 0 0
ORAN 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOMA 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
Table 5.20: Changes in input subsidies in the EU-27 due to „WTO liberalisa-
tion“ (SC4) (deviations from new Base Run (SC2) in US$ million) 
Commodities Greece Italy Spain rest of EU-15
new Member 
States (EU-10) 
Bulgaria & 
Romania
WHEA 0 0 0 1 0 0
COAR 0 1 0 4 0 0
RICE 0 -1 0 0 0 0
OILS 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUGA 0 0 0 0 0 0
MILK 0 0 0 0 0 0
BEEF 1 11 6 50 1 0
PORK 0 1 4 12 1 0
POUL 0 4 3 21 3 0
COTT 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOBA 0 0 0 0 0 0
OLIO 0 0 0 0 0 0
APPL 0 0 0 0 0 0
ORAN 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOMA 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
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Table 5.21: Changes in input subsidies in the EU-27 due to full multilateral 
trade liberalisation (SC5) (deviations from new Base Run (SC2) in 
US$ million) 
Commodities Greece Italy Spain rest of EU-15
new Member 
States (EU-10) 
Bulgaria & 
Romania
WHEA -1 0 0 0 0 0
COAR 0 2 0 6 0 0
RICE 0 0 0 0 0 0
OILS 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUGA 0 0 0 0 1 0
MILK 0 0 0 0 0 0
BEEF 2 34 19 153 3 0
PORK 0 3 7 23 2 0
POUL 1 7 6 41 5 0
COTT 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOBA 0 0 0 0 0 0
OLIO 0 0 0 0 0 0
APPL 0 0 0 0 0 0
ORAN 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOMA 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
 
The changes in customs duties are highest in the beef and milk markets, followed by 
the pork market. This is due to the high levels of changes in net trade, the reduction 
of the NPR and chain effects on border prices. However, the effects of full multilateral 
liberalisation are not linear and double those as under SC4, since the customs duties 
are influenced by multiplying the price difference (i.e. the difference between the farm 
gate and the border prices) with the net trade quantity (Tables 5.22 and 5.23). 
Tables 5.24 and 5.25 show the welfare effects on producers, quota owners, consum-
ers and taxpayers in the EU-27 regions. 
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Table 5.22: Changes in customs duties in the EU-27 due to „WTO liberalisa-
tion“ (SC4) (deviations from new Base Run (SC2) in US$ million) 
Commodities Greece Italy Spain rest of EU-15
new Member 
States (EU-10) 
Bulgaria & 
Romania
WHEA 0 -5 -4 13 3 0
COAR -4 -5 -15 3 15 4
RICE -1 -24 -10 76 0 0
OILS 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUGA 3 0 1 255 13 -2
MILK -12 -71 4 525 570 106
BEEF -42 20 67 592 415 188
PORK -36 -99 80 372 15 34
POUL -3 56 43 407 99 -14
COTT 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOBA 0 0 0 0 0 0
OLIO 0 0 0 0 0 0
APPL 0 12 0 -61 5 -2
ORAN 9 4 37 -750 -8 -4
TOMA 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
Table 5.23: Changes in customs duties in the EU-27 due to full multilateral 
trade liberalisation (SC5) (deviations from new Base Run (SC2) in 
US$ million) 
Commodities Greece Italy Spain rest of EU-15
new Member 
States (EU-10) 
Bulgaria & 
Romania
WHEA 0 -11 -7 24 5 0
COAR -8 -17 -36 -7 25 7
RICE 0 0 0 0 0 0
OILS 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUGA 2 -17 -12 442 15 -9
MILK -32 -186 -8 923 900 136
BEEF -182 -382 -19 -88 741 345
PORK -77 -230 102 596 -25 54
POUL -21 24 0 313 71 -81
COTT 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOBA 0 0 0 0 0 0
OLIO 0 0 0 0 0 0
APPL 0 23 0 -129 10 -3
ORAN 17 4 68 -1551 -16 -7
TOMA 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
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Table 5.24: Welfare effects in the EU-27 due to „WTO liberalisation“ (SC4) 
(deviations from new Base (SC2) in US$ million) 
 Spain Greece Italy rest of EU-15
new Member 
States (EU-10) 
Bulgaria & 
Romania
Producer 
surplus -449 -18 -376 -3143 -1120 -392
Quota owner 
surplus -336 -77 -597 -4832 -741 -166
Consumer 
surplus 892 219 1338 8555 1266 401
Budget1 213 -87 -99 1527 1133 310
Total1 320 36 266 2108 538 153
Budget2 24 137 489 394 -1043  – 
Total2 130 260 854 975 -1638  – 
Notes: 1 Without considering intra-community financial flows; 2 Considering intra-
community financial flows 
Source: own calculations with AGRISIM 
Table 5.25: Welfare effects on the EU-27 due to full multilateral trade liberalisa-
tion (SC5) (deviations from new Base Run (SC2) in US$ million) 
 Spain Greece Italy rest of EU-15
new Member 
States (EU-10) 
Bulgaria & 
Romania
Producer 
surplus -949 -29 -826 -6223 -2154 -755
Quota owner 
surplus -728 -164
-
1324 -10383 -1515 -342
Consumer 
surplus 2051 528 3191 19185 2749 865
Budget1 121 -300 -746 760 1738 442
Total1 495 35 294 3339 818 210
Budget2 18 329 974 365 -1686  – 
Total2 391 664 2014 2945 -2606  – 
Notes: 1 Without considering intra-community financial flows; 2 Considering intra-
community financial flows 
Source: own calculations with AGRISIM 
The simulation results of multilateral trade liberalisation, either partial or full, reveal 
that the EU producers are the social group who are most negatively affected. Under 
the EU’s current policy regime they benefit from high domestic prices, which motivate 
them to produce more. Although the effects on the prices differ from market to mar-
ket, the opening of all 15 markets within the model results in lower farm gate prices 
and thus a reduction in producer surplus (Table 5.25). By contrast, consumers 
benefit from lower prices and higher demand and enjoy welfare gains. 
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The effects on the EU’s budget are positive overall, but these vary between the dif-
ferent regions of the EU, mainly depending on each Member State’s contribution to 
the EU budget and its net trade status. Member States that are net importers do not 
enjoy import levies, but pay them to the EU, whereas net exporters do not finance 
export subsidies from their national sources. Thus, when intra-community financial 
flows are taken into account the effects on taxpayers are particularly beneficial for the 
EU’s Mediterranean Member States in comparison with the other EU regions. The 
budgetary effects on the ten 2004 accession states are negative, despite their low 
contribution to the EU budget, since the system of intra-community financial flows 
means that the customs duties they collect go straight into the EU budget. The pic-
ture would be different if these changes in the budget were financed solely from na-
tional resources. In this case, then the Greek and Italian budgets would be burdened 
with an additional US$87 and 99 million under the „WTO liberalisation“ scenario and 
with an additional US$300 and 746 million under SC5 (Table 5.25).  
The overall welfare effects show that trade liberalisation improves the social welfare 
in all EU regions, apart from the ten 2004 accession States, although here the nega-
tive effects are brought about by the system of intra-community financial flows. Over-
all, the welfare effects across the entire EU-27 are positive. 
5.4.2 Effects on the MPCs 
The effects of „WTO liberalisation“ (SC4) on the MPCs are much smoother and of a 
lower magnitude than the effects of the „Barcelona Agreement“. The effects of a full 
multilateral trade liberalisation (SC5) are twice the magnitude of those of SC4 only in 
those markets where border protection was previously applied.  
Commodity balances and net trade effects 
The changes in the commodity balances under the „WTO liberalisation“ scenario are 
most evident in those markets that are highly protected by the MPCs. The net results 
are generally a decline in supply and small adjustments in demand. More detailed 
analysis is presented below. 
In Morocco the cereal supply decreases by 2 percentage points, milk production by 6 
percentage points and olive oil production by 5 percentage points. More pronounced 
reductions are observed in the supply of poultry meat and apples, where under SC4, 
production declines is by 18 and 12 percentage points respectively. By contrast the 
supply of tomatoes, oranges and cotton increases by 2 percentage points each.  
In Turkey the results are of a small magnitude, with the highest reduction from „WTO 
liberalisation“ being observed in supply of beef market, in the order of 5 percentage 
points. There is a slight increase in the supply of tomatoes and oranges, of 3 and 4 
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percentage points respectively, while the olive oil supply declines by 3 percentage 
points. 
The most significant changes take place in the other MPCs, especially on the tomato 
market. „WTO liberalisation“ leads to a decline in the supply of tomatoes of 20 per-
centage points, although this is still lower than the reduction under to the „Barcelona 
Agreement“. In the rest of the markets, such as olive oil, the effects on supply are not 
more than -5 percentage points. 
The adjustments on demand are also smoother under SC4 than under SC3 („Barce-
lona Agreement“). The highest changes in demand viz à viz the new Base Run (SC2) 
are observed on the Moroccan apple market, and the Turkish beef market, where 
demand increases by 8 percentage points, and on the tomato market in the other 
MPCs, where demand increases by 6 percentage points. In the other markets the 
demand effects are very small and are less than +/- 3 percentage points. 
The effects of full multilateral liberalisation on supply and demand are of twice the 
magnitude to SC4, but only for those markets where a change in the NPR has been 
modelled. 
The net trade effects are illustrated in Figure 5.10. The general tendency is for MPCs 
to slightly increase their imports but also to slightly increase exports of typical Medi-
terranean commodities, such as oranges or tomatoes.  
Figure 5.10: Net trade effects on MPCs due to „WTO liberalisation“ (SC4) 
Notes: Positive values in the Y axis refer to net exports, negative values to net imports 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
-16000
-14000
-12000
-10000
-8000
-6000
-4000
-2000
0
2000
New Base Run
(SC2)
WTO
liberalisation
(SC4)
New Base Run
(SC2)
WTO
liberalisation
(SC4)
New Base Run
(SC2)
WTO
liberalisation
(SC4)
Morocco Turkey Rest of MPCs
10
00
 t
WHEA MILK BEEF OLIO APPL ORAN TOMA
Simulations with AGRISIM and model results 151 
A striking exception to this trend is that of the tomato market in the other MPCs. Not 
only do exports decrease but the net trade status of the region changes. Starting as a 
net exporter of 0.14 million t, the region becomes a net importer of 2.16 million t un-
der „WTO liberalisation“ (SC4) and 4.5 million t under full liberalisation (SC5). 
For olive oil, another typical Mediterranean commodity, the changes in the trade bal-
ance are not in favour of the MPCs, although they are of a quite small level. Exports 
from Turkey decrease by 4,000 and 9,000 t under SC4 and SC5 (respectively). 
Those from the other MPCs decrease by 30,000 and 66,000 t, respectively, under 
the two scenarios. Morocco sees a change in its net trade status moving from being 
a net exporter of 2,000 t to a net importer, of 3,000 and 8,000 t under the two respec-
tive scenarios. 
Further changes of the net trade status are observed in Morocco and Turkey. Mo-
rocco’s net trade status in apples changes, with the country moving from being a net 
exporter of 2,000 t to a net importer of 3,000 t under SC4, and of 8,000 t under SC5. 
Turkey’s net trade status in beef changes moving from being a net exporter of almost 
1,000 t under SC2 to a net importer of 42,000 and 122,000 t under SC4 and SC5 re-
spectively. No further changes in net trade status are observed as a result of simu-
lating a full multilateral trade liberalisation. 
Prices 
The reduction of the results in adjustments to farm gate prices and border prices in 
all MPCs (Table 5.26). The effects vary between the single markets and the 
countries-regions because of the different initial protection. The changes in producer 
incentive prices are equal to those in farm gate prices, because the model does not 
include any agricultural subsidies that act as a price incentive to farmers. 
In Morocco the farm gate prices of rice, milk and poultry are most affected by „WTO 
liberalisation“, all of them falling by 25 percentage points. The farm gate prices for 
olive oil and apples also fall, by 15 percentage points respectively, while those for 
wheat fall by 13 percentage points. By contrast the farm gate prices for beef, pork 
and sugar increase by 5 percentage points each while those for oranges and toma-
toes increase by not more than 4 and 1 percentage points respectively. 
The picture is different in Turkey, with SC4 leading to a decline in the farm gate 
prices of beef of 24 percentage points, and a 10 percentage points decline in farm 
gate prices for coarse grains, oilseeds and olive oil. Reductions of a lower magnitude 
are observed for the farm gate prices for poultry meat (7 percentage points), sugar (6 
percentage points) and cotton (5 percentage points). The farm gate prices for apples, 
oranges and tomatoes are expected to increase by 3, 4 and 2 percentage points re-
spectively. 
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Table 5.26: Net protection rates in the MPCs’ markets, in % 
Morocco Turkey Rest of MPCs 
Commodity Base Year SC4 SC5 Base Year SC4 SC5 Base Year SC4 SC5
WHEA 29 14 0 -7 -3 0 7 3 0
COAR 0 0 0 19 9 0 0 0 0
RICE 111 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OILS 0 0 0 25 13 0 0 0 0
SUGA 0 0 0 27 14 0 2 1 0
MILK 115 57 0 16 8 0 26 13 0
BEEF 0 0 0 207 103 0 8 4 0
PORK 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0
POUL 109 55 0 19 10 0 20 10 0
COTT 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOBA 18 9 0 25 12 0 4 2 0
OLIO 55 27 0 31 16 0 43 22 0
APPL 55 27 0 0 0 0 7 3 0
ORAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 3 0
TOMA 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 19 0
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
In other MPCs the most distinguishable changes in farm gate prices under the „WTO 
liberalisation“ scenario are for olive oil, tomatoes, sugar, milk and poultry meat, which 
change by -14, -12, +11 and -8 percentage points respectively.  
The adjustments to border prices are of lower magnitude than those to farm gate 
prices and some general trends are observable. Overall the border prices increase, 
with the highest increases being for livestock commodities (mainly beef) and sugar. 
In Turkey the border price for beef is by 15 percentage points higher than under the 
new Base Run (SC2), while in the rest of the MPCs the sugar border prices increase 
by 12 percentage points. For Mediterranean commodities, the increase in border 
prices throughout the MPCs is 2 to 4 percentage points. Only in the wheat and 
coarse grains markets is a decrease in border prices, of 2 percentage points.  
The changes in farmers’ revenue are equal to the changes in farm gate prices and 
supply. It is difficult to draw general conclusions on the changes in farmers’ revenue 
since the effects vary between individual countries, however some trends can be 
drawn in relation to particular markets.  
„WTO liberalisation“ leads to a revenue decrease of 10 percentage points for poultry 
producers throughout the MPCs, with Moroccan producers facing a decrease in 
revenue of almost 40 percentage points. The revenue of olive oil growers also de-
creases, by between 12 percentage points in Turkey to nearly 20 percentage points 
in Morocco. Moroccan producers of milk, rice, apple and wheat are also faced with 
significant decreases in their revenue, of 30, 25 and 15 percentage points respec-
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tively. In Turkey tomato farmers face a revenue decrease of 30 percentage points, 
and milk producers one of 12 percentage points. By contrast Turkish sugar farmers 
would enjoy a revenue increase of 12 percentage points. In the other MPCs, distin-
guishable changes in revenue levels are found among farmers of coarse grains and 
oilseeds (a decrease of 11 percentage points for each commodity) among sugar 
farmers (a decrease of 7 percentage points) and orange and tomato farmers (an in-
crease of the same magnitude). For the other commodities farmers’ income levels o 
remain as in the new Base Run scenario. 
The application of full multilateral liberalisation has results that follow the same gen-
eral direction as those from SC4, although they are of about twice the magnitude. 
Budgetary, allocative and welfare effects 
The budgetary effects are attributed to changes in customs duties (Table 5.27), 
which are in turn the result of changes in the net traded quantities and the prices. 
Changes in agricultural subsidies (direct, input and general) are close to zero. 
Table 5.27: Changes in customs duties in MPCs due to „WTO liberalisation“ 
(SC4) and full multilateral trade liberalisation (SC5) (deviations 
from new Base Run (SC2) in US$ million) 
Morocco Turkey Rest of MPCs 
Commodity SC4 SC5 SC4 SC5 SC4 SC5
WHEA -72 -150 -5 -12 -73 -147
COAR 0 0 3 -3 0 0
RICE 0 -1 0 0 0 0
OILS 0 0 -35 -72 0 0
SUGA 0 0 28 57 -3 -7
MILK 15 -7 -3 -5 -48 -202
BEEF 0 0 37 1 -33 -67
PORK 0 0 0 0 0 0
POUL 15 -3 0 1 8 0
COTT 0 -1 0 0 0 0
TOBA -2 -4 9 19 -7 -15
OLIO 4 2 25 48 54 85
APPL 5 2 0 0 0 -1
ORAN 0 0 0 0 4 9
TOMA 0 0 0 0 163 18
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
Opening of trade, either partial or full, results in a decrease of revenue from import 
tariffs but also in lower expenditure on export subsidies. The combination of these 
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effects has a negative impact on Morocco’s overall budget (compared to the new 
Base Run level) and a positive one for Turkey. In the rest of the MPCs the changes 
in budgetary effects stemming from SC4 and SC5 are a result of changes in the 
customs duties for tomatoes, which are in turn due to changes in the net trade status. 
The allocation of resources is clearly in favour of consumers, a result that was ex-
pected and which reflects the theoretical considerations of the benefits of trade liber-
alisation (as discussed in chapter 3). Under the „WTO liberalisation“ scenario con-
sumers benefit from an increase of their surplus of US$0.5 billion in Morocco, US$0.3 
billion in Turkey and of US$1.6 billion in the rest of the MPCs. Producers, however, 
are worse off, with their surplus decreasing by US$0.5, 0.2 and 1.4 billion in the three 
regions respectively. The deviations of the effects of SC5 are about twice the mag-
nitude, as shown in detail in Table 5.28. 
Table 5.28: Welfare effects on MPCs due to „WTO liberalisation“ (SC4) and full 
multilateral trade liberalisation (SC5) (deviations from SC2 in US$ 
million) 
Morocco Turkey Rest of MPCs  
SC4 SC5 SC4 SC5 SC4 SC5
Producer surplus -457 -859 -227 -387 -1476 -2625
Quota owner surplus 0 0 0 0 0 0
Consumer surplus 524 1028 283 552 1608 3024
Budget -36 -162 60 37 63 -329
Total 31 7 116 202 195 69
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
 
The relatively small magnitude of the results in terms of overall welfare and the 
negative budgetary effects on Morocco and the rest of the MPCs compare favourably 
with the findings of earlier studies, such as that of BUSSE and GROIZARD (2007) and 
indicates that openness to trade in itself is not a sufficient condition to provide gains. 
Other factors seem to play an important role, such as for example geographical vari-
ables or institutional quality. This argument is also supported by the findings of 
BORRMANN and BUSSE (2006a),20 which imply that countries with good government 
regulations are more likely to benefit from trade. Certainly it would worth examining 
whether the MPCs require institutional reforms so as to support an efficient market 
structure and a well functioning allocation of resources among the producers and the 
consumers. Such a conclusion is supported by the other empirical studies analysing 
the effects of trade liberalisation on MPCs cited in chapter four. 
                                            
20 A shorter version of this study has been published as BORRMANN and BUSSE (2006b) 
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5.5 The competitiveness of Mediterranean Countries 
The issue of competitiveness is a complex one that can include many aspects. One 
indication of where one country is placed, compared to the rest of the world can be 
drawn by observing changes in its trade balance and especially the changes in the 
trade balance of the main import and export commodities, using these as an ap-
proximation of changes in the shares in commodities that a country has in other mar-
kets. Another indication is changes in a country’s production, compared to the rest of 
the world, since the ability to maintain its supply share can indicate low production 
costs, high yields and the existence of markets where these commodities can be 
sold, which together imply a degree of competitive in supplying a given commodity. 
With this in mind the competitiveness of Mediterranean countries, both the EU Mem-
ber States and the MPCS, is examined by looking changes in their trade balances 
and changes in the world supply (i.e. their share of production) of the main export 
and import commodities. Because of the high competition between the MPCs and the 
EU Mediterranean Member States, the focus here is upon the changes due to the 
forthcoming Mediterranean Free Trade Area, a possible extension of this into a cus-
toms union (SC3) and a possible outcome of the WTO negotiations (SC4). Compari-
sons are made with the new Base Run (SC2), which is a close representation of the 
present day status quo. 
As mentioned in section 5.2.1, the changes in net imports and net exports between 
SC2 and SC3 are rather marginal for the EU Mediterranean countries (Greece, Italy 
and Spain). The net trade status quo of these countries does not change and they 
remain net importers of “northern” commodities, such as wheat, beef and milk, with 
the exception of Greece, which is a net exporter of 95,000 t wheat under both SC2 
and SC3. They remain as net exporters of typical Mediterranean commodities, such 
as tomatoes, oranges, olive oil, cotton and tobacco (with the exception of Italy, which 
is the largest net importer of olive oil among the EU-27). The „Barcelona Agreement“ 
brings only very small changes to the quantities traded and there is a general trend of 
trade performance developing in the favour of these three countries. 
However, the effects of „WTO liberalisation“ (SC4) on the southern EU countries are 
of a higher magnitude, as presented in section 5.3.1. In this scenario the trade per-
formance of the three EU Mediterranean Member States only develops positively in 
respect of the tomato market. In general their imports increase and their exports de-
crease, with the most affected commodities being oranges, milk and beef. This in 
turn leads to some changes in their trade status, as for example in the case of the 
Greek sugar market. 
Figure 5.11 illustrates the deviations between the present situation (SC2) and the 
„Barcelona Agreement“ (SC3) and „WTO liberalisation“ (SC4) scenarios.  
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The picture differs slightly when looking at the net trade effects on the other side of 
the Mediterranean basin, i.e. on the MPCs (section 5.2.2). Under SC3, the trade bal-
ance of Morocco, Turkey and the rest of the MPCs seems to deteriorate slightly for 
markets that are not supported in the EU (i.e. the EU’s NPR is close to zero). For ex-
ample their net imports of cereals increase and their net exports of olive oil decrease. 
By contrast the effects are positive for markets for which the EU levies a high protec-
tion rate, such as beef and milk. In these markets the trade balance develops in fa-
vour of the MPCs. Trade in tomatoes is affected in different ways by the „Barcelona 
Agreement“  with Turkey and Morocco exporting more, and the rest of the MPCs not 
only exporting less, but also moving from net exporters to become net importers.  
Figure 5.11: Net trade effects of the „Barcelona Agreement“ (SC3) and „WTO 
liberalisation“ on Spain, Greece and Italy (SC4) 
Notes: Positive values in the Y axis refer to net exports, negative values to net imports 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
The effects of „WTO liberalisation“ (SC4) on the MPCs are milder and changes of a 
lower magnitude, as presented in detail in section 5.3.2. Compared to the new Base 
Run (SC2) their imports of cereals slightly increase, but they decrease compared to 
the „Barcelona Agreement“ (SC3), as Figure 5.12 shows. Exports of typical Mediter-
ranean commodities, such as olive oil, decrease slightly compared to the new Base 
Run, but by less than under the „Barcelona Agreement“. This same pattern holds for 
the trade balance of tomatoes among the rest of MPCs, where the „WTO liberalisa-
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tion“ leads to a decrease in exports and increase in imports, which is lower than un-
der the „Barcelona Agreement“. The same applies for the increase in net exports of 
oranges.  
Figure 5.12: Net trade effects of the „Barcelona Agreement“  (SC3) and „WTO 
liberalisation“ (SC4) on Morocco, Turkey and the other MPCs  
Notes: Positive values in the Y axis refer to net exports, negative values to net imports 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
Despite the changes in net trade status, the changes in the shares of world produc-
tion and supply are only marginal. The „Barcelona Agreement“ and „WTO liberalisa-
tion“ have virtually no effects on total world supply and the Mediterranean countries, 
as a whole, maintain their original market shares.  
The EU southern Member States are by far the world’s largest supplier of olive oil 
(producing about 80 % of the world’s olive oil). SC3 allows them to increase their 
share of world production by 1.0 percentage poing. Under the „WTO liberalisation“ 
scenario this increase is about half at about +0.5 percentage points. This group of 
countries supplies about 9 %, 11 %, 2.6 % and 5 % of the world’s supply of oranges, 
tomatoes, cotton and tobacco respectively. The „Barcelona Agreement“ and „WTO 
liberalisation“ scenarios only give rise to changes in his initial market of less than +/-
0.5 percentage points. Figure 5.13 gives an overview of the changes in these three 
countries’ shares in the world production of Mediterranean commodities and of ap-
ples. 
-16000
-14000
-12000
-10000
-8000
-6000
-4000
-2000
0
2000
4000
Barcelona
Agreement
(SC3)
WTO
liberalisation
(SC4)
Barcelona
Agreement
(SC3)
WTO
liberalisation
(SC4)
Barcelona
Agreement
(SC3)
WTO
liberalisation
(SC4)
Morocco Turkey Rest of MPCs
10
00
 t
WHEA MILK BEEF OLIO APPL ORAN TOMA
158                                                          Simulations with AGRISIM and model results 
Figure 5.13: Changes in the world supply shares of EU Mediterranean Member 
States (in %) 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
In addition the simulated scenarios show that these three countries maintain their 
share of production within the EU-27, for all these commodities, compared both to 
the Base Run (BA) and to the new Base Run (SC2) - as shown in detail in Table B.8. 
For example throughout the simulations Greece remains the most important cotton 
producer in the EU and Spain the biggest olive oil producer. 82 % of the EU’s cotton 
production and 58 % of the EU’s olive oil production take place in Greece and Spain 
respectively.  
The MPCs also maintain their shares of world production, although these were rather 
small, less than 5 % for all the commodities included in the model, except for olive oil 
and tomatoes, where they account for 18 % of the world’s olive oil and tomato pro-
duction. Throughout the simulations the deviations from the base year and among 
the scenarios are only minor. Distinguishable deviations are observed in relation to 
tomatoes, where the „Barcelona Agreement“ leads to an approximate 4 percentage 
point decrease in the rest of the MPCs share of production and the „WTO liberalisa-
tion“ leads to fall of 2 percentage points. The scenario changes also have small ef-
fects these countries market share for olive oil, which declines by 0.2 percentage 
points in Morocco and Turkey and by 1.0 percentage point in the rest of MPCs. For 
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Turkey’s supply share of tomatoes increases by 0.4 percentage points while that of 
the rest of the MPCs decreases by 4.0 points (Table B.7 and Figure 5.14). It should 
be also noted that, apart from olive oil, where the EU’s southern Member States sup-
ply most of the world’s output, the EU Mediterranean Member States and the MPCs 
have broadly comparable shares of world production for other typical Mediterranean 
commodities. 
Figure 5.14: Changes in world supply shares of all MPCs (in %) 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
Figure 5.15 illustrates the changes in world supply between the new Base Run 
(SC2), the „Barcelona Agreement“ (SC3) and „WTO liberalisation“ (SC4). The 
deviations in absolute numbers are all within 3 percentage points, with the largest 
deviations being in the MPCs’ share of tomato supply under the „Barcelona 
Agreement“ scenario. 
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Figure 5.15: Changes in world supply shares of typical Mediterranean 
commodities and of apples (deviations from new Base Run (SC2) 
in percentage points) 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
From the above it can be concluded that the Free Trade Area and the potential cus-
toms union between the EU and the MPCs will not affect significantly the relative 
competitiveness of the countries involved. The Mediterranean EU Member States not 
only maintain their relative competitiveness, but marginally improve their market ac-
cess for the commodities that they export. 
These three countries’ ability to maintain their initial production shares and the slight 
improvement of their exports under the „Barcelona Agreement“ scenario suggest that 
these countries will not be discriminated against the other EU regions by the Euro-
Med Agreements. Therefore, this analysis should allay the fears of Greece, Italy and 
Spain that they will lose market shares for their commodities as a result of increased 
competition from the MPCs in the wake of the Barcelona Agreement. 
The MPCs by contrast do experience a slight deterioration of their relative competi-
tiveness under the third and fourth simulated scenarios („Barcelona Agreement“ and 
„WTO liberalisation“ respectively), although the effects are only marginal. This out-
come could justify some of the scepticism that the MPCs show towards the Euro-Med 
Agreements. 
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6 Concluding remarks 
Agricultural trade around the Mediterranean basin has been based on traditional re-
lationships between Mediterranean countries. In recent years several attempts have 
been made to boost it through numerous trade agreements between the EU and non-
EU Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs). Despite the fact that the MPCs are in-
volved in several regional trade agreements, which stem back from the ’80’s, regional 
integration has remained low. A new page for integration around the Mediterranean 
started with the EU’s initiative to complete the Euro-Med Agreements through the 
Barcelona Process.  
The forthcoming creation of a Free Trade Area between the EU and non-EU Mediter-
ranean countries within the framework of the Barcelona Agreement and changes to 
the EU’s agricultural policy due to the ongoing WTO negotiations and domestic policy 
reforms offer new opportunities and new challenges for agriculture within Mediterra-
nean countries. The lack of empirical studies on the effects of such likely policy 
changes on the agricultural sector around the Mediterranean and especially their ef-
fects on main traded commodities from the region creates the need for analysing the 
likely impacts of policy reforms on the trade and welfare of the countries involved. 
This study examines the reforms to agricultural policy that are likely to occur within 
the Mediterranean basin and their likely effects on agricultural markets in the EU and 
the MPCs. Simulations of various liberalisation options and intended reforms to the 
EU’s agricultural policy reveal the effects on commodity balances, net trade, prices, 
budgets, welfare and competitiveness within these blocks of countries. Emphasis is 
given to the regional effects on the Mediterranean countries, i.e. those within EU, 
particularly Greece, Italy and Spain and the MPCs. The simulations have been car-
ried out with an extended and modified version of the partial equilibrium trade policy 
model, AGRISIM. 
The simulation results vary from scenario to scenario, from country to country (and/or 
region to region) and from market to market within specific regions, thus making it 
difficult to formulate conclusions on general trends. 
The CAP reform of Mediterranean commodities, i.e. the decoupling of direct pay-
ments for cotton, olive oil and tobacco (and especially the 50 % cut in direct pay-
ments for tobacco) seem to only slightly affect countries within the EU that produce 
these commodities. The impacts on other EU regions and on the MPCs are also 
minimal. The small magnitude of the results can be explained by the fact that de-
coupling only changes the method of supporting farmers, and does not result in any 
further structural reforms. Equally these markets are small and of limited importance 
to both the EU-27 and the MPCs. 
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The main effects of the most recent EU enlargement to include Bulgaria and Roma-
nia are mostly felt only by these two countries, and have almost no impact on the ag-
ricultural markets of other EU regions or of the MPCs.  
The observations from these first two scenarios were used to formulate a new Base 
Run scenario, which includes both the CAP reform for cotton, olive oil and tobacco 
and the enlargement of the EU to include Bulgaria and Romania.  
The analysis of a potential extension of a Free Trade Area between the EU and the 
MPCs into a customs union (SC3) shows only a marginal effect on the commodity 
balances and prices within the EU regions. The deviations of this scenario from the 
new Base Run scenario (SC2) show that the trade performance of EU Mediterranean 
Member States seem to improve slightly, as they are able to export slightly more and 
to import slightly less. They will also enjoy welfare gains. However, the welfare ef-
fects on the other EU regions are negative, due to reduced customs levies. 
The effects of the Barcelona Agreement on the MPCs vary, depending on the 
changes in border protection. Overall their trade performance for their main export 
commodities, such as olive oil and oranges, deteriorates slightly and they suffer from 
some welfare losses. The simulations in this scenario involve an extreme situation 
with the creation of both a Free Trade Area and a customs union between the EU 
and the MPCs, taking the scenario to the upper limits of the Euro-Med Agreements. 
The results show that the EU Mediterranean countries will not be worse off from a full 
implementation of the Barcelona Agreement and will potentially benefit from an ex-
pansion of trade. Moreover, agricultural producers in these countries will not be 
negatively affected. However, the effects of the scenario on the MPCs are negative 
and justify the scepticism that these countries have shown towards the Barcelona 
process. 
The scenario of „WTO liberalisation“ has more marked effects on EU markets, but 
less effect on the markets of the MPCs. In general, the domestic supply for com-
modities that are highly protected in the EU, such as beef, declines, while demand 
increases. The net trade performance of Greece, Italy and Spain only develops posi-
tively for tomatoes. In both the EU regions and the MPC regions, producer surplus 
declines and consumer surplus increases. The effects on the EU’s budget are posi-
tive, revealing overall welfare gains for the EU-27, while the effect on the budget of 
the MPCs is negative, due to a reduction in import revenues. In the event of full trade 
liberalisation the effects are twice the magnitude, but only in those markets where 
border protection previously existed.  
The effects of SC5 on the MPCs are closer to the results of SC3, than those from 
SC4.  
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Mediterranean countries, both within and outside the EU maintain their supply shares 
and there are only marginal effects on their net trade, implying that their relative 
competitiveness is not affected by these simulations. 
To go back to the fourth question in the introduction, over the budgetary effects in the 
EU and in specific Member States, the simulations showed these to be positive, 
since the reduction of trade distorting policies implies lower expenditure. As the CAP 
is financed according to the principle of financial solidarity and member states’ indi-
vidual contributions are based on their Gross National Input, the budgetary effects 
differ between the regions of the EU. The reform of the CAP, the enlargement of the 
EU, the implementation of the Euro-Med Agreements and the opening of EU markets 
is beneficial for the taxpayers of member states that make a small contribution to the 
EU budget, such as Greece, Italy and Spain. By contrast taxpayers in the northern 
EU member states and the new member states experience negative effects, the for-
mer due to the high contribution they make to the common budget and the later be-
cause of losing import rents that they previously enjoyed. Under the new Base Run 
Scenario, the changes in the budget caused by the „Barcelona Agreement“ and 
„WTO liberalisation“ favour taxpayers in the EU-15. Without the intra-community fi-
nancing system the effects on the EU Mediterranean member states would be of a 
lower magnitude, positive under SC3, but negative for Greece and Italy under SC4, 
implying that the EU financing system is particularly beneficial for Greece, Italy and 
Spain. 
The third question in the introduction concerned the effects of these changes on pro-
ducers and consumers. From the changes in consumer surplus it is clear that con-
sumers in both the EU and the MPCs enjoy welfare gains under multilateral liberali-
sation, but are worse off in the event of a customs union between the EU and the 
MPCs. By contrast producers in both sets of countries are worse off due under mul-
tilateral liberalisation, but those in the EU benefit from the implementation of the Bar-
celona Agreement (SC3), with those in the MPCs being worse off.  
Thus the fears of farmers in southern EU countries that their incomes and welfare will 
suffer from the joint effects of the CAP reform for Mediterranean products and the 
Barcelona Agreement are not confirmed by the model results, although a multilateral 
opening of EU markets may have negative consequences for them. Under the cur-
rent protected policy regime producers enjoy higher prices than they would under a 
liberalised policy regime. Some adjustments would be required to offset the negative 
effects of a liberalised policy regime on farmers’ welfare. These might include policies 
that encourage efficiency in production, logistics and marketing so as to maximise 
the benefits from a well functioning supply chain. 
There is little difference in the changes in farmers’ revenue in the north and south of 
the EU, showing that the scenarios explored do not unduly discriminate against 
farmers in EU Mediterranean states. However, it should be noted that the magnitude 
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of the effects of these changes upon typical Mediterranean commodities, such as 
cotton, olive oil and tobacco, is much higher if the producer’s incentive prices are 
used as the basis for calculating farmers’ revenue, largely because of a reduction in 
direct payments made to them. 
The second question in the introduction, asked about the combined effects on EU 
farmers and the regional budgetary effects within the EU. Here the analysis reveals 
that not only are the southern EU Member States not discriminated against by the 
agricultural policy reforms (in comparison to other EU regions), but that they benefit 
more than other EU regions, due to the intra-EU system of financial flows. In addition 
they show a potential for improving their trade balance, even in the event of a cus-
toms union with the MPCs, whose producers are their main competitors. 
This leads back to the first question in the introduction, about the effects of trade lib-
eralisation on Mediterranean agriculture. Under the scenarios Mediterranean agri-
culture does not appear to be worse off, but also not significantly better off. In com-
parison with the rest of the world, the Mediterranean countries maintain approxi-
mately the same degree of competitiveness under multilateral trade liberalisation. 
Equally a Free Trade Area within the Mediterranean does not seem to change the 
relative competitiveness of the EU Mediterranean Member States and non-EU 
Mediterranean countries, although the effects on individual countries are differenti-
ated, as discussed previously.  
One point which clearly emerged from the simulations, which should be telling for 
policy makers is that trade liberalisation, whether multilateral (within the framework of 
the WTO) or bilateral (within the framework of the Barcelona Agreement), leads to 
overall welfare gains and that the effects on markets are of a small magnitude. The 
results of this study compare favourably with those from the empirical studies cited in 
the fourth chapter. Therefore moving towards liberalisation would not harm markets 
but, on the contrary, would be beneficial. The small magnitude of the effects can be 
attributed to the fact that the policies simulated here only refer to the level of applied 
protection and thus only examine the impact of differences between domestic and 
world market prices. The effects of non-tariff barriers or quality issues are not ad-
dressed. Recently a discussion has emerged over such policies, particularly quality 
issues that relate to imported commodities, such as sanitary and phytosanitary crite-
ria and other non-tariff barriers. These policies could, in the long run, result in a shift 
in the supply and demand curves and their impacts could be greater than the impacts 
of changes in price differences. One challenge for future research would be to quan-
tify such policies, in terms of how much and in which direction they shift the curves. 
This leads to the conclusion that policy reforms which sooner or later are inevitable, 
such as the abolition of tariffs, will perhaps be less of an influence on the agricultural 
sector around the Mediterranean than structural changes and non-tariff barriers. 
Structural changes are crucial for Mediterranean agriculture, since an efficiently 
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structured system is a pre-requisite for the re-allocation of resources (initially within 
the sector and subsequently within the overall economy) that will allow compensation 
of any losses incurred by farmers. The MPCs require a proper infrastructure that can 
promote effective production structures and an efficient distribution of resources. This 
is a necessary condition for overcoming any possible negative impacts of non-tariff 
barriers, such as food quality criteria for exports to the EU. 
The establishment of common protocols of origin could represent a way to overcome 
most of the existing non-tariff barriers relating to food quality. Although this process 
has started, with the Pan Euro Mediterranean Protocol of Origin, the numerous bilat-
eral trade agreements, which embody different protocols of origin, complicates its 
adoption. Adoption of common rules of origin within these various trade agreements 
among the Mediterranean countries is problematic, since it involves costs in terms of 
establishing a new system and the necessary administration, as discussed in the 
second chapter. The situation is complicated by the fact that, until now, all the initia-
tives for regional integration and the required administrative support have been 
dominated by the EU and its institutions. The MPCs have not taking an active role in 
participating, but have been quite passive observers. This situation reinforces the 
argument made above, that structural changes are needed in the MPCs and that 
good (and active) governance is of prime importance for the future of the agricultural 
sector in these countries. 
One limitation of the study is the comparative-static nature of the model. Although 
through shift factors and the possibility to model population growth do allow some 
dynamic aspects to be captured, the results must be seen as comparative-static. The 
model is not suited for prognosis and the results should be interpreted more as pos-
sible trends rather than as absolute predictions. This said, the model is suitable for a 
“with and without” policy analysis. Moreover, because of its comparative-static na-
ture, the model underestimates the true gains from trade and liberalisation, since 
these gains are commonly much higher in reality than the comparative-static results. 
This is because trade liberalisation is a dynamic rather than a static procedure and 
the positive welfare effects are often of a higher magnitude than the comparative-
static analysis suggests.  
Further issues that were not examined in this study, but remain worth investigating 
are the effects of further regional agreements, such as the Cotonou Agreement which 
established an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the EU and the Af-
rican, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACPs) and the impacts of the EU’s trade ne-
gotiations with the Mercosur States.  
Another area worthy of further investigation is the regional impacts within the coun-
tries concerned, particularly the impacts on rural areas within the MPCs. Since there 
are differences in the effects between consumers and producers, these may have 
regional implications, which need to be further investigated. The future development 
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of the economies of MPCs often relies on the development of their rural areas, which 
in turn is highly dependent on agricultural activities. There is a concern that while 
trade liberalisation brings aggregate benefits the regional distribution of these within 
countries, especially between less and more favoured regions may be negative. 
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7 Summary  
Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements have been gaining attention and rele-
vance in recent years. After the deadlock in the Doha Negotiations in the summer of 
2006, international attention has focused on regional trade integration and particu-
larly on the initiatives of the European Union (EU) to conclude or deepen existing 
trade agreements with blocks of countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific.  
For the non-EU countries around the Mediterranean the most important of the nu-
merous regional trade agreements in which they are involved are the Euro-Med 
Agreements, which influence their trade flows and seek to promote deeper regional 
integration.  
At present trade flows of agricultural commodities around the Mediterranean are 
along on a north-south axis, with trade focused on specific commodities. The north-
ern EU Member States export cereals, meat and dairy products to the MPCs, while in 
turn the MPCs mainly export fruits, vegetables and olive oil to the northern EU coun-
tries. This places them in direct competition with the EU Mediterranean member 
states. The high similarity in the exports of the MPCs and the EU Mediterranean 
member states and the high complementarity in trade among the MPCs and northern 
EU member states has created diverging interests within the EU (between northern 
and southern member states) which have very different attitudes towards the Euro-
Med Agreements and any strategy towards further agricultural trade liberalisation. 
Trade preferences within the Euro-Med Agreements have been granted so far only 
from the EU to the MPCs. The value of the preference margin for selected agricul-
tural commodities reveals that the benefits for the MPCs have been slightly intensi-
fied because of the Barcelona Agreement but the gains are different from country to 
country and are only for fruits and vegetables. The MPCs on the other side have not 
granted preferences to the EU and keep high protection rates for those commodities 
that they import mainly from the EU as the nominal protection rate shows, such as 
livestock commodities and cereals,. This seems to contradict their willingness to 
deepen their trade relationships with the EU and benefit from this preferential treat-
ment.  
Trade among the MPCs remains rather low, despite these countries being connected 
with each other through a number of trade agreements. Similarities in production and 
exports certainly play a key role in low south-south integration. Exports destined to 
the EU and trade with the EU appear more attractive and leave little space for intra-
south trade.  
The forthcoming creation of a Free Trade Area between the EU and the MPCs, fore-
seen by the Barcelona Agreement, the partial trade liberalisation that might result 
from the ongoing WTO negotiations and domestic policy reforms (i.e. of the CAP) 
offer new opportunities and new challenges for the agricultural sector around the 
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Mediterranean basin, but also make the trade relationships round the Mediterranean 
to look more complex and create uncertainty to the farmers, which in turn creates the 
need for further analysis. 
Based on the theory of applied welfare economics, this study empirically shows that 
the latest CAP reform will lead to only small adjustments in producer surplus and will 
only have a limited effect on the well being of producers. The magnitude of these ef-
fects largely depends upon how much the new decoupled subsidies affect producers’ 
decision making processes, which will reflect the impact that the existing direct sub-
sidies have on production. 
Theoretical assessments of Free Trade Areas suggest that the welfare effects are 
negative for third countries and are clearly positive for the partner countries, when 
the partner countries that are net suppliers are more efficient (or at least as efficient) 
as third country suppliers. The magnitude of these effects depends upon several 
factors: the existing set of tariffs, the relative amount of imports from preferential and 
non-preferential suppliers, expenditure on domestic goods and the level of substitu-
tion between domestically produced and imported goods. Because of the interplay of 
these factors, it is not clear whether the trade creation effects are greater or lesser 
than the trade diversion effects. Thus there is some ambiguity about the effects of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area on social welfare. This implies the need for 
further empirical analysis. However, it is clear that preferential suppliers enjoy the 
preference margin granted by partner countries that are net importers. 
Multilateral liberalisation is generally beneficial for welfare but not always for coun-
tries that are already involved in a regional trade agreement and enjoy preference 
margins. This is connected to the issue of preference erosion. A theoretical assess-
ment of preference erosion shows positive welfare effects for third countries and 
negative ones for preferential suppliers, especially if they are less efficient than third 
countries. The effects on preferential importers are neither clearly positive nor nega-
tive. This analysis is highly relevant for the Mediterranean Partner Countries due to 
the regional trade agreements that exist between them and with the EU. 
Existing empirical assessments of trade liberalisation around the Mediterranean ba-
sin have mostly been undertaken using General Equilibrium Models, focusing on the 
effects of the abolition of import tariffs between the EU and the MPCs on the secon-
dary and tertiary sectors (i.e. manufactured goods and services). The studies have 
usually focused on individual MPCs and most studies show disparities between the 
EU and the examined (non–EU) Mediterranean country. Few empirical studies focus 
on the agricultural sector, and especially on the main agricultural commodities pro-
duced in Mediterranean countries. Those that exist either do not take into account 
simultaneous policy changes (i.e. reform of the EU’s agricultural policy and trade lib-
eralisation) or do not assess the regional disparities between farmers in different EU 
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regions. Thus there was a gap in the analysis of the impacts of policy reforms on 
trade and the welfare of the involved countries, which this study addresses. 
The main objective of this study has been to provide deeper insights into the impacts 
of agricultural and trade policy reforms in the Mediterranean basin. Further objectives 
include evaluating the effects of these new policy regimes, suggesting further 
changes to them and providing sound empirical results that can inform the discus-
sions of policy makers over the future of Mediterranean agriculture.  
In particular the thesis seeks to address the following questions: 
1. What are the likely overall impacts of trade liberalisation for the agricultural 
sectors in the EU and the MPCs? 
2. What are the likely regional effects within the EU? Do the policy changes dis-
criminate against southern EU Member States in comparison to the northern 
ones? 
3. What are the likely effects on producers and consumers within the two main 
trading blocks (i.e. the EU and MPCs)? 
4. What are the likely budgetary effects for the EU as a whole and for particular 
Member States? 
This study empirically analyses the impacts of different policy scenarios on Mediter-
ranean countries by using an extended and modified version of the trade policy 
model, AGRISIM.  
AGRISIM is an acronym of AGricultural SImulations Model and is a synthetic simula-
tion model, comparative-static and deterministic in nature, with non linear, iso elastic 
demand and supply functions. It is a net trade model that assumes homogenous 
products. Regions are connected with each other through a market clearing mecha-
nism, in which the derived world market price feeds into domestic markets through 
domestic prices. The net aggregate trade from all regions, which is given by the dif-
ference between supply and demand, is fed back into the world market clearing 
mechanism. It considers the effects of different policy interventions, such as changes 
in the nominal protection rate, price transmission elasticities, minimum producer 
prices, production quotas and subsidies. Through shift coefficients in the demand 
and supply functions additional variables, such as population and income growth, can 
be simulated. The model is used to simulate the effects on production, consumption, 
trade, domestic prices, border prices, state budgets, consumer and producer sur-
pluses and overall welfare.  
The model was updated to the year 2001 and extended to include all the Mediterra-
nean Partner Countries and five commodities (apples, cotton, olive oil, oranges, to-
bacco and tomatoes) so as to cover the main markets of Mediterranean countries. 
Particularly for the EU Member States a new module has been programmed enabling 
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to take into account the intra-community financial system of the EU when calculating 
the budget effects that entail in each of the EU regions. 
The simulations covered four policy scenarios: 
a) Further Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform 
b) EU enlargement 
c) WTO liberalisation 
d) Preferential Treatment of non-EU Mediterranean countries (MPCs) 
These policy scenarios were addressed through five simulation scenarios that model 
the differences against a Base Run scenario.  
The Base Run scenario simulates the full implementation of Agenda 2000, the 2004 
eastern enlargement of the EU and the Luxembourg Agreement. SC1 simulates the 
effects of the CAP reform of three Mediterranean commodities: cotton, olive oil and 
tobacco. SC2 simulates the enlargement of the EU to include Bulgaria and Romania. 
These two scenarios are carried forward into the other scenarios. Because the re-
sults of these scenarios are of a very small magnitude and because together they 
represent the current policy regime, they are used as the new Base Run. 
SC3 simulates the implementation of the forthcoming Free Trade Area between the 
EU and the Mediterranean Partner Countries. Because the model assumes homoge-
nous commodities and does not offer the possibility of modelling bilateral trade rela-
tionships, this scenario goes one step further and simulates a customs union be-
tween the EU and the MPCs. This is accomplished by applying the EU’s trade policy 
with the rest of the world, as expressed through the Nominal Protection Rate (NPR), 
to the MPCs. The results of this scenario show the upper bounds of the full imple-
mentation of the Barcelona Agreement, thus this scenario is named the „Barcelona 
Agreement“.  
In SC4 and SC5 two different options for liberalisation are simulated. SC4 simulates 
a 50 % multilateral liberalisation, which is a feasible likely outcome of the ongoing 
WTO negotiations. This scenario is referred to as „WTO liberalisation“. SC5 simu-
lates a 100 % multilateral liberalisation. Although this scenario has a very limited 
practical use, since it is an unlikely outcome, it is useful for checking the plausibility of 
the model results and for understanding their relative magnitude.  
An overview of the assumptions of each scenario follows in Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1: Overview of simulated scenarios 
 Base Run SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
Agenda 2000 9 9 9 9 9 9 
2004 EU eastern enlargement  9 9 9 9 9 9 
Luxembourg Agreement 9 9 9 9 9 9 
CAP reform of Mediterranean commodities  9 9 9 9 9 
EU enlargement with Bulgaria and Romania   9 9 9 9 
„Barcelona Agreement“    9   
„WTO liberalisation“     9  
Full multilateral liberalisation      9 
Source: Own compilation 
The simulation results indicated that the CAP reform of Mediterranean commodities 
only very slightly affects the markets for cotton, olive oil and tobacco and then only 
within the EU Mediterranean member states. The enlargement of the EU to include 
Bulgaria and Romania only affects these two countries. The very small magnitude of 
the results from these two scenarios allowed SC2 to be re-formulated as the new 
Base Run scenario, providing an accurate representation of the existing policy re-
gime. Throughout the thesis the results from SC3, SC4 and SC5 are compared with 
the new Base Run. 
The „Barcelona Agreement“ has very limited effects on all the EU regions, whether 
Mediterranean or non-Mediterranean. The effects on the net trade performance of 
the southern EU Member States are slightly positive, and there are almost no effects 
on the other EU regions. Changes in welfare favour producers and are slightly unfa-
vourable to consumers, due to a slight increase in farm gate prices. The budgetary 
effects throughout the EU regions are slightly negative, due to a small reduction in 
customs duties. These effects vary between the EU regions, according to the finan-
cial flows between national budgets and that of Brussels. These results could be due 
the EU’s trade with the MPCs being small compared to intra-EU trade and to its trade 
with the rest of the world, implying that a customs union with the MPCs would have 
little or no effect on EU markets. It also shows that the EU Mediterranean Member 
States should not fear losing their market shares or seeing a decline in their agricul-
tural sectors due to higher competition from the MPCs. 
The effects of the „Barcelona Agreement“ on the MPCs vary, depending on the 
changes in levels of border protection for each market. Overall a slight deterioration 
in their trade performance is observed for the main exported commodities, such as 
olive oil and oranges. Equally these countries will suffer from welfare losses, due to a 
reduction in the trade levies that they currently collect. However, producers will bene-
fit from higher farm gate prices and thus enjoy an increase in their surplus. In total 
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the effects on the MPCs are unfavourable and can justify their scepticism towards the 
Barcelona process. 
The „WTO liberalisation“ scenario has more marked effects on EU markets. In gen-
eral it leads to a reduction in the internal supply of highly protected commodities, 
such as beef, while the demand for these increases. The net trade performance of 
Greece, Italy and Spain only develops positively for tomatoes. As expected from the 
theoretical analysis of multilateral market liberalisation, the producer surplus declines 
and the consumer surplus increases, in all EU regions. The effects on the EU’s 
budget are positive, revealing overall welfare gains for the EU-27. In the event of full 
trade liberalisation the effects are twice the magnitude, but only for those markets 
border protection previously existed.  
The „WTO liberalisation“ scenario has less effect on the markets of the MPCs than 
SC3. Their net trade performance declines somewhat but the changes are of a very 
small magnitude, except for markets that were initially high protected. There is a re-
duction in farm gate prices, which leads to a decrease in producer surplus and farm-
ers’ revenue, but also to an increase consumers’ wellbeing as measured by an in-
crease in consumer surplus. Only in Morocco does this scenario have a negative ef-
fect on the budget, due to a reduction in import revenues. The effects of SC5 are 
twice the magnitude in markets where border protection initially (in the new Base Run 
scenario) was applied. In terms of welfare SC5 results in positive budget changes for 
Turkey (but not the other MPCs). Interestingly the effects of this scenario on the 
MPCs are closer to the results of the Barcelona Agreement (SC3) than those from 
SC4. 
None of the simulations affect the competitiveness of the Mediterranean countries, 
either within or outside the EU. 
From the model results it is clear that trade liberalisation, either multilateral (within 
the framework of the WTO) or bilateral (within the framework of the Barcelona 
Agreement) leads to overall welfare gains, with the effects on markets being of a 
small magnitude. This compares favourably with the outcome of the empirical studies 
cited in the fourth chapter of this thesis. It seems that liberalisation does not leave the 
Mediterranean agriculture any worse off, but also not significantly better off. This 
point, that liberalisation of the markets would not be harmful, but on the contrary it 
would be beneficial for agricultural markets due to the positive welfare effects should 
be taken into consideration by policy makers. 
The small magnitude of the effects on agricultural markets might be attributed to the 
relatively minor importance of the MPCs as trade partners with the EU or to the 
simulations that were run, which mostly capture shocks in the level of applied protec-
tion. The scenarios have focused simulating various differences between domestic 
and world market prices, expressed through different levels of NPR. Policies relating 
to non-tariff barriers or quality issues have not been examined. Discussion about the 
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effects of such policies has recently emerged, particularly over the quality of imported 
commodities, such as the sanitary and phytosanitary criteria and/or other non-tariff 
barriers. In the long run these policies could result in shifts in the supply and demand 
curves, the impacts of which might exceed those caused by any changes in price. 
One challenge for future research would be to seek to quantify the extent and direc-
tion of such shifts, through a quantitative modelling exercise. 
In respect of the discussion about regional disparities within the EU, it seems that the 
fears of farmers in southern EU countries that the reform of the CAP for Mediterra-
nean products and the Barcelona Agreement will reduce their income and have 
negative impacts on them are unfounded. EU farmers are only worse off under a 
multilateral opening of EU markets. The analysis shows an improvement in the net 
trade performance of the EU Mediterranean member states, with an increase in their 
trade balance, following a customs union with the MPCs, their main competitors. The 
changes in farmers’ revenue in northern and southern EU member states are quite 
similar, indicating that the EU’s Mediterranean farmers are not unduly discriminated 
against (compared to their colleagues in other EU regions) by these changes in agri-
cultural policy. However, the magnitude of the effects is higher for typical Mediterra-
nean commodities, such as cotton, olive oil and tobacco when the producer’s incen-
tive prices are used to calculate farmers’ revenue, due to modelling of direct pay-
ments. The regional budgetary effects in the EU reveal that the Mediterranean EU 
Member States benefit more from the intra-EU financial flows between national 
budgets and that of Brussels’ budget. This evidence also contradicts the argument 
that the EU’s agricultural policy discriminates against the southern EU regions. 
At risk of generalisation, since the results do vary from market to market, Tables 7.2 
to 7.5 give a compact overview of the results of the model for the EU regions and the 
MPCs. 
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Table 7.2: Evaluation of policy scenarios on EU Mediterranean Member 
States 
changes of: 
simulated 
scenarios 
net 
trade
farm gate 
prices 
world supply 
shares 
producer 
surplus 
consumer 
surplus budget 
overall 
welfare 
new Base 
Run (SC2) 0 0 0 - 0/- - - 
„Barcelona 
Agreement“ 
(SC3) 
0/+ + 0 + - + + 
„WTO 
liberalisation“ 
(SC4) 
- - 0 - + + + 
full 
multilateral 
liberalisation 
(SC5) 
- - 0 - + + + 
Notes: +: positive; –: negative; 0: almost no change; 0/-: slightly negative; 0/+: slightly 
positive 
For the budgetary effects and overall welfare, intra-EU financial flows have been 
taken into account. 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
Table 7.3: Evaluation of policy scenarios on northern EU Member States 
changes of: 
simulated 
scenarios 
net 
trade
farm gate 
prices 
world supply 
shares 
producer 
surplus 
consumer 
surplus budget 
overall 
welfare 
new Base 
Run (SC2) 0 0 0 - + + + 
„Barcelona 
Agreement“ 
(SC3) 
0 + 0 + + + 0/- 
„WTO 
liberalisation“ 
(SC4) 
0 - 0 - + + + 
full 
multilateral 
liberalisation 
(SC5) 
0/- - 0 - + + + 
Notes: +: positive; –: negative; 0: almost no change; 0/-: slightly negative; 0/+: slightly 
positive 
For the budgetary effects and overall welfare, intra-EU financial flows have been 
taken into account. 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
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Table 7.4: Evaluation of policy scenarios on new EU Member States (EU-10) 
changes of 
simulated 
scenarios 
net 
trade
farm gate 
prices 
world supply 
shares 
producer 
surplus 
consumer 
surplus budget 
overall 
welfare
new Base 
Run (SC2) 0 0 0 - + 0/- - 
„Barcelona 
Agreement“ 
(SC3) 
0 + 0 - + - - 
„WTO 
liberalisation“ 
(SC4) 
0/- - 0 - + - - 
full 
multilateral 
liberalisation 
(SC5) 
0/- - 0 - + - - 
Notes: +: positive; –: negative; 0: almost no change; 0/-: slightly negative; 0/+: slightly 
positive 
For the budgetary effects and overall welfare, intra-EU financial flows have been 
taken into account. 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
Table 7.5: Evaluation of policy scenarios on the MPCs 
changes of 
simulated 
scenarios 
net 
trade
farm gate 
prices 
world supply 
shares 
producer 
surplus 
consumer 
surplus budget 
overall 
welfare
new Base 
Run (SC2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
„Barcelona 
Agreement“ 
(SC3) 
0/- + 0 + - - - 
„WTO 
liberalisation“ 
(SC4) 
0/- - 0 - + + + 
full 
multilateral 
liberalisation 
(SC5) 
0/- - 0 - + - + 
Notes: +: positive; –: negative; 0: almost no change; 0/-: slightly negative; 0/+: slightly 
positive 
Source: Own compilation based on AGRISIM simulations 
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Annex 
A. To Chapter two 
Calculation of the Value of Preference Margins 
The estimation of preference margins has been the subject of a number of empirical 
studies. ALEXANDRAKI and LANKES (2004) estimated the preference margins for mid-
dle-income developing countries, while earlier YAMAZAKI (1996) estimated the value 
of preferences granted by the EU, the USA and Japan to all their preferential trade 
partners based on 1992 data. GRETHE and TANGERMANN (1998a) calculated the VPM 
for all agricultural commodities among Mediterranean countries and more recently 
MARTÍNEZ GÓMEZ (2007) did the same for Moroccan clementines. 
The VPM is defined as the difference between the preferential and the world market 
price: 
PWP qPPVPM )( −=          (A.1) 
with PP price perceived by preferential exporters 
 PW world market price 
 qp quantity exported by the preferential country (or quantity imported to the  
preference-granting country) 
 
A graphic illustration follows in Figure A.1. IDA is the import demand curve for a cer-
tain commodity of country A. ESB is the export supply curve of this commodity from 
country B and ESc is the export supply curve for the same commodity from country 
C. Country C can also be considered as the rest of world. In order to simplify the fig-
ure it is assumed that country B has an upward-sloping export supply curve, whereas 
country C has a perfectly elastic export supply curve. At the beginning a MFN tariff 
(tMFN) is applied to the exports from both B and C to country A, meaning that country 
A imports quantity Q1 from country B and quantity (Q3-Q1) from country C, with a 
price PW+tMFN. It should be noted that PW is the world market price. Under this regime 
the export supply curves of countries B and C are formed in relation to the new do-
mestic price in country A, i.e. to ESB+tMFN and to ESC+tMFN respectively. Assuming 
that country A only gives preferential access to country B, then a new preferential 
tariff, tP, is applied to imports from B, resulting in an increase of exports from B coun-
try to country A from Q1 to Q2 at the expense of country C, whose exports to country 
A are reduced to (Q3-Q2). Due to the preferential regime the export supply curve of 
country B shifts, as shown in the figure by the curve ESB+TP. The resultant prefer-
ence margin under this new preferential regime equals the area a+b, the area esti-
mated by equation A.1. It is equal to the tariff revenue no longer collected by country 
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A under the new preferential regime, which it grants instead to exporters from country 
B. 
Figure A.1: Illustration of preference margin effects 
Source: own compilation based on LIAPIS, 2007, pp. 147-148; FRANCOIS et al., 2006; REED, 
2001, pp. 97-103. 
When working with trade statistics and with a large number of commodities and 
countries, it is often easier to utilise the value of trade flows instead of individual price 
and quantity data, and this approach is adopted within most research (ALEXANDRAKI 
and LANKES, 2004; YAMAZAKI, 1996; GRETHE and TANGERMANN, 1998a; MARTÍNEZ 
GÓMEZ, 2007; LIAPIS, 2007). LIAPIS (2007, p. 148) asks whether or not the value of 
trade flows is influenced by the value of the preference margin. To avoid this caveat 
(and following the studies mentioned above) the calculations of the value of trade 
flow are adjusted by the MFN tariff rate. Following GRETHE and TANGERMANN (1998a) 
it is assumed that both preferential and non-preferential commodities (i.e. commodi-
ties to which MFN tariff rates are applied) are homogenous and are thus sold on EU 
markets at the same domestic price. This is described in the following equation: 
)1()1( PPMFNW tPtP +=+  (A.2) 
with tMFN MFN ad valorem import tariff to the EU 
 tP preferential ad valorem import tariff to the EU 
price 
quantity Q1 Q2 Q3 
IDA 
ESB 
PW ESC 
ESC+tMFN PW+tMFN 
ESB+tMFN 
ESB+tP 
PW+tP 
a b
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By combining equations A.1 and A.2, equation A.3 is derived: 
 
PP
MFN
PMFN qP
t
ttVPM +
−=
1
)(
 (A.3) 
While Ppqp have been replaced by the value of the trade flow.  
This equation was applied when calculating the VPM granted by the EU to commodi-
ties imported from the MPCs, but only those commodities included in the AGRISIM 
model. The tables below provide the detailed results. Due to data availability the 
value of trade flow used for these calculations is the import value, derived from the 
TRAINS database through the WITS application. 
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Table A.1: Value of Preference Margins resulting from the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements in ’000 US$ (1999) 
of which Commodity                  \ Country  
(HS 1996) Morocco Turkey 
rest of 
MPCs Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Libya Syria Tunisia 
0201 Bovine meat n.a2 0.00 0.00 n.a n.a 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
0203 Pig meat n.a n.a 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
0207 Poultry meat 8.03 0.00 522.16 n.a n.a 522.16 n.a n.a n.a 0.00 n.a 
0401 Milk and cream, not concentrated 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a n.a 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
0402 Milk and cream, concentrated n.a 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 
0702 Tomatoes 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 0.00 
080510 Oranges 33168.58 0.00 16250.72 n.a 1135.16 10017.52 n.a 0.00 n.a 0.00 5098.04 
080810 Apples 380.96 0.00 1.69 0.11 0.27 0.00 n.a n.a n.a 0.92 0.38 
1001 Wheat and meslin n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1003 Barley n.a n.a 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1005 Maize (corn) 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.00 
1006 Rice n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a n.a 
1007 Grain sorghum n.a n.a 0.00 n.a 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.00 
1008 Other cereals 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.00 
1201 Soya beans n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1204 Linseed n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1206 Sunflower seeds 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1207 Other oil seeds 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 n.a 
1507 Soya-bean oil 65.85 n.a 0.93 n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.93 n.a n.a n.a 
1509 Olive oil 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 
1512 Sunflower, safflower or cotton-seed oil n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a n.a 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
2401 Unprocessed tobacco 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a n.a n.a 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 
5201 Cotton-not carded or combed 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a n.a n.a 0.00 0.00 
170111 Cane sugar n.a n.a 0.00 n.a n.a 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
 Sum 33623.42 0.00 16775.50 0.11 1135.43 10539.68 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.92 5098.42 
Notes: for the period 1998-2003 import duties (into the EU) where reported only for 1999 and 2003 and for Libya only for 1999; n.a= non-
available import duty for this commodity; MPCs: Mediterranean Partner Countries 
Source: Own calculations based on reported import duties derived from TRAINS and bilateral trade flows derived from COMTRADE 
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Table A.2: Value of Preference Margins resulting from the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements in ’000 US$ (2003) 
of which Commodity                  \ Country  
(HS 1996) Morocco Turkey 
rest of 
MPCs Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Libya Syria Tunisia 
0201 Bovine meat n.a2 n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 n.a n.a n.a 0.00 n.a 
0203 Pig meat 0.00 n.a 0.00 n.a n.a 0.00 n.a 0.00 n.a n.a n.a 
0207 Poultry meat n.a 111.79 0.00 n.a n.a 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
0401 Milk and cream, not concentrated n.a 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
0402 Milk and cream, concentrated n.a 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
0702 Tomatoes 58370.40 19387.20 2447.66 1.36 444.09 0.00 316.72 3.11 n.a 0.00 1682.38 
080510 Oranges 48831.55 5780.60 30046.55 n.a 4725.44 18548.43 n.a 36.15 n.a n.a 6736.53 
080810 Apples -0.03 343.39 -0.03 n.a -0.02 0.00 n.a n.a n.a -0.02 n.a 
1001 Wheat and meslin n.a 133.26 0.87 n.a n.a 0.00 n.a 0.87 n.a 0.00 n.a 
1003 Barley n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1005 Maize (corn) 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a n.a 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1006 Rice n.a 687.73 0.00 n.a 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.00 0.00 
1007 Grain sorghum n.a n.a 0.00 n.a 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1008 Other cereals n.a n.a 0.00 n.a 0.00 n.a n.a 0.00 n.a 0.00 n.a 
1201 Soya beans n.a n.a 0.00 n.a n.a 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1204 Linseed 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1206 Sunflower seeds n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a n.a n.a 0.00 n.a 
1207 Other oil seeds 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 n.a 
1507 Soya-bean oil 28.51 2.34 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1509 Olive oil 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 
1512 Sunflower, safflower or cotton-seed oil 33.98 3.29 8.29 n.a 8.29 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
2401 Unprocessed tobacco n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 n.a n.a 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 
5201 Cotton-not carded or combed 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a n.a n.a 0.00 0.00 
170111 Cane sugar n.a 0.00 0.00 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
 Sum 107264.41 26449.60 32503.34 1.36 5177.80 18548.43 316.72 40.13 0.00 -0.02 8418.91 
Notes: for the period 1998-2003 import duties (into the EU) where reported only for 1999 and 2003 and for Libya only for 1999; n.a= non-
available import duty for this commodity 
Source: Own calculations based on reported import duties derived from TRAINS and bilateral trade flows derived from COMTRADE 
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Table A.3: Applied tariffs by the MPCs (in %) 
Commodity 
Reporter Partner 
Tariff 
year HS 1996 Description 
Weighted 
average of 
AVE
Algeria Egypt 2001 1207 Other oil seeds 5
Algeria Egypt 2001 1006 Rice 10.32
Algeria Jordan 2001 0402 Milk and cream, concentrated 5
Algeria Syria 2001 5201 Cotton, not carded or combed 5
Algeria Syria 2001 1207 Other oil seeds 5
Algeria Syria 2001 1001 Wheat and meslin 2.5
Algeria Turkey 2001 1003 Barley 7.5
Algeria Turkey 2001 1207 Other oil seeds  5
Algeria Turkey 2001 1001 Wheat and meslin 2.5
Egypt Israel 1998 080810 Apples 40
Egypt Israel 1998 1206 Sunflower seeds 1
Egypt Jordan 1998 080810 Apples 40
Egypt Jordan 1998 070200 Tomatoes 20
Egypt Lebanon 2002 080810 Apples 40
Egypt Lebanon 1998 1005 Maize (corn) 1
Egypt Lebanon 2002 1509 Olive oil 12.5
Egypt Syria 2002 080810 Apples 40
Egypt Syria 2002 5201 Cotton, not carded or combed 5
Egypt Syria 2002 100110 Durum wheat 1
Egypt Syria 2002 080510 Oranges 40
Egypt Tunisia 1998 1509 Olive oil 12.5
Egypt Turkey 2002 080810 Apples 40
Egypt Turkey 2002 1005 Maize (corn). 1
Egypt Turkey 1998 1509 Olive oil 12.5
Egypt Turkey 1998 1507 Soya-bean oil  8.67
Egypt Turkey 2002 1206 Sunflower seeds 1
Israel Egypt 2005 1006 Rice 0
Israel Jordan 2005 1509 Olive oil 0
Israel Jordan 2005 070200 Tomatoes 0
Israel Turkey 2005 5201 Cotton, not carded or combed 0
Israel Turkey 2005 1005 Maize (corn) 0
Israel Turkey 2005 1509 Olive oil 8
Jordan Israel 2001 0402 Milk and cream, concentrated  5
Jordan Lebanon 2001 080510 Oranges 32.5
Jordan Lebanon 2001 1507 Soya-bean oil 17.5
Jordan Syria 2001 5201 Cotton, not carded or combed 0
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Table A.3: -continued- 
Commodity 
Reporter Partner 
Tariff 
year HS 1996 Description 
Weighted 
average of 
AVE
Jordan Syria 2001 080510 Oranges 32.5
Jordan Syria 2001 1207 Other oil seeds 10
Jordan Syria 2001 1512 Sunflower-seed, safflower or cotton-
seed oil  
30
Jordan Syria 2001 2401 Unmanufactured tobacco 20
Jordan Turkey 2001 1003 Barley 0
Jordan Turkey 2001 1005 Maize (corn) 5
Jordan Turkey 2001 080510 Oranges 32.5
Jordan Turkey 2001 1207 Other oil seeds 5
Jordan Turkey 2001 1205 Rape or colza seeds 10
Jordan Turkey 2001 1512 Sunflower-seed, safflower or cotton-
seed oil 
13.9
Jordan Turkey 2001 1001 Wheat and meslin 0
Lebanon Egypt 2001 0207 Meat and edible offal, of the poultry 5
Lebanon Egypt 2001 1207 Other oil seeds 5
Lebanon Egypt 2001 1006 Rice 5
Lebanon Egypt 2001 1512 Sunflower-seed, safflower or cotton-
seed oil 
15
Lebanon Egypt 2001 0702 Tomatoes 70
Lebanon Jordan 2001 0207 Meat and edible offal, of the poultry 5
Lebanon Jordan 2001 0702 Tomatoes 70
Lebanon Syria 2001 1008 Other cereals 5
Lebanon Syria 2001 5201 Cotton, not carded or combed 0
Lebanon Syria 2001 1207 Other oil seeds 0.49
Lebanon Syria 2001 1512 Sunflower-seed, safflower or cotton-
seed oil 
15
Lebanon Syria 2001 0702 Tomatoes 70
Lebanon Turkey 2001 080810 Apples 70
Lebanon Turkey 2001 1008 Other cereals 5
Lebanon Turkey 2001 5201 Cotton, not carded or combed 0
Lebanon Turkey 2001 1005 Maize (corn) 0
Lebanon Turkey 2001 0402 Milk and cream, concentrated 5
Lebanon Turkey 2001 1207 Other oil seeds 4.22
Lebanon Turkey 2001 1507 Soya-bean oil 15
Lebanon Turkey 2001 1206 Sunflower seeds 0
Lebanon Turkey 2001 1512 Sunflower-seed, safflower or cotton-
seed oil 
15
Lebanon Turkey 2001 1001 Wheat and meslin 0
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Table A.3: -continued- 
Commodity 
Reporter Partner 
Tariff 
year HS 1996 Description 
Weighted 
average of 
AVE
Libya Tunisia 2002 080810 Apples 30
Libya Tunisia 2002 1003 Barley 0
Libya Tunisia 2002 1007 Grain sorghum 0
Libya Tunisia 2002 1005 Maize (corn) 0
Libya Tunisia 2002 0207 Meat and edible offal, of the poultry 50
Libya Tunisia 2002 1507 Soya-bean oil 15
Libya Tunisia 2002 1206 Sunflower seeds 12.5
Libya Turkey 2002 1003 Barley 0
Morocco Egypt 2001 5201 Cotton, not carded or combed 2.5
Morocco Egypt 2001 0207 Meat and edible offal, of the poultry 131.5
Morocco Egypt 2001 1207 Other oil seeds 28.5
Morocco Egypt 2001 1006 Rice 98.11
Morocco Lebanon 2001 1005 Maize (corn) 17.5
Morocco Lebanon 2001 1207 Other oil seeds 22.12
Morocco Lebanon 2001 1206 Sunflower seeds 24.8
Morocco Libya 2001 1007 Grain sorghum 13.75
Morocco Syria 2001 5201 Cotton, not carded or combed 2.5
Morocco Tunisia 2001 0207 Meat and edible offal, of the poultry 117.2
Morocco Tunisia 2001 1509 Olive oil  54.5
Morocco Turkey 2001 1003 Barley 24.88
Morocco Turkey 2001 5201 Cotton, not carded or combed 2.5
Morocco Turkey 2001 1509 Olive oil 54.5
Morocco Turkey 2001 1207 Other oil seeds 28.5
Morocco Turkey 2001 2401 Unmanufactured tobacco 17.5
Morocco Turkey 2001 1001 Wheat and meslin 29.09
Syria Egypt 2002 1006 Rice 7
Syria Egypt 2002 1507 Soya-bean oil 4
Syria Egypt 2002 0702 Tomatoes 15
Syria Jordan 2002 0702 Tomatoes 15
Syria Lebanon 2002 080510 Oranges 15
Syria Lebanon 2002 1507 Soya-bean oil  4.79
Syria Turkey 2002 1003 Barley 1
Tunisia Egypt 2004 1007 Grain sorghum 34.33
Tunisia Egypt 2003 1204 Linseed 43
Tunisia Egypt 2002 1005 Maize (corn) 0
Tunisia Egypt 2004 1006 Rice 27
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Table A.3: -continued- 
Commodity 
Reporter Partner 
Tariff 
year HS 1996 Description 
Weighted 
average of 
AVE
Tunisia Egypt 2003 1206 Sunflower seeds 75
Tunisia Jordan 2002 1509 Olive oil 156
Tunisia Lebanon 2004 100890 Other cereals 100
Tunisia Libya 2002 1007 Grain sorghum 34.33
Tunisia Libya 2004 080510 Oranges 200
Tunisia Libya 1998 1206 Sunflower seeds 43
Tunisia Libya 2002 0702 Tomatoes 170
Tunisia Morocco 2004 0207 Meat and edible offal, of the poultry 73
Tunisia Morocco 1998 0203 Meat of swine 43
Tunisia Morocco 1998 1206 Sunflower seeds 43
Tunisia Syria 2004 5201 Cotton, not carded or combed. 0
Tunisia Syria 2003 100110 Durum wheat 79
Tunisia Turkey 2002 1003 Barley 84
Tunisia Turkey 2004 5201 Cotton, not carded or combed 0
Tunisia Turkey 1998 100110 Durum wheat 17
Tunisia Turkey 2004 1005 Maize (corn) 0
Tunisia Turkey 2003 2401 Unmanufactured tobacco 25
Turkey Egypt 2003 5201 Cotton, not carded or combed 0
Turkey Egypt 2003 1006 Rice 44.83
Turkey Egypt 2003 1206 Sunflower seeds 8
Turkey Israel 2003 5201 Cotton, not carded or combed 0
Turkey Israel 1999 100110 Durum wheat 25
Turkey Israel 2003 1005 Maize (corn) 0
Turkey Israel 2003 1507 Soya-bean oil 25
Turkey Israel 1999 1206 Sunflower seeds 19
Turkey Jordan 2003 080810 Apples 60.9
Turkey Jordan 2003 0207 Meat and edible offal, of the poultry 62.23
Turkey Jordan 2003 100820 Millet 20
Turkey Jordan 2003 080510 Oranges 54.6
Turkey Jordan 1999 1006 Rice 35
Turkey Lebanon 1999 1006 Rice 35
Turkey Syria 2003 5201 Cotton, not carded or combed 0
Turkey Syria 2003 100110 Durum wheat 15
Turkey Syria 1999 1006 Rice 35
Turkey Tunisia 2003 2401 Unmanufactured tobacco 25
Source: TRAINS 
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Table A.4: Export subsidies for agricultural commodities reported by the 
MPCs to the WTO 
WTO 
member Year Commodity 
Notified 
expenditures 
in US$ 
Quantity notified 
of subsidised ex-
ports in tonnes 
Percent of al-
lowed quantity 
used in % 
Israel 1997 Citrus fruits 562000 19900 5
Israel 1997 Flowers fresh 4348000 4151 55
Israel 1997 Fruits other than citrus 989000 50 0
Israel 1997 Vegetables, fresh 4600 17600 20
Israel 1998 Flowers fresh 1409000 2441 33
Israel 2000 Citrus fruits 561000 50000 13
Israel 2000 Flowers fresh 3181000 3540002 49
Israel 2000 Fruits other than citrus 599000 35000 70
Israel 2000 Goose liver 83000 60 21
Israel 2000 Vegetables, fresh 459000 40000 48
Israel 2001 Citrus fruits 380000 60000 16
Israel 2001 Cotton 886000 600 1
Israel 2001 Flowers fresh 2320000 5260000003 75
Israel 2001 Fruits other than citrus 1488000 36000 73
Israel 2001 Goose liver 25000 100 44
Israel 2001 Vegetables, fresh 836000 78200 96
Morocco 1997 Flowers 277598.92 1571 n.a
Morocco 1997 Fruit 14020.147 86 n.a
Morocco 1997 Vegetables 451033.337 1286 n.a
Morocco 1998 Flowers 260965.142 1108 n.a
Morocco 1998 Fruit 45849.471 112 n.a
Morocco 1998 Vegetables 223594.682 729 n.a
Morocco 1999 Flowers 84805.299 496 n.a
Morocco 1999 Fruit 22280.209 50 n.a
Morocco 1999 Vegetables 290746.688 1165 n.a
Morocco 2000 Flowers 91189.386 512 n.a
Morocco 2000 Fruit 68111.744 196 n.a
Morocco 2000 Vegetables 42044.287 137 n.a
Tunisia 1997 Citrus fruit 210151.38 3169 n.a
Tunisia 1997 Dates 349065.004 4505 n.a
Tunisia 1997 Sardines 3807658.059 30000004 n.a
Tunisia 1997 Tomato double 
concentrate 
4338379.341 13478 n.a
Tunisia 1997 Wine 54318.789 6140005 n.a
Tunisia 1998 Citrus fruit 207929.52 3169 n.a
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Table A.4: -continued- 
WTO 
member Year Commodity 
Notified 
expenditures 
in US$ 
Quantity notified 
of subsidized ex-
ports in tonnes 
Percent of al-
lowed quantity 
used in % 
Tunisia 1998 Dates 345374.45 4505 n.a
Tunisia 1998 Sardines 376740.09 30000004 n.a
Tunisia 1998 Tomato double 
concentrate 
5085462.56 18239 n.a
Tunisia 1998 Wine 53744.49 6140005 n.a
Tunisia 1999 Citrus fruit 269893.355 5536 n.a
Tunisia 1999 Dates 906480.722 13279 n.a
Tunisia 1999 Potatoes 242821.985 3938 n.a
Tunisia 1999 Tomato double 
concentrate 
4019688.269 19322 n.a
Tunisia 1999 Wine 41837.572 5062435 n.a
Tunisia 2000 Citrus fruit 220890.165 6667 n.a
Tunisia 2000 Dates 944149.318 14772 n.a
Tunisia 2000 Potatoes 88513.999 4500 n.a
Tunisia 2000 Tomato double 
concentrate 
4712132.089 23266 n.a
Tunisia 2000 Wine 46733.668 651222 n.a
Tunisia 2001 Citrus fruit 442925.496 7117 n.a
Tunisia 2001 Dates 429254.956 19182 n.a
Tunisia 2001 Potatoes 73820.916 1035 n.a
Tunisia 2001 Tomato double 
concentrate 
40328.093 27660 n.a
Tunisia 2001 Wine 2379050 593760 n.a
Turkey 1997 Apples 0 47581 72
Turkey 1997 Citrus fruit 
(Oranges,Mandarins, 
Lemons,Grapefruit) 
9500 180783 68
Turkey 1997 Creams 817780 136 78
Turkey 1997 Cut flowers (fresh) 352100 870640763 100
Turkey 1997 Eggs 3706600 503000003 97
Turkey 1997 Fruit juices 
(concentrated) 
1314336 21550 100
Turkey 1997 Fruits (frozen) 0 13691 100
Turkey 1997 Homogenised fruit 
preparations 
0 6989 82
Turkey 1997 Meat of the Poultry 0 1569 68
Turkey 1997 Olive oil 2235933 1531 7
Turkey 1997 Onion-Dried 0 106473 80
Turkey 1997 Potatoes 5470 16351 52
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Table A.4: -continued- 
WTO 
member Year Commodity 
Notified 
expenditures 
in US$ 
Quantity notified 
of subsidized ex-
ports in tonnes 
Percent of al-
lowed quantity 
used in % 
Turkey 1997 Potatoes (frozen and 
fried) 
1114050 99 1
Turkey 1997 Prepared or preserved 
fish, crustaceans and 
molluscs 
15435200 7427 91
Turkey 1997 Preserves, pastes 0 280640 100
Turkey 1997 Tomatoes 0 114520 100
Turkey 1997 Vegetables 
(dehydrated) 
1586200 864 79
Turkey 1997 Vegetables,frozen 
(exc.potatoes) 
0 14420 100
Turkey 1998 Apples 0 12324 19
Turkey 1998 Citrus fruit 
(Oranges,Mandarins, 
Lemons,Grapefruit) 
11550 108861 42
Turkey 1998 Creams 747252 165 97
Turkey 1998 Cut flowers (fresh) 215124 830500003 100
Turkey 1998 Eggs 3411900 307325003 60
Turkey 1998 Fruit juices 
(concentrated) 
730004 20070 100
Turkey 1998 Fruits (frozen) 0 7766 60
Turkey 1998 Homogenised fruit 
preparations 
0 8063 100
Turkey 1998 Meat of the Poultry 0 1784 78
Turkey 1998 Natural honey 1002144 0 0
Turkey 1998 Olive oil 0 10439 47
Turkey 1998 Potatoes (frozen and 
fried) 
604650 927 12
Turkey 1998 Prepared or preserved 
fish, crustaceans and 
molluscs 
15190500 4031 50
Turkey 1998 Preserves, pastes 0 266500 100
Turkey 1998 Vegetables 
(dehydrated) 
1478740 895 83
Turkey 1998 Vegetables,frozen 
(exc.potatoes) 
0 13820 100
Turkey 1999 Apples 0 3663 6
Turkey 1999 Chocolate and other 
food preparations 
containing chocolate 
0 21350 100
Turkey 1999 Cut flowers (fresh) 141350 790640003 100
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Table A.4: -continued- 
WTO 
member Year Commodity 
Notified 
expenditures 
in US$ 
Quantity notified 
of subsidized ex-
ports in tonnes 
Percent of al-
lowed quantity 
used in % 
Turkey 1999 Eggs 3099600 504820003 100
Turkey 1999 Fruit juices 
(concentrated) 
1035184 18450 99
Turkey 1999 Fruits (frozen) 0 11252 93
Turkey 1999 Homogenised fruit 
preparations 
0 7579 100
Turkey 1999 Macaroni vermicelli 0 9595 31
Turkey 1999 Meat of the Poultry 0 1680 75
Turkey 1999 Olive oil 790636 5102 23
Turkey 1999 Onion-Dried 0 46508 36
Turkey 1999 Potatoes 33495 13821 46
Turkey 1999 Potatoes (frozen and 
fried) 
1666980 609 8
Turkey 1999 Prepared or preserved 
fish, crustaceans and 
molluscs 
13882440 7938 100
Turkey 1999 Preserves, pastes 0 252408 100
Turkey 1999 Vegetables 
(dehydrated) 
1266594 1060 100
Turkey 1999 Vegetables,frozen 
(exc.potatoes) 
0 11949 90
Turkey 2000 Apples n.a 2031 3
Turkey 2000 Chocolate and other 
food preparations 
containing chocolate 
n.a 20420 100
Turkey 2000 Cut flowers (fresh) 160160 584995263 77932
Turkey 2000 Eggs 2665611 228800503 46
Turkey 2000 Fruit juices 
(concentrated) 
654410 15867 93
Turkey 2000 Fruits (frozen) n.a 7113 62
Turkey 2000 Homogenised fruit 
preparations 
n.a 7050 99
Turkey 2000 Macaroni vermicelli n.a 10206 37
Turkey 2000 Meat of the Poultry n.a 1735 78
Turkey 2000 Olive oil 566695 10000 47
Turkey 2000 Onion-Dried n.a 33335 26
Turkey 2000 Potatoes n.a 29850 100
Turkey 2000 Prepared or preserved 
fish, crustaceans and 
molluscs 
13103750 7810 100
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Table A.4: -continued- 
WTO 
member Year Commodity 
Notified 
expenditures 
in US$ 
Quantity notified 
of subsidized ex-
ports in tonnes 
Percent of al-
lowed quantity 
used in % 
Turkey 2000 Preserves, pastes n.a 238250 100
Turkey 2000 Vegetables 
(dehydrated) 
1261400 1045 100
Turkey 2000 Vegetables,frozen 
(exc.potatoes) 
n.a 11900 93
Notes: 1: in millions of units; 2: in thousands of units; 3: in units; 4: in tins; 5: in bottles; 
n.a: not available 
Source: WTO notifications 
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B. To Chapter five  
AGRISIM Simulation Results 
Table B.1: Base Run projections of product balances and prices 
  
Supply 
(in 1000 t) 
Food 
demand 
(in 1000 t) 
Farm gate 
price (in 
US$/t) 
Border 
price 
(in US$/t) 
Producer 
incentive price 
(in US$/t) 
WHEA 4609 3643 112 110 129
COAR 10651 2024 106 99 122
RICE 816 635 180 180 221
OILS 349 633 841 841 928
SUGA 949 1303 266 152 277
MILK 7082 6910 286 179 324
BEEF 594 616 1859 768 2210
PORK 3049 2656 1395 1137 1427
POUL 1073 1078 957 643 988
COTT 102 94 1271 1271 2228
TOBA 42 89 4814 4814 6046
OLIO 1599 653 1762 1762 2092
APPL 962 759 583 547 583
ORAN 2822 1479 550 479 550
ESP 
TOMA 3731 1826 634 634 634
WHEA 2499 1621 112 110 124
COAR 2310 442 106 99 116
RICE 138 103 180 180 220
OILS 9 103 973 973 1028
SUGA 315 328 266 152 276
MILK 1920 2143 286 179 334
BEEF 52 254 1859 768 2048
PORK 143 390 1395 1137 1427
POUL 145 213 957 643 988
COTT 456 167 810 810 1358
TOBA 136 72 2700 2700 3942
OLIO 540 334 1162 1162 1673
APPL 243 190 140 132 140
ORAN 1022 479 331 289 331
GRE 
TOMA 1821 1294 637 637 637
WHEA 6155 8701 112 110 138
COAR 10985 1455 106 99 122ITA 
RICE 1183 596 180 180 228
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Table B.1: - continued -  
  
Supply 
(in 1000 t) 
Food 
demand 
(in 1000 t) 
Farm gate 
price (in 
US$/t) 
Border 
price 
(in US$/t) 
Producer 
incentive price 
(in US$/t) 
OILS 322 712 852 852 959
SUGA 1283 1605 266 152 284
MILK 12317 12965 286 179 317
BEEF 1025 1378 1859 768 2119
PORK 1544 2426 1395 1137 1427
POUL 1140 1065 957 643 988
COTT 0 275 1460 1460 2185
TOBA 130 114 1723 1723 2904
OLIO 588 837 1627 1626 2395
APPL 2340 1363 507 476 507
ORAN 1857 1722 478 416 478
ITA 
TOMA 6530 3657 1036 1036 1036
WHEA 71738 28175 112 110 127
COAR 65849 12702 106 99 125
RICE 232 2312 180 180 228
OILS 4280 5644 699 699 778
SUGA 11968 9952 266 152 282
MILK 104516 89726 286 179 309
BEEF 5213 5132 1859 768 2298
PORK 13584 11215 1395 1137 1427
POUL 6914 5963 957 643 988
COTT 0 426 895 895 1626
TOBA 43 617 2576 2576 3841
OLIO 42 286 1614 1614 2764
APPL 6129 8673 694 652 694
ORAN 222 2803 6911 6017 6911
E12 
TOMA 2982 5374 1461 1461 1461
WHEA 22799 8657 111 108 129
COAR 34328 4402 93 86 113
RICE 8 348 89 89 134
OILS 1423 1294 511 511 597
SUGA 2517 2552 155 88 175
MILK 22256 12476 302 189 325
BEEF 817 234 2408 1012 2746
PORK 3202 3300 1207 983 1249
POUL 1719 1412 1085 730 1123
COTT 0 184 1295 1295 1295
E10 
TOBA 36 106 3426 3426 3426
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Table B.1: - continued -  
  
Supply 
(in 1000 t) 
Food 
demand 
(in 1000 t) 
Farm gate 
price (in 
US$/t) 
Border 
price 
(in US$/t) 
Producer 
incentive price 
(in US$/t) 
OLIO 4 22 2504 2504 2504
APPL 3643 1752 149 140 149
ORAN 37 317 421 367 421
E10 
TOMA 604 925 585 585 585
WHEA 11836 4692 138 104 138
COAR 13084 1715 130 108 130
RICE 8 145 5129 4771 5129
OILS 528 422 615 621 615
SUGA 74 739 34 15 34
MILK 6456 5857 205 166 205
BEEF 217 220 1126 1257 1126
PORK 708 792 1082 1245 1082
POUL 392 479 1294 788 1294
COTT 3 52 1290 1281 1290
TOBA 51 70 3281 2776 3281
OLIO 0 5 2198 1966 2198
APPL 550 553 703 586 703
ORAN 0 70 715 634 715
BUR 
TOMA 1045 1073 1215 972 1215
WHEA 3332 5459 208 162 208
COAR 1281 2239 123 123 123
RICE 37 37 679 321 679
OILS 9 418 1959 1959 1959
SUGA 488 954 352 352 352
MILK 1165 817 1305 607 1305
BEEF 150 150 1987 1987 1987
PORK 1 1 802 802 802
POUL 253 258 1362 651 1362
COTT 0 38 1080 1053 1080
TOBA 6 16 2467 2099 2467
OLIO 68 60 2959 1915 2959
APPL 228 209 552 358 552
ORAN 708 408 332 332 332
MOR 
TOMA 881 604 401 401 401
WHEA 19099 13869 130 139 132
COAR 10333 2557 108 91 111
RICE 360 694 92 92 92
TUR 
OILS 256 601 1027 818 1048
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Table B.1: - continued -  
  
Supply 
(in 1000 t) 
Food 
demand 
(in 1000 t) 
Farm gate 
price (in 
US$/t) 
Border 
price 
(in US$/t) 
Producer 
incentive price 
(in US$/t) 
SUGA 2070 1811 293 230 303
MILK 9374 9155 207 179 208
BEEF 335 332 2205 718 2228
PORK 0 0 1310 1310 1310
POUL 627 622 1014 849 1014
COTT 900 1324 611 611 611
TOBA 145 160 1659 1328 1659
OLIO 117 111 1842 1404 1842
APPL 2449 2056 356 356 356
ORAN 1250 1011 325 325 325
TUR 
TOMA 8432 5277 257 257 257
WHEA 14655 23120 166 155 166
COAR 14750 9555 80 80 80
RICE 5229 4998 169 169 169
OILS 69 1129 1813 1813 1813
SUGA 1430 4900 110 109 110
MILK 9941 10907 695 551 695
BEEF 893 1318 2258 2095 2258
PORK 17 27 878 863 878
POUL 1709 1708 1596 1331 1596
COTT 689 527 957 957 957
TOBA 57 286 2521 2433 2521
OLIO 430 420 2573 1798 2573
APPL 1237 1149 500 469 500
ORAN 3041 2351 326 305 326
MPC 
TOMA 9894 8878 486 355 486
Source: Own simulations with AGRISIM 
Table B.2: Custom duties and agricultural subsidies in Base Year (in US$ 
million) 
  Custom levies Direct subsidies Input subsidies General subsidies
WHEA -8 75 5 0
COAR -50 98 7 0
RICE -24 41 8 0
OILS 0 316 20 0
SUGA -12 2 6 0
ESP 
MILK -9 4 8 0
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Table B.2: - continued -  
  Custom levies Direct subsidies Input subsidies General subsidies
BEEF -120 846 156 0
PORK 121 8 28 0
POUL 13 6 28 0
COTT 0 1864 0 0
TOBA 0 2449 0 0
OLIO 0 579 0 0
APPL 0 0 0 0
ORAN 68 0 0 0
ESP 
TOMA 0 0 0 0
WHEA 1 75 5 0
COAR -9 98 7 0
RICE -3 41 8 0
OILS 0 316 20 0
SUGA 2 2 6 0
MILK -32 4 8 0
BEEF -182 846 156 0
PORK -73 8 28 0
POUL -20 6 28 0
COTT 0 1068 0 0
TOBA 0 2470 0 0
OLIO 0 975 0 0
APPL 0 0 0 0
ORAN 17 0 0 0
GRE 
TOMA 0 0 0 0
WHEA -12 75 5 0
COAR -31 98 7 0
RICE -51 41 8 0
OILS 0 316 20 0
SUGA -17 2 6 0
MILK -186 4 8 0
BEEF -553 846 156 0
PORK -213 8 28 0
POUL 24 6 28 0
COTT 0 1327 0 0
TOBA 0 2325 0 0
OLIO 0 1298 0 0
APPL 23 0 0 0
ORAN 4 0 0 0
ITA 
TOMA 0 0 0 0
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Table B.2: - continued -  
  Custom levies Direct subsidies Input subsidies General subsidies
WHEA 10 75 5 0
COAR -105 98 7 0
RICE 138 41 8 0
OILS 0 316 20 0
SUGA 441 2 6 0
MILK 895 4 8 0
BEEF -768 846 156 0
PORK 766 8 28 0
POUL 368 6 28 0
COTT 0 1327 0 0
TOBA 0 2479 0 0
OLIO 0 819 0 0
APPL -129 0 0 0
ORAN -1551 0 0 0
E12 
TOMA 0 0 0 0
WHEA 13 7 5 0
COAR 39 3 4 0
RICE 0 0 0 0
OILS 3 20 29 0
SUGA 16 6 8 0
MILK 1781 5 5 1
BEEF 1493 38 29 10
PORK -69 14 38 2
POUL 121 17 35 1
COTT 0 0 0 0
TOBA 0 0 0 0
OLIO 64 0 0 0
APPL 13 0 0 0
ORAN -20 0 0 0
E10 
TOMA 11 0 0 0
WHEA 13 0 0 0
COAR -1 0 0 0
RICE -52 0 0 0
OILS -1 0 0 0
SUGA -14 0 0 0
MILK -1 0 0 0
BEEF 2 0 0 0
PORK 14 0 0 0
POUL -41 0 0 0
BUR 
COTT 0 0 0 0
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Table B.2: - continued -  
  Custom levies Direct subsidies Input subsidies General subsidies
TOBA -7 0 0 0
OLIO -1 0 0 0
APPL -2 0 0 0
ORAN -6 0 0 0
BUR 
TOMA -32 0 0 0
WHEA -149 0 0 0
COAR 0 0 0 0
RICE -1 0 0 0
OILS 0 0 0 0
SUGA 0 0 0 0
MILK -6 0 0 0
BEEF 0 0 0 0
PORK 0 0 0 0
POUL -2 0 0 0
COTT -1 0 0 0
TOBA -3 0 0 0
OLIO 2 0 0 0
APPL 2 0 0 0
ORAN 0 0 0 0
MOR 
TOMA 0 0 0 0
WHEA -10 0 2 0
COAR -7 0 3 0
RICE 0 0 0 0
OILS -71 0 22 0
SUGA 57 0 9 0
MILK 0 1 0 0
BEEF 1 0 23 0
PORK 0 0 0 0
POUL 1 0 0 0
COTT 0 0 0 0
TOBA 18 0 0 0
OLIO 47 0 0 0
APPL 0 0 0 0
ORAN 0 0 0 0
TUR 
TOMA 0 0 0 0
WHEA -147 0 0 0
COAR 0 0 0 0
RICE 0 0 0 0
OILS 0 0 0 0
MPC 
SUGA -7 0 0 0
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Table B.2: - continued -  
  Custom levies Direct subsidies Input subsidies General subsidies
MILK -194 0 0 0
BEEF -67 0 0 0
PORK 0 0 0 0
POUL 0 0 0 0
COTT 0 0 0 0
TOBA -15 0 0 0
OLIO 81 0 0 0
APPL -1 0 0 0
ORAN 9 0 0 0
MPC 
TOMA 12 0 0 0
Source: Own calculations with AGRISIM 
Table B.3: Changes in commodity balances (deviation from BA in %)  
  Supply Food demand 
  SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
WHEA 1 1 2 2 3 0 0 0 2 3
COAR 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 10
RICE 0 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 -9 -2
OILS 1 1 1 2 3 0 0 1 0 0
SUGA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 20
MILK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4
BEEF 1 1 1 -6 -19 0 0 0 10 40
PORK 0 0 -1 -5 -9 0 0 0 4 7
POUL 0 0 -1 -11 -21 0 0 0 14 29
COTT -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 0 0 0 0 -1
TOBA -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 -2
OLIO -1 -1 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -3 -2 -4
APPL 0 0 0 -1 -2 0 0 0 0 1
ORAN 0 0 0 -3 -6 0 0 0 1 3
ESP 
TOMA 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 0 0 -1
WHEA -2 -2 -2 1 3 0 0 0 1 2
COAR -2 -2 -2 -2 -3 0 0 0 2 5
RICE 1 1 1 6 2 0 0 0 -9 -3
OILS 0 0 -1 2 4 0 0 1 1 1
SUGA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 20
MILK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5
BEEF 2 2 2 -5 -20 0 0 0 11 43
PORK -1 -1 -2 -5 -9 0 0 0 1 -2
GRE 
POUL -1 0 -1 -12 -22 0 0 0 13 28
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Table B.3: - continued -   
  Supply Food demand 
  SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
COTT -4 -4 -4 -4 -3 0 0 0 -1 -2
TOBA -4 -4 -4 -4 -3 0 0 0 -2 -4
OLIO -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -1 -1 -5 -3 -5
APPL 0 0 0 4 8 0 0 0 -1 -3
ORAN 0 0 -1 -2 -4 0 0 0 1 1
GRE 
TOMA 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 0 0 -1
WHEA 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 4
COAR 1 1 1 -1 -3 0 0 0 5 11
RICE 0 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 -10 -3
OILS 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
SUGA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 20
MILK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5
BEEF 0 0 0 -6 -21 0 0 0 11 43
PORK 0 0 0 -4 -6 0 0 0 2 0
POUL 0 0 0 -11 -22 0 0 0 13 27
COTT -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 0 0 0 0 -1
TOBA -7 -7 -7 -6 -5 0 0 -1 -3 -5
OLIO -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -4 -2 -4
APPL 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0
ORAN 0 0 -1 -3 -6 0 0 0 1 2
ITA 
TOMA 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0
WHEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
COAR 0 0 0 -1 -2 0 0 0 2 4
RICE 0 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 -9 -2
OILS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUGA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 20
MILK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4
BEEF 0 0 0 -6 -19 0 0 0 11 44
PORK 0 0 0 -4 -6 0 0 0 2 1
POUL 0 0 0 -11 -21 0 0 0 14 28
COTT -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 0 0 0 -1 -1
TOBA -5 -5 -4 -4 -3 0 0 0 -2 -4
OLIO -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -4 -3 -4
APPL 0 0 0 -1 -2 0 0 0 0 1
ORAN 0 0 0 -5 -10 0 0 0 1 3
E12 
TOMA 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
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Table B.3: - continued -   
  Supply Food demand 
  SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
WHEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3
COAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 8
RICE 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -1 -2
OILS 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 -1
SUGA 0 0 0 -2 -5 0 0 0 5 13
MILK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 18 44
BEEF 0 0 0 -5 -11 0 1 3 35 115
PORK 0 0 0 -1 -2 0 0 0 7 13
POUL 0 0 0 -4 -9 0 0 0 20 41
COTT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOBA 0 0 0 -1 -2 0 0 0 -1 -2
OLIO 0 0 1 -1 -2 0 0 -1 -1 -1
APPL 0 0 0 3 7 0 0 0 -1 -3
ORAN 0 0 -1 -3 -5 0 0 0 1 3
E10 
TOMA 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 -1 0 -1
WHEA 0 -4 -4 -4 -4 0 -1 -1 1 3
COAR 0 3 3 3 3 0 -5 -5 -3 -1
RICE 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 1 1 1 1
OILS 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 -1
SUGA 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 19 -4 -14
MILK 0 0 0 0 0 0 -24 -23 -11 7
BEEF 0 25 25 19 10 0 -72 -72 -62 -39
PORK 0 8 8 7 6 0 -28 -29 -23 -19
POUL 0 -4 -4 -9 -13 0 23 23 48 76
COTT 0 33 32 28 21 0 0 0 0 0
TOBA 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 5 5 4 3
OLIO 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 3 2 2 2
APPL 0 -9 -9 -10 -11 0 5 5 6 6
ORAN 0 1 1 -3 -6 0 -1 -1 1 3
BUR 
TOMA 0 -32 -31 -31 -31 0 10 9 10 9
WHEA 0 0 -6 -2 -4 0 0 4 2 5
COAR 0 0 -11 -2 -7 0 0 -2 0 0
RICE 0 0 -6 -4 -10 0 0 3 2 5
OILS 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUGA 0 0 6 0 1 0 0 -5 0 -1
MILK 0 0 -6 -6 -14 0 0 0 0 0
BEEF 0 0 23 2 5 0 0 -24 -1 -4
PORK 0 0 6 1 3 0 0 -4 -1 -2
MOR 
POUL 0 0 -23 -18 -38 0 0 0 0 0
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Table B.3: - continued -   
  Supply Food demand 
  SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
COTT 0 0 7 5 11 0 0 1 0 0
TOBA 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 0 2 0 1
OLIO 0 0 -11 -5 -10 0 0 6 2 6
APPL 0 0 -26 -12 -26 0 0 18 8 19
ORAN 0 0 11 3 7 0 0 -6 -2 -4
MOR 
TOMA 0 0 4 3 5 0 0 -1 -1 -1
WHEA 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 -2 0 -1
COAR 0 0 -12 -3 -6 0 0 3 3 7
RICE 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 -2 0 -1
OILS 0 0 -3 -1 -3 0 0 2 1 2
SUGA 0 0 3 -1 -1 0 0 -3 1 1
MILK 0 0 25 0 2 0 0 -5 0 0
BEEF 0 0 -3 -5 -14 0 0 6 8 24
PORK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
POUL 0 0 12 -2 -3 0 0 5 -3 -5
COTT 0 0 -1 1 2 0 0 0 0 -1
TOBA 0 0 -2 0 -1 0 0 2 0 1
OLIO 1 1 -5 -2 -5 0 0 3 1 3
APPL 0 0 5 2 5 0 0 -3 -1 -3
ORAN 0 0 11 3 7 0 0 -5 -2 -3
TUR 
TOMA 0 0 7 4 8 0 0 -2 -1 -2
WHEA 0 0 -2 -1 -3 0 0 4 1 2
COAR 0 0 -2 1 3 0 0 -3 0 0
RICE 0 0 6 0 1 0 0 -2 0 0
OILS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1
SUGA 0 0 5 1 2 0 0 -5 -1 -2
MILK 0 0 12 -4 -9 0 0 -7 3 6
BEEF 0 0 20 0 1 0 0 -22 -1 -3
PORK 0 0 5 1 2 0 0 -4 -1 -1
POUL 0 0 10 -3 -6 0 0 2 0 0
COTT 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 -1
TOBA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OLIO 1 1 -10 -4 -10 0 0 5 2 5
APPL 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 1
ORAN 0 0 5 1 2 0 0 -3 0 -1
MPC 
TOMA 0 0 -39 -20 -39 0 0 13 5 13
Source: Own simulations with AGRISIM 
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Table B.4: Net trade effects (in 1000 t) 
 BA SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
WHEA -3011 -2952 -2945 -2925 -3032 -3039
COAR -4733 -4610 -4656 -4611 -5307 -5840
RICE 167 168 168 168 271 191
OILS -539 -536 -536 -539 -533 -529
SUGA -104 -104 -103 -106 -213 -369
MILK -71 -71 -74 -85 -207 -370
BEEF -26 -18 -17 -17 -121 -388
PORK 417 410 397 394 165 -56
POUL 1 -3 1 -5 -266 -534
COTT 8 4 4 4 5 5
TOBA -47 -48 -48 -48 -47 -46
OLIO 488 479 479 504 492 506
APPL -5 -5 -4 -5 -15 -24
ORAN 957 957 957 943 859 758
ESP 
TOMA 1255 1255 1263 1359 1322 1383
WHEA 130 92 95 95 124 155
COAR -1007 -1047 -1053 -1050 -1125 -1198
RICE 14 15 15 15 33 19
OILS -99 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100
SUGA 16 16 16 16 -11 -51
MILK -297 -297 -298 -302 -346 -404
BEEF -167 -166 -165 -165 -197 -287
PORK -297 -298 -300 -300 -309 -303
POUL -68 -69 -68 -69 -114 -159
COTT 289 272 272 272 274 276
TOBA 62 57 57 57 59 61
OLIO 209 201 201 217 209 218
APPL 44 44 45 44 55 68
ORAN 405 405 405 397 386 365
GRE 
TOMA 344 344 347 395 375 403
WHEA -4641 -4531 -4525 -4498 -4746 -4857
COAR -2217 -2135 -2186 -2152 -2989 -3721
RICE 521 524 524 523 650 553
OILS -497 -495 -495 -497 -494 -492
SUGA -153 -153 -153 -156 -287 -480
MILK -1727 -1727 -1734 -1756 -2014 -2357
BEEF -353 -349 -348 -348 -566 -1150
PORK -882 -885 -894 -895 -985 -991
POUL 75 73 76 71 -198 -461
ITA 
COTT -275 -275 -275 -275 -274 -272
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Table B.4: - continued -  
  BA SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
TOBA 16 7 7 8 11 16
OLIO -231 -229 -229 -207 -218 -205
APPL 740 740 741 740 722 708
ORAN 70 70 70 58 6 -61
ITA 
TOMA 3173 3173 3181 3288 3243 3306
WHEA 9746 9733 9802 9988 9032 9033
COAR -746 -744 -888 -766 -2463 -3662
RICE -2296 -2296 -2296 -2298 -2051 -2228
OILS -2167 -2169 -2169 -2172 -2155 -2139
SUGA 3866 3866 3871 3848 3032 1833
MILK 8665 8665 8622 8491 6974 4948
BEEF -85 -84 -81 -80 -958 -3300
PORK 2366 2367 2316 2303 1679 1394
POUL 974 975 995 963 -595 -2154
COTT -426 -425 -425 -425 -423 -420
TOBA -266 -266 -266 -265 -257 -244
OLIO -268 -265 -265 -257 -261 -256
APPL -3037 -3037 -3034 -3037 -3135 -3223
ORAN -1736 -1736 -1736 -1737 -1789 -1846
E12 
TOMA -2843 -2843 -2840 -2803 -2818 -2797
WHEA 1928 1926 1936 1952 1668 1420
COAR 3741 3741 3727 3671 2914 1821
RICE -358 -358 -358 -358 -355 -351
OILS 153 153 153 154 166 180
SUGA 214 214 219 203 35 -254
MILK 8016 8016 7960 7794 5501 1949
BEEF 538 538 534 526 419 180
PORK -98 -97 -112 -111 -353 -586
POUL 194 194 198 196 -158 -537
COTT -183 -183 -183 -183 -183 -183
TOBA -44 -44 -44 -44 -43 -43
OLIO -18 -18 -18 -17 -18 -17
APPL 1116 1116 1122 1116 1249 1421
ORAN -301 -301 -301 -302 -306 -310
E10 
TOMA -373 -373 -371 -350 -359 -346
WHEA 422 421 21 22 -145 -316
COAR -7 -6 835 827 625 352
RICE -144 -144 -146 -146 -146 -146
OILS 106 106 110 110 113 116
BUR 
SUGA -710 -710 -833 -854 -676 -604
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Table B.4: - continued -  
  BA SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
MILK -171 -171 1373 1307 563 -587
BEEF -10 -10 200 199 166 97
PORK -89 -88 192 192 143 98
POUL -83 -83 -209 -211 -345 -497
COTT -49 -49 -49 -49 -49 -49
TOBA -15 -14 -19 -19 -18 -18
OLIO -5 -5 -5 -5 -5 -5
APPL -13 -13 -91 -91 -101 -107
ORAN -74 -74 -73 -73 -75 -76
BUR 
TOMA -131 -131 -537 -522 -528 -519
WHEA -3208 -3209 -3208 -3600 -3400 -3589
COAR -1770 -1770 -1772 -1797 -1774 -1784
RICE -3 -3 -3 -6 -5 -9
OILS -411 -411 -411 -411 -411 -411
SUGA -466 -466 -466 -386 -461 -453
MILK -10 -10 -10 -63 -61 -131
BEEF 0 0 0 70 5 14
PORK 0 0 0 0 0 0
POUL -4 -4 -4 -63 -51 -100
COTT -38 -38 -38 -38 -38 -38
TOBA -10 -9 -9 -10 -10 -10
OLIO 2 2 2 -8 -3 -8
APPL 8 8 8 -86 -35 -87
ORAN 259 259 259 356 287 318
MOR 
TOMA 207 207 210 250 233 256
WHEA 1291 1287 1292 1646 1418 1551
COAR -169 -171 -164 -2922 -704 -1348
RICE -358 -358 -358 -325 -355 -350
OILS -343 -344 -344 -362 -352 -361
SUGA 901 901 902 1022 878 858
MILK -155 -155 -181 2511 -135 62
BEEF 3 2 1 -29 -42 -122
PORK 0 0 0 0 0 0
POUL 5 5 6 48 7 15
COTT -424 -422 -422 -430 -412 -394
TOBA 55 55 56 49 54 53
OLIO 107 108 108 98 104 99
APPL 222 222 224 393 300 390
ORAN 143 143 143 323 196 254
TUR 
TOMA 642 642 687 948 1007 1315
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Table B.4: - continued -  
  BA SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
WHEA -13941 -13945 -13936 -15495 -14310 -14659
COAR -12513 -12517 -12547 -13777 -11852 -11122
RICE 110 110 111 476 140 184
OILS -1125 -1126 -1126 -1119 -1122 -1118
SUGA -4414 -4414 -4413 -4093 -4353 -4274
MILK -1395 -1395 -1407 475 -2098 -2835
BEEF -413 -413 -415 51 -402 -366
PORK -10 -10 -10 -8 -9 -9
POUL -3 -2 0 134 -59 -100
COTT 182 183 183 186 191 202
TOBA -173 -173 -173 -174 -172 -171
OLIO 104 107 107 41 77 41
APPL -42 -42 -41 -44 -54 -64
ORAN 431 431 431 641 462 499
MPC 
TOMA 99 99 137 -4541 -2167 -4481
Notes: Net trade is calculated as the difference between supply and demand. When 
supply>demand a region is considered to be a net exporter and when 
supply<demand a net importer. 
Source: Own simulations with AGRISIM 
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Table B.5: Changes in prices (deviation from BA in %) 
 Producer’s incentive price Farm gate price Border price 
 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
WHEA 3 3 3 0 -3 0 0 0 -4 -7 0 0 0 -3 -5
COAR 2 2 2 -2 -5 0 0 0 -5 -8 0 0 0 -1 -1
RICE 0 0 0 18 4 0 0 0 22 4 0 0 0 1 4
OILS 2 2 2 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
SUGA 0 0 0 -14 -29 0 0 0 -15 -31 0 0 0 8 21
MILK 3 2 1 -9 -22 0 0 -2 -14 -28 0 0 -2 6 16
BEEF 3 3 3 -10 -33 0 0 0 -15 -42 0 -1 -3 13 41
PORK 0 0 0 -6 -12 0 0 0 -6 -13 0 0 0 3 7
POUL 0 0 0 -15 -27 0 0 0 -15 -28 0 0 0 2 7
COTT -27 -27 -27 -26 -26 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 2
TOBA -20 -20 -20 -19 -17 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 2 4
OLIO -6 -6 -3 -5 -2 2 2 6 4 6 2 2 6 4 6
APPL 0 0 0 -1 -2 0 0 0 -1 -2 0 0 0 2 4
ORAN 0 0 -1 -4 -8 0 0 -1 -4 -8 0 0 -1 3 6
ESP 
TOMA 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 2 1 2
WHEA 9 9 9 5 3 0 0 0 -4 -7 0 0 0 -3 -5
COAR 4 4 4 0 -4 0 0 0 -5 -8 0 0 0 -1 -1
RICE 2 2 2 20 5 0 0 0 22 4 0 0 0 1 4
OILS 6 6 6 6 7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
SUGA 1 1 1 -13 -29 0 0 0 -15 -31 0 0 0 8 21
MILK 20 19 18 8 -4 0 0 -2 -14 -28 0 0 -2 6 16
GRE 
BEEF 3 3 3 -11 -35 0 0 0 -15 -42 0 -1 -3 13 41
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Table B.5: - continued -   
  Producer incentive price Farm gate price Border price 
  SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
PORK 0 0 0 -6 -12 0 0 0 -6 -13 0 0 0 3 7
POUL 0 0 0 -15 -27 0 0 0 -15 -28 0 0 0 2 7
COTT -24 -24 -24 -23 -22 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 3
TOBA -31 -31 -30 -29 -26 1 1 1 4 8 1 1 1 4 8
OLIO -13 -13 -9 -11 -9 3 3 9 6 10 3 3 9 6 10
APPL 0 0 0 5 10 0 0 0 5 10 0 0 0 8 17
ORAN 0 0 -1 -2 -5 0 0 -1 -2 -5 0 0 -1 4 9
GRE 
TOMA 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 2 1 2
WHEA 3 3 3 0 -3 0 0 0 -4 -7 0 0 0 -3 -5
COAR 1 1 1 -3 -6 0 0 0 -5 -8 0 0 0 -1 -1
RICE 1 1 1 18 4 0 0 0 22 4 0 0 0 1 4
OILS 2 2 2 2 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
SUGA 1 1 0 -13 -28 0 0 0 -15 -31 0 0 0 8 21
MILK 1 1 0 -11 -23 0 0 -2 -14 -28 0 0 -2 6 16
BEEF 1 1 1 -12 -36 0 0 0 -15 -42 0 -1 -3 13 41
PORK 0 0 0 -6 -12 0 0 0 -6 -13 0 0 0 3 7
POUL 0 0 0 -15 -27 0 0 0 -15 -28 0 0 0 2 7
COTT -19 -19 -19 -19 -18 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 2
TOBA -39 -39 -39 -37 -33 1 1 1 6 12 1 1 1 6 12
OLIO -14 -14 -11 -13 -11 2 2 6 4 7 2 2 6 4 7
APPL 0 0 0 -1 -2 0 0 0 -1 -2 0 0 0 2 5
ORAN 0 0 -1 -4 -7 0 0 -1 -4 -7 0 0 -1 3 7
ITA 
TOMA 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
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Table B.5: - continued -   
  Producer incentive price Farm gate price Border price 
  SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
WHEA 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 -4 -7 0 0 0 -3 -5
COAR 0 0 0 -3 -6 0 0 0 -5 -8 0 0 0 -1 -1
RICE 0 0 0 -4 -7 0 0 0 22 4 0 0 0 1 4
OILS 0 0 0 17 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
SUGA 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 -15 -31 0 0 0 8 21
MILK 0 0 0 -14 -29 0 0 -2 -14 -28 0 0 -2 6 16
BEEF 0 0 -1 -13 -25 0 0 0 -15 -42 0 -1 -3 13 41
PORK 0 0 0 -12 -34 0 0 0 -6 -13 0 0 0 3 7
POUL 0 0 0 -6 -12 0 0 0 -15 -28 0 0 0 2 7
COTT 0 0 0 -15 -27 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 3
TOBA -26 -26 -26 -26 -25 1 1 1 4 8 1 1 1 4 8
OLIO -32 -32 -32 -30 -27 2 2 6 4 7 2 2 6 4 7
APPL -8 -8 -5 -6 -5 0 0 0 -1 -3 0 0 0 2 4
ORAN 0 0 0 -1 -3 0 0 0 -6 -13 0 0 0 0 0
E12 
TOMA 0 0 0 -6 -13 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
WHEA 0 0 0 -3 -6 0 0 0 -4 -7 0 0 0 -3 -5
COAR 0 0 0 -4 -7 0 0 0 -5 -9 0 0 0 -1 -2
RICE 0 0 0 2 6 0 0 0 3 8 0 0 0 3 8
OILS 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 2
SUGA 0 0 -1 -9 -20 0 0 -1 -10 -22 0 0 -1 14 36
MILK 0 0 -1 -13 -26 0 0 -1 -14 -28 0 0 -1 6 15
BEEF 0 -1 -2 -19 -39 0 -1 -2 -22 -45 0 -1 -2 10 31
E10 
PORK 0 0 0 -6 -11 0 0 0 -6 -12 0 0 0 4 8
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Table B.5: - continued -   
  Producer incentive price Farm gate price Border price 
  SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
POUL 0 0 0 -15 -28 0 0 0 -15 -29 0 0 0 1 6
COTT 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 2
TOBA 0 0 1 3 6 0 0 1 3 6 0 0 1 3 6
OLIO 1 1 4 3 4 1 1 4 3 4 1 1 4 3 4
APPL 0 0 0 4 9 0 0 0 4 9 0 0 0 8 16
ORAN 0 0 -1 -4 -6 0 0 -1 -4 -6 0 0 -1 4 7
E10 
TOMA 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 2 1 2
WHEA 0 -17 -17 -20 -22 0 -23 -23 -26 -29 0 0 0 -3 -5
COAR 0 0 0 -4 -7 0 -10 -10 -14 -18 0 0 0 -1 -1
RICE 0 -6 -6 -6 -6 0 -7 -7 -7 -7 0 0 0 0 0
OILS 0 12 12 13 14 0 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 1
SUGA 0 42 38 76 101 0 -24 -27 11 35 0 1 -4 86 213
MILK 0 50 48 33 16 0 29 27 12 -5 0 0 -2 7 17
BEEF 0 183 180 124 58 0 164 161 105 39 0 -1 -2 8 25
PORK 0 41 41 32 23 0 41 41 31 23 0 0 0 3 7
POUL 0 -9 -9 -23 -35 0 -9 -9 -23 -36 0 0 0 1 6
COTT 0 -1 -1 0 1 0 -1 -1 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
TOBA 0 -15 -15 -12 -9 0 -15 -15 -12 -9 0 1 1 3 7
OLIO 2 -9 -6 -8 -6 2 -9 -6 -8 -6 2 2 5 3 6
APPL 0 -11 -11 -13 -13 0 -11 -11 -13 -13 0 0 0 2 4
ORAN 0 2 1 -3 -8 0 2 1 -3 -8 0 0 0 2 4
BUR 
TOMA 0 -20 -19 -19 -19 0 -20 -19 -19 -19 0 0 1 1 1
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Table B.5: - continued -   
  Producer incentive price Farm gate price Border price 
  SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
WHEA 0 0 -21 -13 -25 0 0 -21 -13 -25 0 0 0 -2 -3
COAR 0 0 8 -1 -1 0 0 8 -1 -1 0 0 0 -1 -1
RICE 0 0 -34 -26 -52 0 0 -34 -26 -52 0 0 0 1 2
OILS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUGA 0 0 75 4 9 0 0 75 4 9 0 0 0 4 9
MILK 0 0 -26 -25 -51 0 0 -26 -25 -51 0 0 0 2 5
BEEF 0 0 161 5 16 0 0 161 5 16 0 0 -1 5 16
PORK 0 0 22 5 10 0 0 22 5 10 0 0 0 5 10
POUL 0 0 -29 -25 -49 0 0 -29 -25 -49 0 0 0 2 7
COTT 0 0 -2 0 0 0 0 -2 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
TOBA 1 1 -14 -3 -7 1 1 -14 -3 -7 1 1 1 5 10
OLIO 2 2 -32 -15 -32 2 2 -32 -15 -32 2 2 5 3 6
APPL 0 0 -31 -15 -31 0 0 -31 -15 -31 0 0 0 3 6
ORAN 0 0 14 4 8 0 0 14 4 8 0 0 -1 4 8
MOR 
TOMA 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 3 2 3
WHEA 0 0 10 1 3 0 0 10 1 3 0 0 0 -2 -4
COAR 0 0 -9 -9 -17 0 0 -9 -9 -17 0 0 0 -1 -1
RICE 0 0 40 3 8 0 0 40 3 8 0 0 0 3 8
OILS 0 0 -20 -9 -19 0 0 -20 -10 -19 0 0 0 1 1
SUGA 0 0 36 -6 -10 0 0 37 -6 -11 0 0 0 6 14
MILK 0 0 36 -1 0 0 0 36 -1 0 0 0 -1 6 16
BEEF 0 -1 -17 -24 -53 0 -1 -17 -25 -53 0 -1 -3 14 44
TUR 
PORK 0 0 22 3 6 0 0 22 3 6 0 0 0 3 6
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Table B.5: - continued -   
  Producer incentive price Farm gate price Border price 
  SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
POUL 0 0 24 -7 -12 0 0 25 -7 -12 0 0 0 1 5
COTT 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 2 4
TOBA 1 1 -19 -4 -8 1 1 -19 -4 -8 1 1 2 7 16
OLIO 2 2 -18 -8 -18 2 2 -18 -8 -18 2 2 7 5 8
APPL 0 0 7 3 6 0 0 7 3 6 0 0 0 3 6
ORAN 0 0 14 4 8 0 0 14 4 8 0 0 -1 4 8
TUR 
TOMA 0 0 4 2 5 0 0 4 2 5 0 0 4 2 5
WHEA 0 0 -4 -5 -9 0 0 -4 -5 -9 0 0 0 -2 -3
COAR 0 0 8 -1 -2 0 0 8 -1 -2 0 0 0 -1 -2
RICE 0 0 40 2 4 0 0 40 2 4 0 0 0 2 4
OILS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUGA 0 0 72 11 27 0 0 72 11 27 0 0 0 12 29
MILK 0 0 26 -9 -17 0 0 26 -9 -17 0 0 0 2 5
BEEF 0 0 142 1 7 0 0 142 1 7 0 0 -1 5 15
PORK 0 0 20 3 8 0 0 20 3 8 0 0 0 4 9
POUL 0 0 24 -8 -14 0 0 24 -8 -14 0 0 0 1 3
COTT 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 3
TOBA 1 1 -3 2 5 1 1 -3 2 5 1 1 1 4 8
OLIO 2 2 -26 -12 -26 2 2 -26 -12 -26 2 2 6 4 6
APPL 0 0 0 -1 -2 0 0 0 -1 -2 0 0 0 2 5
ORAN 0 0 7 1 2 0 0 7 1 2 0 0 -1 4 9
MPC 
TOMA 0 0 -25 -12 -25 0 0 -25 -12 -25 0 0 3 2 3
Source: Own simulations with AGRISIM 
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Table B.6: Changes of farmer’s revenue (% deviations from BA) 
  BA SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
WHEA 0.0 1.4 1.5 2.0 -2.0 -4.4
COAR 0.0 1.3 1.0 1.3 -3.7 -7.3
RICE 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 29.4 5.5
OILS 0.0 1.3 1.2 1.2 2.6 4.0
SUGA 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.3 -14.8 -31.0
MILK 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -1.5 -13.7 -27.5
BEEF 0.0 1.4 1.4 1.4 -19.8 -53.1
PORK 0.0 -0.2 -0.7 -0.8 -10.9 -20.8
POUL 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.6 -24.3 -42.7
COTT 0.0 -4.1 -4.1 -4.1 -3.5 -2.2
TOBA 0.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 1.3 4.1
OLIO 0.0 0.7 0.7 5.4 3.1 5.9
APPL 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -2.1 -3.9
ORAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -7.0 -13.8
ESP 
TOMA 0.0 0.0 0.3 4.4 2.7 5.1
WHEA 0.0 -1.8 -1.6 -1.4 -2.7 -3.9
COAR 0.0 -1.9 -2.2 -2.0 -6.9 -11.3
RICE 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.4 29.8 5.9
OILS 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 2.3 4.9
SUGA 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.3 -14.8 -31.0
MILK 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -1.5 -13.7 -27.5
BEEF 0.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 -19.8 -53.5
PORK 0.0 -1.2 -1.7 -1.8 -11.4 -20.7
POUL 0.0 -0.6 -0.3 -0.8 -25.1 -43.8
COTT 0.0 -3.5 -3.5 -3.4 -2.4 -0.4
TOBA 0.0 -3.8 -3.6 -3.3 -0.3 4.5
OLIO 0.0 0.1 0.1 7.1 3.6 7.8
APPL 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 8.6 19.0
ORAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.7 -4.1 -8.2
GRE 
TOMA 0.0 0.0 0.3 4.4 2.7 5.1
WHEA 0.0 2.0 2.1 2.6 -2.1 -4.9
COAR 0.0 0.8 0.5 0.8 -5.6 -10.9
RICE 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 29.3 5.6
OILS 0.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 2.0 3.1
SUGA 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.3 -14.8 -31.0
MILK 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -1.5 -13.7 -27.5
BEEF 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.4 -20.7 -53.8
PORK 0.0 -0.2 -0.7 -0.8 -9.9 -18.2
ITA 
POUL 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.4 -24.7 -43.4
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Table B.6: - continued -  
  BA SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
COTT 0.0 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.2 -1.1
TOBA 0.0 -6.4 -6.1 -5.7 -1.1 6.2
OLIO 0.0 0.6 0.6 5.3 3.0 5.8
APPL 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -1.6 -2.9
ORAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.2 -6.3 -12.6
ITA 
TOMA 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.7 1.6 3.1
WHEA 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 -3.9 -6.8
COAR 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -5.5 -9.9
RICE 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 29.0 5.3
OILS 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.8 1.7
SUGA 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.3 -14.8 -31.0
MILK 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -1.5 -13.7 -27.5
BEEF 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -20.4 -52.8
PORK 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.6 -9.6 -18.2
POUL 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.2 -24.2 -42.9
COTT 0.0 -4.0 -4.0 -3.9 -3.0 -1.3
TOBA 0.0 -4.0 -3.9 -3.6 -0.4 4.6
OLIO 0.0 0.5 0.6 5.5 3.0 6.0
APPL 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -2.7 -5.0
ORAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -11.0 -21.4
E12 
TOMA 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.9 1.2 2.2
WHEA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 -3.8 -6.7
COAR 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -4.6 -8.8
RICE 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 3.2 8.9
OILS 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.3 2.8
SUGA 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.7 -11.4 -26.3
MILK 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -1.4 -14.0 -28.0
BEEF 0.0 -0.1 -0.9 -2.7 -25.1 -51.0
PORK 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 -7.2 -13.5
POUL 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -19.1 -34.6
COTT 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.9 2.2
TOBA 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.7 3.8
OLIO 0.0 1.4 1.4 4.7 1.8 2.2
APPL 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 7.3 17.1
ORAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.4 -6.3 -11.3
E10 
TOMA 0.0 0.0 0.3 4.8 2.9 5.6
WHEA 0.0 0.0 -26.3 -26.0 -29.3 -31.7
COAR 0.0 0.0 -8.0 -7.8 -11.8 -15.6
RICE 0.0 0.0 -7.6 -7.6 -7.5 -7.4
BUR 
OILS 0.0 0.0 1.9 2.0 2.9 3.8
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Table B.6: - continued -  
  BA SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
SUGA 0.0 0.0 -23.5 -26.9 11.3 35.6
MILK 0.0 0.0 29.3 27.7 12.5 -4.9
BEEF 0.0 0.0 229.6 224.6 143.5 53.8
PORK 0.0 0.0 51.7 51.7 40.0 29.4
POUL 0.0 0.0 -13.3 -13.5 -30.2 -43.9
COTT 0.0 0.2 31.9 31.6 27.6 22.6
TOBA 0.0 0.5 -16.0 -15.7 -13.7 -10.4
OLIO 0.0 1.7 -10.5 -6.8 -8.6 -6.3
APPL 0.0 0.0 -19.2 -19.3 -21.6 -22.8
ORAN 0.0 0.0 3.3 2.5 -5.7 -13.1
BUR 
TOMA 0.0 0.0 -45.4 -44.0 -44.6 -43.7
WHEA 0.0 0.0 0.0 -25.6 -14.8 -27.8
COAR 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -3.7 -3.1 -7.7
RICE 0.0 0.0 0.0 -37.9 -29.0 -56.6
OILS 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0.3 0.6
SUGA 0.0 0.0 0.0 85.0 4.1 10.1
MILK 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -30.2 -30.0 -58.3
BEEF 0.0 0.0 -0.4 220.1 7.1 22.0
PORK 0.0 0.0 -0.5 29.7 6.0 13.4
POUL 0.0 0.0 0.3 -45.5 -38.6 -68.2
COTT 0.0 0.3 0.2 4.9 4.5 10.4
TOBA 0.0 0.7 0.9 -15.2 -3.6 -7.2
OLIO 0.0 2.0 2.0 -39.0 -18.6 -38.7
APPL 0.0 0.0 0.1 -48.8 -25.7 -48.9
ORAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.4 7.1 15.4
MOR 
TOMA 0.0 0.0 0.5 7.0 4.3 8.2
WHEA 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.3 2.0 4.4
COAR 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -19.9 -11.5 -21.8
RICE 0.0 0.0 0.0 46.9 3.4 9.4
OILS 0.0 0.0 0.0 -22.8 -10.9 -21.7
SUGA 0.0 0.0 0.1 41.3 -6.4 -11.7
MILK 0.0 0.0 -0.6 70.0 -0.6 2.7
BEEF 0.0 -0.1 -1.2 -19.7 -28.5 -59.7
PORK 0.0 0.0 -0.2 22.3 2.8 6.2
POUL 0.0 0.0 0.2 39.0 -9.0 -14.7
COTT 0.0 0.4 0.4 -0.4 2.3 5.7
TOBA 0.0 1.1 1.4 -20.2 -3.9 -8.3
OLIO 0.0 2.7 2.7 -22.2 -9.5 -21.7
APPL 0.0 0.0 0.1 12.0 5.4 11.8
TUR 
ORAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.3 7.3 15.7
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Table B.6: - continued -  
  BA SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
TUR TOMA 0.0 0.0 0.7 11.1 6.7 13.0
WHEA 0.0 0.0 0.0 -6.3 -6.2 -11.9
COAR 0.0 0.0 -0.4 5.8 0.0 0.8
RICE 0.0 0.0 0.0 48.1 1.9 5.2
OILS 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.3 0.6
SUGA 0.0 0.0 0.1 80.0 11.8 29.5
MILK 0.0 0.0 -0.2 41.6 -12.5 -23.7
BEEF 0.0 0.0 -0.4 190.5 1.2 8.1
PORK 0.0 0.0 -0.4 26.0 4.5 10.2
POUL 0.0 0.0 0.1 35.8 -10.4 -18.7
COTT 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.8 2.1 5.0
TOBA 0.0 0.6 0.8 -2.8 2.3 5.1
OLIO 0.0 2.2 2.3 -33.6 -15.7 -33.2
APPL 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -1.6 -2.9
ORAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.3 1.7 3.9
MPC 
TOMA 0.0 0.0 0.5 -54.3 -29.4 -53.7
Source: Own simulations with AGRISIM 
Table B.7: Changes in production shares relative to the world supply (in %) 
  BA SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
WHEA 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
COAR 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6
RICE 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
OILS 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
SUGA 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0
MILK 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
BEEF 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.2
PORK 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.1 4.9 4.7
POUL 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 2.9 2.5
COTT 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5
TOBA 5.0 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8
OLIO 77.6 77.3 77.3 78.7 78.0 78.7
APPL 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.0
ORAN 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.1 8.9 8.6
Mediterra- 
nean EU  
Member 
States 
TOMA 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.5 11.5 11.6
WHEA 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.4
COAR 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.2 7.2
RICE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
E12 
OILS 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9
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Table B.7: - continued -  
  BA SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
SUGA 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.7 9.5
MILK 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.8 17.6
BEEF 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.2 7.0
PORK 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.2 13.7
POUL 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.7 8.6 7.5
COTT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOBA 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
OLIO 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
APPL 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.4 10.3
ORAN 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
E12 
TOMA 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
WHEA 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6
COAR 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
RICE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OILS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SUGA 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
MILK 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
BEEF 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
PORK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
POUL 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2
COTT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOBA 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
OLIO 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.8
APPL 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
ORAN 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.2
MOR 
TOMA 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
WHEA 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
COAR 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1
RICE 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
OILS 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
SUGA 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6
MILK 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.0 1.6 1.6
BEEF 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
PORK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
POUL 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8
COTT 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.3
TOBA 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
OLIO 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.3 3.3
APPL 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.3 4.4
TUR 
ORAN 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.1
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Table B.7: - continued -  
  BA SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
TUR TOMA 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.4 8.3 8.5
WHEA 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.5
COAR 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7
RICE 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
OILS 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
SUGA 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
MILK 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.6 1.5
BEEF 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.5
PORK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
POUL 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.2
COTT 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
TOBA 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
OLIO 12.2 12.4 12.4 11.3 11.9 11.3
APPL 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
ORAN 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.1 4.9 5.0
MPC 
TOMA 9.3 9.3 9.4 5.6 7.5 5.7
Source: Own simulations with AGRISIM 
Table B.8: Change in production shares of the Mediterranean Member States 
relative to the EU-27 supply (in %) 
 BA SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
WHEA 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0
COAR 7.8 7.9 7.8 7.8 7.9 7.9
RICE 34.2 34.2 34.2 34.2 34.2 34.2
OILS 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.2
SUGA 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6
MILK 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6
BEEF 7.5 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.3
PORK 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.5 13.2
POUL 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.3 9.2
COTT 18.2 18.1 18.1 18.1 18.1 18.1
TOBA 9.6 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9
OLIO 57.7 57.9 57.9 57.9 57.9 57.9
APPL 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.8
ORAN 47.3 47.3 47.3 47.4 47.2 47.1
ESP 
TOMA 22.3 22.3 22.8 22.9 22.9 23.0
WHEA 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2
COAR 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6GRE 
RICE 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8
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Table B.8: - continued -  
 BA SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
OILS 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
SUGA 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9
MILK 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
BEEF 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6
PORK 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
POUL 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
COTT 81.3 81.4 81.3 81.3 81.3 81.3
TOBA 31.1 31.0 31.1 31.1 31.1 31.2
OLIO 19.5 19.2 19.2 19.3 19.3 19.3
APPL 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9
ORAN 17.2 17.2 17.2 17.1 17.3 17.5
GRE 
TOMA 10.9 10.9 11.1 11.2 11.2 11.2
WHEA 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
COAR 8.0 8.1 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.8
RICE 49.6 49.6 49.6 49.6 49.6 49.6
OILS 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7
SUGA 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.6
MILK 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0
BEEF 12.9 13.0 12.9 12.9 12.8 12.4
PORK 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9
POUL 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 9.9 9.7
COTT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOBA 29.8 28.8 28.8 28.8 29.0 29.1
OLIO 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2
APPL 16.9 16.9 16.9 16.9 16.8 16.6
ORAN 31.2 31.2 31.2 31.2 31.2 31.2
ITA 
TOMA 39.1 39.1 39.9 39.7 39.8 39.7
Source: Own simulations with AGRISIM 
Table B.9: Change in welfare (deviations from BA in US$ million) 
  SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
producer surplus -35 -41 93 -490 -991
quota owner surplus 25 18 -7 -318 -710
consumer surplus -21 -7 -39 885 2044
budget (taxpayers 
effect)1 51 54 57 267 175
total1 20 24 105 344 518
budget (taxpayers 
effect)2 -12 -12 -5 12 6
ESP 
total2 -44 -42 43 88 349
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Table B.9: - continued -  
  SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
producer surplus -175 -174 -118 -192 -202
quota owner surplus 27 25 18 -52 -139
consumer surplus -11 -9 -36 210 519
budget (taxpayers 
effect)1 182 183 184 95 -117
total1 22 25 48 61 61
budget (taxpayers 
effect)2 -174 -174 -173 -37 155
GRE 
total2 -333 -331 -310 -71 333
producer surplus -145 -143 -44 -519 -969
quota owner surplus 9 -4 -45 -601 -1328
consumer surplus -27 -9 -52 1330 3182
budget (taxpayers 
effect)1 151 153 160 54 -593
total1 -13 -2 19 263 292
budget (taxpayers 
effect)2 -87 -84 -76 405 890
ITA 
total2 -251 -239 -217 615 1775
producer surplus -35 -70 -32 -3213 -6293
quota owner surplus -16 -125 -481 -4957 -10508
consumer surplus -18 107 356 8662 19292
budget (taxpayers 
effect)1 52 65 108 1592 825
total1 -17 -24 -49 2084 3315
budget (taxpayers 
effect)2 259 275 309 668 640
E12 
total2 190 186 153 1161 3130
producer surplus 0 -23 -47 -1143 -2177
quota owner surplus -1 -23 -93 -764 -1538
consumer surplus -2 24 69 1290 2773
budget (taxpayers 
effect)1 0 21 74 1153 1759
total1 -2 0 4 537 818
budget (taxpayers 
effect)2 14 -5 -55 -1048 -1691
E10 
total2 11 -26 -125 -1664 -2632
producer surplus -391 -451 -147 -5557 -10633
quota owner surplus 45 -109 -608 -6692 -14223
consumer surplus -79 107 299 12377 27811
budget (taxpayers 
effect) 435 475 583 3161 2048
EU-25 
total 10 22 127 3290 5004
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Table B.9: - continued -  
  SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
producer surplus 0 2527 2527 2135 1773
quota owner surplus 0 587 567 421 245
consumer surplus -1 -160 -154 240 704
budget (taxpayers 
effect) 0 -3150 -3135 -2840 -2708
BUR 
total -1 -196 -195 -43 14
producer surplus 3 2 125 -455 -857
quota owner surplus 0 0 0 0 0
consumer surplus -3 -2 27 522 1026
budget (taxpayers 
effect) 0 -1 -226 -36 -163
MOR 
total 0 0 -75 31 7
producer surplus 8 0 1332 -227 -386
quota owner surplus 0 0 0 0 0
consumer surplus -8 0 -1002 283 552
budget (taxpayers 
effect) -2 1 -391 61 39
TUR 
total -2 2 -61 117 204
producer surplus 20 17 5012 -1458 -2608
quota owner surplus 0 0 0 0 0
consumer surplus -21 -14 -5490 1594 3010
budget (taxpayers 
effect) -4 -8 -341 54 -338
MPC 
total -6 -4 -819 191 65
Notes: 1 Without considering intra-community financial flows 
2 Considering intra-community financial flows 
Source: Own simulations with AGRISIM 
 
For the quotation used throughout the tables in the Annex the reader should refer to 
Table 5.1. 
